It Takes Two to Tangle: Public-Private Partnerships and their Impact on Public Values by Reynaers, A.
 
 
  
It Takes Two to Tangle  
Public-Private Partnerships and their Impact on Public Values 
2 
 
Reading committee:  
 
Prof. dr. Tony Bovaird  University of Birmingham, UK 
Prof. dr. Nicolette van Gestel Tilburg University, The Netherlands  
Prof. dr. Graeme Hodge  Monash University, Australia 
Prof. dr. Jeroen Maesschalck University of Leuven, Belgium  
Prof. dr. Willem Trommel VU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Anne-Marie Reynaers, 2014 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, 
photocopy, recording, by print, or otherwise, without prior written permission from 
the rightful owner: Anne-Marie Reynaers.  
 
 
Printed by: Drukkerij Grafic Image, Beek en Donk, the Netherlands. 
 
ISBN 978 90 9028091 2 
 
3 
 
VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT 
 
It Takes Two to Tangle 
Public-Private Partnerships and their Impact on Public Values 
 
 
 
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
 
ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan 
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus 
prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen 
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie 
van de Faculteit der Sociale Wetenschappen 
op woensdag 2 april 2014 om 11.45 uur 
in de aula van de universiteit, 
De Boelelaan 1105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
door 
Anne-Marie Reynaers 
geboren te Roosendaal 
4 
 
promotor:  prof.dr. L.W.J.C. Huberts  
copromotor:  dr. G. de Graaf 
  
5 
 
Acknowledgements 
August 20th, 2009. My first working day at the VU University Amsterdam as a 
PhD candidate. The sun shone. I went in to my office and turned on the 
computer. I was all alone. I sat down and after contemplating the absence of 
any decoration, the silence of the empty corridor, and the noisy streets of 
Amsterdam, I wondered: how does one write a thesis and where does one 
start? Killing time, I decided to explore the web for possibly interesting 
literature and turned on the computer. The browser appeared. I typed in some 
key words followed by a hopeful and energetic ‘enter’ with which the journey 
began.  
 My starting place was Reading and on the way I visited Thinking and 
Writing before it was time for a brief pit stop. I continued, visiting Reading, 
Thinking and Writing once more: a journey during which I almost lost sight of 
the track and took side-roads leading to nowhere. Fortunately, I always 
managed to keep the engine running and by the time I discovered what final 
destination would be appropriate, my thesis and I had become good travelling 
companions. On arrival, I first took some time in silence and solitude to 
consider the kilometers covered. After that, I went for a walk to see where 
Route 66 had brought me. I sat down, took out my note book, and wrote: this 
place here is splendid, but not as splendid as the journey just made. I parked 
the car and, who knows, it may serve me well for another grand trip to be 
made in the future.  
 It has been four years and I sit behind my desk again. I stare at the 
decorated walls while contemplating the silence of the empty corridor, and the 
noisy streets of Amsterdam. I am almost ready to go, but a little yellow post-it 
has just reminded me that the acknowledgements still have to be written. I turn 
on the computer, and while thinking about what to write, and to whom, I 
realize that, traveling this far would have been impossible without the help, 
support, inspiration, love, laughter and care of family, friends and colleagues.  
*** 
In the first place, I thank my promoter, Leo Huberts, and my supervisor, Gjalt 
de Graaf, for having given me the opportunity to write this thesis. Thank you 
so much for your time, interest, trust, support, and for inspiring discussions 
and brainstorming sessions. We made a good team.  
6 
 
 I thank the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) for 
providing the research grant and the Netherlands Institute of Government 
(NIG) for the post-graduate courses and travel grants provided. Thanks to all 
the respondents who have participated in this study. Your perceptions and 
reflections have been informative and illuminating. 
 I thank all reviewers, especially those of the Public Administration Review 
and the members of the reading committee for their valuable reviews of my 
work. In addition, I would like to thank those who have inspired and 
stimulated me during national and international conferences. In that respect, I 
especially thank Zeger van der Wal who, in the beautiful city of Chicago, made 
me realize that doubt and insecurity could and should be replaced by 
determination and trust. I thank Kay for her advice, flexibility, and efficient 
editing.   
 I thank all my colleagues from the department of Political Science and 
Public Administration of the VU University Amsterdam: especially colleague 
PhD candidates Debby, Hester, Judith, Leonie, and Saif. Thank you all for 
your company, support, the tea breaks, tears, and laughter. Special thanks to 
Judith, for having received me with open arms. To Saif, for his kindness, and 
Debby for her brilliant ideas, chocolate cookies, and all the interesting 
conversations during which we tried to make sense of the world. I hope one 
day we will understand it all.  
 From the UNED University in Madrid I thank Professor Guirola Lopéz, 
Professor Garrido Medina, and Professor Chuliá Rodrigo for having given me 
the opportunity to write a part of my thesis at their university and for having 
shown such interest in my work.  
 I thank De Klaverweide, Lieke Lomans and Jos Claessens for their time, 
support, and training back in the early days. From het Gertrudis College in 
Roosendaal, I thank Piet Keijsers who inspired me to read and keep on 
reading. You were the catalyst for my curiosity.  
 On a more personal note, I thank Arjen for the reflective lunch breaks. Stijn 
for your non-violent communication. Bauke for your contagious creativity. 
Willem for your understanding. Caro, Daan, Inge, Nic, San, Shel and Tes for 
your friendship. Liesa, for your pragmatism and the enjoyable conversations 
around the Hofvijver. Thank you, Queeny, for your care, delicious food and 
laughter and Marijke, for our past and our future. Gracias María por acogerme 
7 
 
en Madrid. Belén, Fernando, Belén, Ramón, Rocío, Mari Pi, Herminia, Julián, 
Toya, Miguel, Carmen, Esperanza y Nacho por vuestro cariño. 
 I owe the world to my family: you make it count. Thank you all for your 
support and the chances you have given me. Mama, I thank you from the 
greatest depth of my heart for your unconditional love, care, and perseverance. 
Thank you dad, for all the running hours, for teaching me to always look on 
the bright side of life and for your insatiable appetite for life. Esther and 
Sandra, thank you so much for everything you give and everything we share. 
With such amazing sisters, the tough becomes tender and the difficult easy. 
Thank you my dear Marley and Nelson for your youthful happiness, energy, 
and innocence: I dedicate this book to you.  
 I have saved my last words of gratitude, for him who already knows. This 
splendid journey would not have been half so splendid were it not for you. 
Thank you so much for your support, your advice, for helping me to get my 
feet back on the ground when trying to solve the unsolvable, for your 
friendship and appreciation. It is an honor to be accompanied by you while 
discovering what life and love is about.  
 
*** 
 
I’m no great runner, by any means. 
I’m at an ordinary - or perhaps more like mediocre - level. 
But that’s not the point. 
The point is whether or not I improved over yesterday. 
In long-distance running the only opponent you have to beat is yourself, 
the way you used to be.” 
 
(Haruki Murakami, What I talk about when I talk about running) 
  
8 
 
  
9 
 
Table of Contents 
Part I Introduction 
 
1 Public-Private Partnerships through the Lens of Public Values 13  
1.1 Introduction        13  
1.2 Public sector reform        14  
1.3 Concerns for public values      16 
1.4 Central research question      17 
1.5 Research approach       18 
1.6 Outline        18 
 
Part II Theory and Methodology 
 
2 Public-Private Partnerships and Public Values   23 
2.1 Introduction        23 
2.2 Public-Private Partnerships      23 
2.3 Public values        32 
2.4 Assumptions       36 
2.5 Conclusion         48 
 
3 Methodology        51 
3.1 Introduction        51 
3.2 Studying public values in PPPs     51 
3.3 The case study approach       54 
3.4 Data collection       58 
3.5 Analysis         60 
3.6 Generalization and reliability       62 
3.7 Ethical considerations      63 
 
Part III Findings  
 
4 The Highway       67 
4.1 Introduction        67 
4.2 Project description        67 
4.3 Findings        68 
4.4 Conclusion        81 
 
10 
 
5 The Detention Center      85 
5.1 Introduction        85 
5.2 Project description        85 
5.3 Findings        86 
5.4 Conclusion        102 
 
6 The Wastewater Project      105  
6.1 Introduction        105 
6.2 Project description        105 
6.3 Findings        106 
6.4 Conclusion        119 
 
7 The Ministry of Finance      123 
7.1 Introduction        123 
7.2 Project description        123 
7.3 Findings        124 
7.4 Conclusion        138 
 
Part IV Cross-Case Comparison and Conclusions 
 
8 Cross-Case Comparison      143 
8.1 Introduction        143 
8.2 Findings         143 
8.3 Conclusion        161 
 
9 Conclusions and Discussion       167 
9.1 Introduction        167 
9.2 General conclusion       167 
9.3 Implications  for theory      169 
9.4 Implications for practice      176 
9.5 Future research       178 
 
References        181 
Samenvatting        197 
Appendix I   Documents       207 
Appendix II  Topic list       210 
11 
 
Part I  
Introduction 
  
12 
 
  
13 
 
1 Public-Private Partnerships through the Lens of Public Values 
 
1.1 Introduction 
On October 29th 2012, the Dutch coalition cabinet Rutte II formed by the 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Labor Party 
(PvdA), announced that the new government would continue to stimulate 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) (Regeerakkoord 2012, 37).1 The PPPs the 
coalition refers to are also known as Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance-
Operate projects (DBFMO). With PPPs, the state delegates service delivery 
and the attendant risks and responsibilities to a consortium through a long-
term integrated performance contract. In contrast to most Anglo-Saxon 
countries such as England, New Zealand, and Australia where PPPs have been 
used for public service delivery since the early 1980s, PPPs have assumed a 
more significant role for Dutch public policy only from the 1990s.2PPPs are 
called into existence for the procurement of public roads, schools, detention 
centers and other public infrastructure. Given the policy intentions of the 
current government, PPPs are expected to become more important in the 
coming years.  
Some scholars consider PPPs to be an organizational manifestation of the 
New Public Management reform (NPM) (see Chapter 2). The NPM reform 
postulates the idea of ‘business-like government’ as a remedy for the apparently 
inefficient, ineffective and unaffordable (welfare) state. Supporters of the NPM 
reform suggest that the introduction of private sector management techniques 
and private sector values on the one hand, and increasing cooperation between 
the public and private sector on the other hand, enhance the efficiency, 
effectiveness, and legitimacy of the public sector. Considered as an 
institutionalization of the NPM reform, PPPs are attributed similar qualities.  
Despite the suggested benefits of NPM in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness, NPM practices have become controversial. Critical scholars 
suggest that the expected efficiency and effectiveness gain is realized at the 
expense of other important public values such as accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, responsibility and quality (see Chapter 2). There has been 
                                                            
1 Regeerakkoord VVD-PvdA. Bruggen slaan. 29-10-2012 (p.37).  
2 Kamerstuk: 29ste vergadering: Vaste commissie voor volkshuisvesting en ruimtelijke ordening.  
   Woensdag 5 april 1990. UCV 29. 
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ample scientific debate on the problematic relationship between NPM and 
public values, but since most studies approach PPPs in terms of efficiency and 
effectiveness, public administration literature provides almost no empirical 
knowledge about public values in PPPs. 
That lack of empirical knowledge on public values in PPPs forms the 
starting point for this study. The rest of this chapter outlines the central 
research question and is structured as follows. The first section briefly 
describes the history and characteristics of the public sector reforms that aimed 
at establishing more business-like government and that formed the nucleus 
from which PPPs have developed. The second section briefly defines and sets 
out the problem with PPPs in terms of public values, and this is further 
elaborated in Chapter 2. The third section presents and the central research 
question. Section 4 briefly describes the research approach that will be 
explained in detail in Chapter 3. Finally, section 5 provides the outline of this 
book.  
 
1.2 Public sector reform 
Throughout history, the organization of the public sector has been subject to 
continuous change. It has been argued, however, that in OECD countries, 
public sector reforms have become relatively more prominent since the second 
half of the twentieth century (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011).  
Between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, countries such as the USA, the 
UK and France, underwent a first public sector reform concerned with the 
rationalization of strategic policymaking and evaluation. This reform aimed at 
improving the Weberian hierarchical state model as introduced by Max Weber 
in the early 1920s, and which functioned as a model for many Western 
countries (Weber 1922, 24-130). The quest for rationality coincided with an 
overall modernizing trend brought about by scientific and technological 
innovation (Pollitt 1984; Wildavsky 1979). During the 1970s, however, trust in 
rationality and modernization declined as a result of a worldwide financial 
downturn and the spreading belief that the Western (welfare) state model had 
proven to be inefficient, ineffective and, in the long run, unaffordable (e.g. 
Held 1984).  
Against this background came a second reform, put into effect more widely 
and known as the New Public Management (NPM) (Aucoin 1990; Hood 
1991). The term NPM has been used in public administration literature to refer 
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to different conceptualizations (Dunleavy et al. 2005). Drechsler (2005, 95) 
defines NPM as a process in which business principles and private sector 
management techniques are transferred into the public sector in 
correspondence with, and based on, a neo-liberal understanding of the 
economy and the State. According to Drechsler (2005, 97), NPM is not just a 
fashion as sometimes suggested but rather a genuine ideology of the “neo-
liberal creed.” In defining NPM, Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011, 10) make a 
distinction between NPM as a general theory and NPM as a bundle of specific 
concepts and practices. NPM as a theory implies public sector improvement 
once private sector values and techniques are introduced. NPM as a bundle of 
specific concepts and practices refers to, amongst other things, emphasis on 
performance and performance measurement, the use of contracts as 
coordinative devices, and the introduction of market-type mechanisms such as 
competitive tendering and performance related pay (Osborne and Gaebler 
1992).  
Between the 1970s and 1990s, many governments did indeed introduce 
private sector values, management techniques and/or intensified cooperation 
with the private sector. In relation to private values and management 
techniques, Hood (1995, 95), describes public sector reforms as implying a 
shift from “[p]olicy making to management skills, from a stress on process to a 
stress on output, from orderly hierarchies to an intended more competitive 
basis for providing public services, from fixed to variable pay and from a 
uniform and inclusive public service to a variant structure with more emphasis 
on contract provision.” 
With respect to cooperation with the private sector, alternative public 
service delivery structures such as privatization, contracting and PPPs have 
been created and are referred to as organizational manifestations of the NPM 
reform (Klijn and Teisman 2000). Gradually, the NPM reform was 
institutionalized in many Western countries. However, it has been 
demonstrated that the extent and speed with which this happened differs 
significantly between countries. In the Netherlands, for example, public sector 
reform started between 1982 and 1986. Compared with Anglo-Saxon 
countries, reforms were initiated relatively late and have been less prominent 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 294).  
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1.3 Concerns for public values 
Whereas supporters of the NPM reform describe the benefits for public policy 
of business-like government in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, others are 
less convinced of the healing power of NPM (e.g Measschalck 2004).Box 
(1999, 19), for example, argues: “[T]here remains a sense that something is 
wrong [...] something about running government like a business does not feel 
right.” In that respect, public values literature expresses this gut feeling in 
further detail.  
In a nutshell, public values literature is concerned with the question of 
whether NPM allows for the safeguarding of public values such as 
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, responsibility and quality (Bevir 
2010; Frederickson and Smith 2003; Jacobs 1992; Rhodes 1996; Skelcher 2010; 
Stoker 1998; Wittmer 2000). For example, Terry (1998, 198) assumes that 
public values are at stake in the context of NPM and argues that public values 
are not visible on the business-like “radar screen.” Broadbent and Laughlin 
(2003, 335-336), summarize the assumed tension between NPM and public 
values as follows: “A genuine concern to many is that this private sector 
supplier, with its profit emphasis and necessity to give priority to its 
shareholders, may or may not share the same public service values that might 
be the case if provision was exclusively made by those in the employment of 
the public sector.” In fact, some have gone further to suggest that the profit 
motive, which must inevitably drive the private sector suppliers, is 
fundamentally different to, and likely to clash with, the values and ethos of the 
public sector. 
In contrast to the idea that NPM might imply a loss of public values, others 
argue that the exact opposite is true. Hirsch and Osborne (2000), for example, 
state that the introduction of private-sector techniques, such as performance 
measurement and the use of output indicators help governments to increase 
transparency and accountability. Rather than assuming that public values are at 
stake, it is maintained that public values are safeguarded or even strengthened 
(e.g. Osborne and Plastrik 1998). 
Overall, the public values literature provides many contradicting claims 
about the relationship between NPM and public values. Moreover, it has been 
suggested that the bulk of these claims are based on normative ideas about 
NPM rather than on convincing empirical evidence of the actual functioning of 
private sector mechanisms or organizational manifestations of the NPM 
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reform (Goddard 2004). Furthermore, whereas public administration literature 
provides empirical knowledge of the safeguarding of public values in the 
context of privatization and contracting (e.g. Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 
2002; De Bruijn and Dicke 2006; Hall, Holt and Purchase 2003; Hodge and 
Cohgill 2007; Karré and In ‘t Veld 2007; Milward and Provan 2000), empirical 
research on public values in PPPs remains scarce. As a result, the question of 
to what extent public values are safeguarded in PPPs remains unanswered 
which is surprising, considering the importance of these arrangements for 
public policy (Bovaird 2004, Bovaird 2010).  
 
1.4 Central research question 
The lack of empirical knowledge on the safeguarding of public values in PPPs, 
forms the starting point of this study. This research goes beyond the normative 
debate by adopting an empirical approach as suggested by Broadbent and 
Laughlin who argue (2003, 332-333): “PPPs cannot be ruled out on the basis 
of prejudice but need to be analyzed with an open mind […].”Adopting such 
an approach, this study provides deeper empirical insights into the actual 
practice of PPPs in terms of public values.  
In addition, following the suggestion of Flinders (2010, 115), who warns of 
a “[l]azy way of theorizing about PPPs as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ ‘accountable’ or 
unaccountable”, this thesis suggests that thinking in such dichotomous terms 
does not help in developing a better understanding of public values in PPPs, 
since the relationship is probably more complex. In that respect, the suggestion 
of Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke (2006, 232) is germane. They argue, in the 
context of contracting for public services, that it is unrealistic to search for a 
“one-size-fits-all judgment”, and stress the importance of taking into account 
specific contextual factors which might influence the outcome.  
The central research question of this study is: What happens to public values in 
public-private partnerships and what conditions are influential? The phrase ‘what 
happens’ refers to the suggested loss, safeguarding or reinforcement of public 
values. The phrase ‘what conditions are influential’ refers to those contextual 
factors that are likely to impact on public values in PPPs. The values under 
scrutiny in this study are, respectively, accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, responsibility and quality and the term PPPs refers in this 
study to DBFMO projects.  
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1.5 Research approach 
The question of how to determine what happens to public values in PPPs is 
not an easy one to answer. First, the public values concept is ambiguous since 
there is no universal and objective definition of such values. Instead, the exact 
use and meaning of a specific value is context dependent. Second, it is hard to 
locate and assess public values since they “are neither here nor there” (de 
Graaf 2003, 22). Unlike material concepts, immaterial concepts such as values 
cannot be measured on an objective interval scale that allows for determining 
whether the occurrence of a certain value has increased or decreased. Taking 
both considerations into account, this study assesses what happens with public 
values in PPPs by conducting a multiple qualitative case study. The case study 
approach is compatible with the explorative research questions and in line with 
the suggestion that public values as well as PPPs should be studied in their 
specific context (Bovaird 2004; Carroll and Steane 2000; de Graaf 2003). The 
selected projects concern the construction and maintenance of a highway; the 
construction and operation of a detention center; the construction, renovation 
and operation of wastewater installations; and the renovation and operation of 
the office of the Ministry of Finance (see Chapter 3). The projects differ on a 
number of fronts such as product and sector. Variation on such aspects 
supports the second research aim of this study, namely, to determine the 
conditions that influence what happens to public values in PPPs. 
 
1.6 Outline 
The rest of this book is divided into three further parts. Part II consists of two 
chapters that make up the theoretical and methodological framework of this 
study. Chapter 2 (Public-Private Partnerships and Public Values), provides an 
overview of the literature on the central concepts of this study and the 
relationship between those concepts. Chapter 3 (Methodology) describes and 
explains the research design, the methodological approach and the research 
methods. Part III presents the findings and consists of four empirical chapters 
concerning, respectively, the following four PPP projects: the construction and 
operation of a highway, the construction and operation of a detention center, 
the construction, renovation and operation of a wastewater system, and the 
construction and operation of the office of the Ministry of Finance. Each 
chapter starts by introducing the project followed by a description of the 
research findings presented by value (i.e. accountability, transparency, 
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responsiveness, responsibility, and quality). Part IV consists of two chapters. 
Chapter 8 (Cross-Case Comparison) provides an overarching analysis based on 
a cross-case comparison in which the findings per case study are compared. 
Finally, Chapter 9 (Conclusions and Discussion) answers the central research 
questions and follows up with a more general discussion on the implications of 
the research findings. 
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Part II 
Theory and Methodology 
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2 Public-Private Partnerships and Public Values  
 
2.1 Introduction3 
The central research question of this study is: What happens to public values in 
public-private partnerships and what conditions are influential? The aim of this chapter 
it to discuss and define the concepts of PPPs and public values and to take a 
closer look at the relationship between both concepts as expressed in public 
administration literature. The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 
first describes the institutional history of PPPs that is defined in this study as 
DBFMO. Second, it defines the relationship between the term PPPs and 
DBFMO. Third, it explains the institutional logic of DBFMO by taking a 
closer look at its internal steering mechanisms. Finally it stipulates the 
differences between DBFMO, privatization, and contracting. Section 2.3 
discusses the ambiguous concept of public values and briefly outlines the 
public value debate to be found in public administration literature. Section 2.4 
connects the central concepts by providing an overview of the scientific debate 
on accountability, transparency, responsiveness, responsibility and quality as 
public values, and provides an overview of organizational manifestations of 
public sector reforms such as, amongst others, DBFMO. Section 2.5 provides 
the conclusion and lists the conditions that, according to the current public 
value literature reviewed in this chapter, influence the trajectory of public 
values in NPM related practices.  
 
2.2 Public-Private Partnerships 
 
2.2.1 Historical background 
During the 1970s and 1980s, considerable parts of the public sector in Anglo-
Saxon countries were “subject to aggressive privatization” (Broadbent and 
Laughlin 2003, 334). In various countries, the privatization program led to 
economic and political problems, which made governments search for 
alternative ways of engaging with the private sector for public service delivery. 
The outcome of this quest was the introduction of PPPs with the suggestion 
that they would form an alternative to the privatization agenda. According to 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2003, 334) PPPs represent an alternative approach to 
                                                            
3 Parts of this chapter have been published (Reynaers 2013; Reynaers and De Graaf 2014).  
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public service delivery that still allows for private sector involvement while at 
the same time providing a “more direct control relationship between the public 
and private sector.”  
In the United Kingdom, PPPs (initially referred to as Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs)) entered the political agenda around 1979 under the 
conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher. The introduction of PFI 
was supposed to decrease central government’s economic influence and to 
update the social and economic infrastructure. When Labor won the general 
election in 1997, the term PFI was replaced by the “friendlier sounding” term 
PPPs, that was ought to downplay its conservative origin (Bult-Spiering and 
Dewulf 2006; Wettenhall 2010). 
Around the early 1990s, following the example of the United Kingdom and 
other Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia and New Zealand, some 
European countries -The Netherlands, Spain and Belgium amongst them- 
began exploring the options for PPPs. In the Netherlands, PPPs appeared on 
the political agenda around 1988 when Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers 
suggested the use of PPPs in the context of housing and country planning.4 
During the 1990s, the Dutch government undertook various initiatives in order 
to stimulate PPPs. Approximately ten years later, GerritZalm (then Minister of 
Finance), gave the official green light for PPPs, resulting in a pilot program of 
nine projects coordinated by the national knowledge center publiek-private 
samenwerking (PPS). This pilot program would allow the government to 
establish whether PPPs would indeed produce better results. It would allow the 
optimization of the PPPs structure, determine what institutional aspects 
impede the use of PPPs, and develop knowledge on the processes involved in 
PPPs procurement that could be used in future projects.5Ten to fifteen years 
later, several projects have indeed been procured according to PPPs principles 
and, based on the current policy intentions, PPPs are expected to become 
increasingly important for Dutch public administration.6 
 
 
                                                            
4 Kamerstuk: 29ste vergadering: Vaste commissie voor volkshuisvesting en ruimtelijke ordening. 
   Woensdag 5 april 1990. UCV 29. 
5 Voortgangsrapportage PPS. Van incidenteel naar structureel. Available through:  
 www.ppsbijhetrijk.nl, date of access 21-5-2013.  
6 Regeerakkoord VVD-PvdA. Bruggen slaan. 29-10-2012. 
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2.2.2 PPPs as umbrella term 
In public administration literature, the term PPPs is used for many types of 
public-private cooperation that differ in several respects such as hierarchy, 
formality and collaboration. The use of the term PPPs to refer to this wide 
range of public-private arrangements has led to much confusion in the 
literature about its definition. For example, the term PPPs is used to refer to 
both hierarchical and formal as well as to horizontal and informal partnerships 
(e.g. Sullivan and Skelcher 2003; Weihe 2008). Hierarchical and formal 
partnerships are also known as concession partnerships. In concession 
partnerships, the cooperation between the public and private sector is 
coordinated through performance contracts. In that respect, Lonsdale (2007) 
argues that concession partnerships should not be considered as true 
partnerships since the level of collaboration between the public and private 
sector in terms of joint action and decision making is relatively low. Informal 
and horizontal partnerships, also known as alliance partnerships, coordinate 
public-private cooperation through a process of continuous negotiation rather 
than through contracts. As such, the level of cooperation is therefore 
considered to be relatively high (Edelenbos and Teisman 2008; Klijn and Twist 
2007; Kouwenhoven 1991; Lewis 2000).  
The term PPPs is not only used to refer to a wide range of partnerships that 
differ with respect to the dimensions of hierarchy, formality, and collaboration. 
The term also refers to partnership constructions that differ with respect to 
their normative aims or goals. In relation to normative aims, Linder (1999, 26-
31) distinguishes five partnership interpretations. First, PPPs are considered as 
a tool to change traditional public management by facilitating cooperation with 
private firms. As such, PPPs are expected to enhance innovation, productivity, 
competition, and service efficiency. Second, PPPs are considered as allowing 
for problem conversion since they allow governments to commercialize public 
problems. As a result, public managers are able to reframe public service 
delivery problems in such a way that private sector firms are willing to take 
over service delivery and this is expected to result in substantial cost reduction. 
Third, PPPs are considered as a tool for moral regeneration. It is expected that 
cooperation between the public and private sector will inspire civil servants 
and public managers to imitate private sector colleagues’ business-like 
behavior. Fourth, PPPs are considered as a tool that allows for financial risk 
sharing since most partnership constructions imply a substantial or complete 
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investment by private sector firms that can be earned back during the duration 
of the contract. Finally, PPPs are considered as vehicles for power sharing 
between the state and the private sector. As such, PPPs are expected to create 
an ethos of trust and cooperation that allows both sides to benefit from their 
shared responsibilities, risks, resources, and knowledge.  
With respect to the different goals ascribed to PPPs, Hodge (2010, 5), 
distinguishes five partnership variations: partnerships as institutional 
cooperation for joint production and risk sharing; partnerships as public policy 
networks; partnerships for civil society and community development; 
partnerships for urban renewal and downtown economic development; and 
partnerships as Long-term Infrastructure Contracts (LTICs).  
Hence, the term PPPs is an umbrella term that is used to refer to various 
types of public-private cooperation that can differ with respect to the 
dimensions hierarchy, formality, cooperation, normative aims, and goals. In 
that respect, Weihe (2006, 21) argues that rather than searching for a critical 
core of the PPPs definition, we need to accept the fact that the term PPPs 
represents multiple cores. With respect to conducting research on PPPs, it 
follows that one must take into account the institutional differences between 
the various partnerships constructions since, what goes for one PPP type does 
not have to go for other PPPs (Bovaird 2004, 213). Having said that, the next 
section defines and explains the institutional structure and logic of the PPPs 
type addressed in this study. 
 
2.2.3 Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance-Operate  
The term PPPs is used as an umbrella term to refer to many different types of 
public-private cooperation. A specific PPP type is the Long-term Infrastructure 
Contract (LTIC) (Hodge 2010). This study addresses a specific type of LTIC 
known as Design-Build-Finance-Maintenance-Operate projects (DBFMO) (e.g. 
Bult-Spiering and Dewulf 2006). DBFMO projects do not only concern public 
infrastructure such as roads, but can also include public utility buildings such as 
schools and hospitals. Table 1, defines PPPs, LTIC, and DBFMO and 
demonstrates how they are related. 
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Table 1: Definitions of PPPs, LTIC, and DBFMO 
Term Definition  Abbreviation 
Public-Private 
partnerships 
An umbrella term for all types of public-private cooperation 
whether highly formal and hierarchical or informal and 
horizontal.  
PPPs 
Long-term 
Infrastructure 
Contract 
A specific type of PPP entailing formal and hierarchical 
public-private cooperation structured through long-term 
contracts.  
LTIC 
Design-Build- 
Finance-Maintain-
Operate  
A type of LTIC that transfers risks and responsibilities for 
the design, construction, financing, maintenance, and 
operation of a public service to a private consortium. 
DBFMO 
 
DBFMO is a concession partnership where cooperation between the public 
and private sector is organized through a long-term performance contract. 
Procurement according to DBFMO is not revolutionary for its public-private 
character: Governments often rely on private sector involvement when it 
comes to the implementation of public service delivery because of a lack of 
technical expertise or capacity. What does differ from traditional procurement is 
the distribution of risks and responsibilities and the organization of ownership 
and oversight (Broadbent and Laughlin 2003, 335-336).  
DBFMO contracts transfer the responsibility and risks for the design, 
construction, maintenance, operation, and finance of public infrastructure and 
public service delivery to a private consortium. The first responsibility is the 
design of the public infrastructure or asset. The actual freedom of the 
consortium with respect to the design depends on the output specifications 
and the juridical considerations set by the public procurer.7 Second, the 
consortium becomes responsible for the construction of the infrastructure, 
including the responsibility to overcome construction failures and to deliver on 
time and according to the output specifications. Third, the consortium is 
responsible for infrastructure maintenance, implying that the consortium must 
detect and repair malfunctions or damage during the duration of the contract. 
The responsibility for the operation implies that the consortium must carry out 
primary or secondary processes in relation to public service delivery. Finally, 
the consortium is supposed to finance the project in advance, meaning that 
consortium partners must invest their own capital in combination with external 
support from banks. The formal responsibility for providing public services 
remains with the public domain, as does infrastructure ownership.  
                                                            
7 The output specifications often include norms concerning output as well as outcome.  
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The performance contract and output specifications form the basis of the 
cooperation between the procurer and the consortium and are developed by 
civil servants on behalf of the public procurer. With due observance of legal 
requirements, they have discretionary freedom to define expectations in terms 
of scope, service level, outcome measures, costs, financial incentives, sanctions, 
monitoring, and reporting requirements (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2006). In 
DBFMO projects, output rather than traditionally used input specifications are 
used meaning that instead of prescribing how, the procurer only describes what 
standards should be met. The contract and output specifications form the basis 
for the bidding process during which competing private consortia propose 
integrated project plans. During the bidding process, the exact content of the 
contract and output specifications may change, depending on the proposals 
from the bidding consortia. The winning consortium becomes responsible for 
performing as agreed upon during the duration of the contract.  
The consortium has the contractual obligation to monitor its performance. 
As such, the consortium creates an integrated monitoring plan that meets the 
procurer’s approval, one that measures performance in terms of output 
specifications and links it to a financial mechanism that determines the height 
of the monthly availability fee that the procurer owes the consortium for its 
delivered services. When monitoring reports show no discrepancies between 
the output specifications and the actual service delivery, the procurer pays the 
full availability fee. If, however, service delivery is not as agreed upon, the 
procurer receives a financial discount, resulting in a lower availability fee for 
the consortium. Such a reduction is expected to stimulate the consortium to 
provide the service level as agreed upon. Besides the monitoring conducted by 
the consortium, the procurer can conduct additional tests, the results of which, 
together with the consortium’s monitoring reports and user feedback, provide 
input for the daily, weekly, or monthly meetings between the consortium and 
the procurer during which performance is evaluated and, if necessary, 
adjusted.8 Overall, the contract, output specifications, monitoring mechanism, 
and performance related pay are instruments that, in theory, help the procurer 
to control public service delivery.  
                                                            
8 Voortgangsrapportage PPS 2007 en vooruitblik 2008. Samen werken aan meerwaarde. Available  
  through: www.rijksoverheid.nl (date of access 21-5-2013). 
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2.2.4 PPPs, privatization, and contracting 
PPPs (in this study delimited to DBFMO) are not the only public-private 
structures through which governments provide public services and products. 
Following the Anglo-Saxon axiom ‘less government more market’, many 
western governments have privatized former state monopolies and outsourced 
certain public tasks to private firms. What all three configurations have in 
common is the fact that they facilitate private sector involvement to some 
extent. Despite similarities in all three structures, they differ in various respects 
such as ownership, decision-making authority, and duration. It is important to 
consider these differences since what is true for privatization or contracting 
need not necessarily be true for PPPs. In order to avoid copying and pasting 
assumptions about privatization or contracting to PPPs, the next section 
describes the institutional differences between PPPs, privatization, and 
contracting. 
Privatization can be defined as “any action that transfers some or all of the 
ownership and/or control of state-owned enterprises to the private sector” 
(Hitt et al. 2000, 511). When governments privatize public monopolies, 
ownership, control, and decision-making authority are transferred from the 
public to the private sector. In contrast, ownership, control, and decision-
making authority remain with the procurer in PPPs. As far as the responsibility 
for service supply and service quality goes, this remains with the public sector 
in PPPs, whereas privatization entails that private firms make their own 
decisions on service supply and service quality (Hiemstra and Horwitz 2003, 3). 
Contracting can be defined as “the reliance on external sources for 
manufacturing components and other value-adding activities” (Lei and Hitt 
1995, 836). Contracting involves a temporary and singular principal-agent 
relation in which the public partner defines what, how, and by whom 
something must be done (Klijn and Teisman 2000). The biggest difference 
between contracting and privatization is that asset ownership usually remains 
with the public sector in the context of contracting. As such, the procurer 
remains in control by monitoring performance and replacing the contractor if 
necessary (Domberger and Jensen 1997). Whereas contracting or contracting 
out implies ‘simple contracting’ (i.e. one service is contracted out for a 
relatively short period to a single private party), PPPs imply ‘complex 
contracting’ (i.e. an integrated contract for a relatively long period (between 15 
and 30 years) is signed with a multi-headed consortium).  
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With respect to privatization and PPPs, scholars do not agree on whether 
both are manifestations of the NPM reform. In relation to that, Pollitt and 
Bouckaert (2011) describe how the NPM reform gradually changed character 
from the 1990s resulting in alternative reform models such as, amongst others, 
the New Public Governance (NPG). NPG advocates a legitimate and effective 
government by cooperation between governments, markets, civil society, and 
other social actors with respect to policymaking and policy implementation 
(Osborne 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 22). NPG substitutes the focus on 
efficiency, effectiveness, and businesslike government of the NPM reform for 
trust, transparency, governance, and, indeed, partnerships with the ultimate aim 
or regaining public trust (Trommel 2009). It is suggested that partnerships 
might enable governments to control public-private service delivery and public 
values to a far greater extent than is the case with privatization (e.g. Peat and 
Costley 2001, 71). Bovaird (2004), for example, refers to the necessity for PPPs 
as a solution to problems related with privatization. Similarly, Kouwenhoven 
(1991, 89) argues: “Especially in those cases that the government would like to 
privatize in order to act more market like, but at the same time would like to 
have a certain influence, PPPs form a possible alternative.”  
Hence, PPPs are suggested as fitting both the NPM and the NPG 
paradigm, given that they represent features of both reform models (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011). However, some argue that the use of the term PPPs is 
nothing more than a language tool that seeks to replace the “Thatcherite use of 
the word privatization” (Hall, De la Motte and Davies 2003, 2). In line, Savas 
(2002) argues that the term privatization is often replaced by PPPs simply 
because of the negative connotations of privatization. The importance of this 
discussion becomes evident from section 2.4 onwards when we consider the 
(normative) assumptions about public values made in relation to privatization 
and PPPs.  
 
2.2.5 Research on PPPs 
Public-private partnerships have been studied from different angles and by 
different disciplines. For example, some scholars study PPPs in terms of 
strategic dilemmas, managerial behavior, and management mechanisms (e.g. 
Klijn and Teisman 2000; Edelenbos and Teisman 2008; Charles, et al. 2007; 
Klijn and van Twist 2007). Other studies focus on the effectiveness, cost-
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efficiency, and economic performance of PPPs (e.g. Savas 2000; van Ham and 
Koppenjan 2001). 
This study does not approach PPPs from a managerial nor an economic 
perspective but from a public values perspective. The public values literature is 
concerned with the question of whether private sector involvement and the 
introduction of private sector instruments allow for the safeguarding and 
elaboration of public values such as accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, responsibility, and quality (Bevir 2010; Frederickson and Smith 
2003; Jacobs 1992; Rhodes 1996; Skelcher 2010; Stoker 1998; Wittmer 2000). 
In that respect Broadbent and Laughlin (2003, 335-336), summarize: “A 
genuine concern to many is that this private sector supplier, with its profit 
emphasis and necessity to give priority to its shareholders, may or may not 
share the same public service values that might be the case if provision was 
exclusively made by those in the employment of the public sector. In fact, 
some have gone further to suggest that the profit motive, which inevitably 
must drive the private sector suppliers, is fundamentally different to, and likely 
to clash with, the values and ethos of the public sector.”  
Public administration literature provides (admittedly, relatively little) 
empirical knowledge on the safeguarding of public values in the context of 
privatization and contracting (e.g. Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002; De 
Bruijn and Dicke 2006; Hall, Holt and Purchase 2003; Hodge and Cohgill 
2007; Karré and In ‘t Veld 2007; Kolthoff 2007; Milward and Provan 2000; van 
Gestel 2012). In contrast, empirical knowledge on the safeguarding of public 
values in the context of PPPs (defined as DBFMO) remains far scarcer, which 
is surprising considering the importance of these arrangements for public 
policy and their possible impact on public values (see section 2.4). The 
question of to what extent public values are safeguarded in DBFMO, therefore 
remains unanswered.  
From the following section and onwards, the focus shifts from PPPs to the 
second central concept of study: public values. Section 2.3 introduces the 
public values debate in the context of NPM briefly. Section 2.3.2 discusses the 
ambiguousness of the public values concept. Section 2.4 presents and contrasts 
the various assumptions on public values in organizational manifestations of 
the NPM reform including privatization, contracting, and PPPs (however 
defined).  
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2.3 Public values  
2.3.1 The public values debate 
Ever since the rise of NPM, there have been concerns about to the 
safeguarding of public values. Some scholars suggest that the introduction of 
private sector values, management techniques, and public-private cooperation 
will result in their loss (Collins and Butler 2003; Frederickson 1999; Jacobs 
1992; Milward and Provan 2000; Wittmer 2000). Although NPM practices 
might increase efficiency (another subject of debate), critical scholars argue that 
business values should not dominate the creation of public policy. 
Commenting on this, Box (1999, 19) says: “[t]here remains a sense that 
something is wrong [...] something about running government like a business 
does not feel right.” In relation to the suggested dominance of business values 
over public values, Terry (1998, 198) adds that public values are not visible “on 
the [NPM] radar screen.” Likewise, Bovaird (2004, 209) is of the opinion that 
the criteria used to evaluate organizational manifestation of market-like 
reforms should not be limited to criteria that are considered as important in the 
private sector. As well as, for example, financial efficiency being valued, other 
values such as accountability and transparency need to be taken into account 
too. Empirically justified or not, scholars concerned with public values in the 
context of NPM often assume that (1) the private sector, indeed, has different 
value preferences from the public sector; (2) that the public sector respects and 
safeguards public values and (3) that only the public sector is able to safeguard 
public values.  
Whether or not the assumptions on the relationship between NPM and 
public values hold empirically is the subject of scientific debate. And in 
contrast to the assumption that NPM practices imply a loss of public values, 
others suggest otherwise. The assumptions that public and private sector 
values are incompatible, that the public sector actually does safeguard public 
values and that only the public sector is able to safeguard public values have 
been questioned by many (e.g. Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002). Rosenau 
(2000, 222), for example, argues that the safeguarding of public values is never 
certain and that public as well as private actors can violate the safeguarding of 
public values. Section 2.4 takes a closer look at the public value discussion by 
reviewing public administration literature on five specific public values. Prior 
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to that review, however, the following section first addresses the ambiguity in 
the concept of public values.  
 
2.3.2 Conceptual ambiguity  
There is much confusion in public administration literature on the exact 
definition of the concept of public values (Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002; 
van Gestel et al. 2008).  
The first reason for confusion stems from the adjective ‘public’ which 
suggests a distinction between public and private values. Public values are 
assigned to the public sector, while private values are assigned to the private 
sector (Reynaers and De Graaf 2014, 121). Stereotypically, the public sector is 
associated with values such as solidarity and accountability while values such as 
efficiency and competition are associated with the private sector (Rosenau 
2000; Reijniers 1994). Many scholars have demonstrated that such 
dichotomous distinction between sectors and corresponding values does not 
hold true empirically (e.g. Bozeman 1987; Rainey and Bozeman 2000). 
Empirical research on value differences between the public and private sector 
demonstrates that, despite some value differences, the public and private 
sectors also have certain values in common (van der Wal 2008). In that respect, 
van der Wal and Huberts (2008) argue that it is arbitrary to attribute values to 
the public or private sector on theoretical grounds only. In addition, it has been 
demonstrated that public values can also be acted upon and safeguarded by 
private firms (e.g. De Bruijn and Dicke 2006).  
Second, the concept of public values is being used empirically as well as 
normatively. Suggesting normatively that the public sector should safeguard 
certain public values is different from affirming that they actually do so. Hence, 
whether public values can actually be ascribed to the public sector remains to 
be seen. With respect to public values as a normative concept, it is unclear 
which authority would determine what values are public values.  
A third reason for confusion is the fact that public values have no objective 
and universal meaning. As a result, it is difficult to define what a value such as 
transparency, for example, either looks like or should look like. In connection 
with this, some authors argue that public values are socially constructed and 
that their exact meaning and importance depends on the context in which they 
are used (e.g. Couture 1993; de Graaf 2003; Habermas 1996). For instance, 
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Bozeman (2007, 36), states: “[F]or any particular value, the extent to which it is 
embraced […] varies both across and within societies.” 
Fourth, the often-immaterial character of values makes it difficult to locate 
and measure them. As suggested by de Graaf (2003), public values are not just 
“out there” but are expressed through actions, routines, preferences, and 
attitudes (e.g. Schmidt and Posner 1986). Public values, therefore, always 
require further operationalization, and the different ways in which public 
values are operationalized do not provide for a single conceptualization.  
Fifth, the public values concept is used to refer to public goals, process 
related rules as well as moral guidelines for the public sector. For example, in 
some studies public values are defined as public goals such as the reliability and 
safety of public transport or energy services (e.g. de Bruin and Dicke 2006; 
Steenhuisen 2009). Public values can imply process-related rules such as 
transparency (Weihe 2008) and can also refer to normative moral values such 
as honesty (van der Wal 2008).  
 Finally, the term public values can easily be confused with the term public 
value. Van der Wal (2008, 11) defines values as “qualities or standards that 
have a certain weight in the choice of action”. As pointed out earlier, the 
adjective ‘public’ in the term ‘public values’ refers to those values that are 
empirically or normatively considered to belong to the public sector (Reynaers 
and De Graaf 2014, 121). Public values can indicate both what is, or should be, 
appreciated and strived for, as well as indicating what values should be taken 
into account in that pursuit. The term public value is more limited since it 
concerns only outcome, rather than process. As Moore (1994, 296-301) 
describes it: “the task of the public sector and more specifically of public 
managers is to create public value […] public value lies in the satisfaction of 
those whom government programs serve or otherwise encounter” (e.g. Moore 
2000).  
2.3.3 Public values in this study  
The next section takes a closer look at the public values concept in relation to 
NPM and focuses on five specific values, namely: accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, responsibility, and quality. Since the public values literature 
distinguishes many different public values (Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 
2007), the selection requires justification.  
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 Following Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman (2002), the selection of values is 
first of all based on their prominence in the public values literature (see section 
2.4). By selecting public values from the public values literature, it is possible to 
compare the scientific debate on public values with the empirical findings to be 
derived from this study (Beck Jørgensen and Bozeman 2002).  
 Accountability, transparency and responsiveness can all be considered 
crucial principles or guidelines for democratic or public governance (Beck 
Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007; Bevir 2010; Skelcher, Mathur and Smith 2005). 
Despite the fact that the actual organization behind the provision of public 
works and services changes, administrations are still expected to fulfill certain 
requirements that are assumed to constitute good governance.  
 Besides their prominence in public values literature – in which the 
safeguarding of these values is often problematized – the values of 
responsibility and responsiveness are selected for their likely relevance to the 
specific DBFMO context. And as the construction of a road is more likely to 
raise questions in terms of quality than in terms of equality, given the fact that 
DBFMO does not imply the reallocation of user rights (something that is very 
likely to be the case in the context of privatization), the value of quality is more 
relevant to this study. Whereas accountability, transparency, responsibility and 
responsiveness can all be considered instrumental values that concern the 
process of cooperation, quality can be considered an end value, since it 
concerns the actual output of the cooperation process. Although the next 
paragraph discusses each value separately, they are related within the greater 
framework of democratic and public governance. With respect to 
accountability and transparency, for example, Fox (2007, 663) argues that 
transparency is supposed to generate accountability.  
  The following section takes a closer look at the public value discussion in 
the context of privatization, contracting and PPPs (however defined). The 
reason for including literature on privatization and contracting is that there is 
relatively little empirical research available on public values in the context of 
PPPs (let alone DBFMO). Although privatization, contracting and PPPs have 
different institutional structures, and therefore a possibly different influence on 
public values, we cannot altogether ignore their similarities as manifestation of 
the NPM reform. 
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2.4 Assumptions 
The following five sections consecutively describe the scientific debate on 
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, responsibility, and quality in the 
context of privatization, contracting, and PPPs (however defined). Each 
section starts with a short discussion on the definition of each value followed 
by an overview on the different assumptions on that particular value.  
 
2.4.1 Accountability 
Public administration literature provides numerous studies on accountability, 
addressing accountability categories, accountability instruments, vertical and 
horizontal accountability, formal and informal accountability, the effectiveness 
of accountability, and the evolution of accountability in relation to NPM (e.g. 
Acar and Guo 2009; Bovens 1998, 2005, 2007; Bovaird 2010; Christensen and 
Lægreid 2002; Day and Klein 1987; Deleon 1998; Hodge and Coghill 2007; 
Salamon 2002; Schillemans 2008; Sterling 2005; Stoker 1998). 
Accountability can be defined as a hierarchical principal-agent relationship 
through which the parliament delegates an authority to civil servants that holds 
them accountable for their functioning (Bovens, Schillemans and ‘t Hart, 
2008). Bovens, Schillemans and ‘t Hart (2008, 2) refer to this system of 
accountabiltiy as a ‘simple system’. In a similar vein, Barberis (1998, 541) 
understands accountability as a process in which ministers are accountable to 
the public via the parliament for their work and that of their departments and 
in which civil servants are internally accountable to their political superiors. 
Both definitions consider accountability as a public affair, referring to 
accountability by and to ministers, civil servants, the parliament, and the public.  
In the context of NPM and the blurring of the boundaries between the 
public and private sector, several scholars argue that the traditional notion of 
accountability as a simple system no longer reflects current practices. Rhodes 
(1997, 21-22), for example, argues, “[t]he traditional mechanisms of 
accountability in representative democracy were never designed to cope with 
multi-organizational fragmented policy systems.”As an alternative to the 
traditional hierarchical notion of accountability, Stoker (2006, 52) understands 
accountability as a “multifaceted concept” that includes more than only linear 
and hierarchical relationships between elected officials and civil servants. 
Hence, definitions of accountability should include the different ways and 
contexts in which public or private organizations and actors are held publicly 
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accountable. Several academics argue that traditional notions of accountability, 
should not be used as a yardstick for evaluating accountability in a non-
traditional policy context (e.g. Bovaird 2004; Bovens, Schillemans and ´t Hart 
2008; Rhodes 1997).  
In the search for a new definition of accountability, Weber (1999) asks what 
accountability should look like in the context of decentralization, 
differentiation, public-private cooperation, and business-like government. In 
this respect, Salamon (2002, 38) argues that we should loosen up traditional 
notions of accountability and develop pluralistic understandings of the 
accountability concept. In the context of recent public sector reforms and the 
importance of output and outcome accountability, Armstrong (2005, 1) defines 
accountability as “the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the 
usage of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated 
performance objectives.” 
In relation to recent public sector reforms such as NPM, many scholars 
suggest that accountability is at stake (e.g. Acar and Robertson 2004; Agranoff 
and McGuire 2001; Behn 2001; Bloomfield 2006; Drewry 2000; Frederickson 
and Smith 2003; Hodge and Greve 2007; Kettl 1996; Peters and Pierre 1998; 
Sterling 2005). In general, concerns centre on various dimensions of 
accountability such as decision-making authority, oversight capacity by the 
public sector, responsibility for the execution of public service delivery and the 
ability to control and adjust private sector behavior.  
Christensen and Lægreid (2002, 288), for example, state that NPM replaces 
political accountability and accountability “for fairness” with accountability for 
efficiency and performance thereby excluding accountability dimensions 
important for democratic governance. Similarly, Collins and Butler (2002, 56) 
argue that NPM diffuses political accountability since it increases the distance 
between political decision-making and the actual delivery of public services and 
public products: “Politicians can hardly be held to account for decisions from 
which they are systematically distanced […] Even if NPM reforms detach it 
from government departments, citizens will demand political accountability. 
Ministers, presidents, mayors and other elected officials will be expected to 
take responsibility for late trains, long hospital waiting lists and changing 
demographics over which their day-to-day control may be low.” Likewise, 
Frederickson and Smith (2003, 218) ask who can be held accountable when 
public policy is realized with the involvement of the private sector: “If public 
38 
 
officials have less power and responsibility, is it fair or even possible to hold 
them accountable for public policy? If the answer is no, who or what should be 
held accountable for public policy?” Finally, others fear for a loss of 
accountability resulting from non-elected public bodies providing a shortfall in 
alternative accountability arrangements (Deakin and Walsh 1996; Frederickson 
and Smith 2003; Skelcher 2010; Stoker 1998). The following sections review 
the debate on accountability in the specific context of the organizational 
manifestations of the NPM reform.  
In the context of privatization, Hodge and Coghill (2007, 697) suggest that 
privatization creates a tension between private sector values on the one hand 
and public accountability on the other hand arguing that “privatization 
introduces complexity and potential conflict between managerialist values and 
the strong concern with public accountability found in many societies.” In that 
respect, Echebarría (2001, 2) argues: “The years following the Washington 
Consensus were dominated by reforms based on the idea that less government 
is better, when the correct idea would have been that better government is 
better. Privatization […] marked the reform agenda. […] in more than a few 
cases, the result was a rickety, disjointed government, defenseless in the face of 
problems for which it nevertheless remains responsible to society, and whose 
credibility has been undermined by the ideological devaluation that 
accompanied reform.”  
In the context of contracting, Mulgan (1997, 108) states that the 
introduction of public service contracts forms a “definite break” in the chain 
of public oversight and accountability. The fact that public services provision is 
no longer taken care of by public servants but by private sector employees is 
considered as a threat since private sector employees are not controlled by a 
department manager nor are they subject to direction from public officials and 
ministers.  
With respect to alliance partnerships, Robertson and Acar (1999, 28) 
demonstrate that the temporary and voluntary nature of PPP structures, in 
combination with the absence of a well-established administrative structure, 
“all conspire to reduce the efficacy of traditional accountability mechanisms” 
where oversight bodies and public officials are believed to replace the oversight 
capacity of the electorate. In that respect Willems and vanDooren (2009, 20) 
conclude that their respondents “all have various sharp-edged criticisms about 
how public accountability regarding public-private partnership (dis)functions in 
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reality.” With respect to PPPs defined as DBFMO, Walker and Walker (2000) 
argue that infrastructural partnerships erode parliamentary and public 
accountability.  
The assumption of accountability being at stake in the context of NPM has 
been disputed by various scholars. Goddard (2004), for example, argues that 
most studies that evaluate the effects of NPM negatively in terms of 
accountability, have merely criticized NPM rather than the actual practice of 
accountability in organizational manifestations of NPM. With respect to the 
suggested accountability gap as a result of the introduction of NPM, Barberis 
(1998, 416) states that an accountability gap was omnipresent even before the 
introduction of NPM and that recent reforms have simply highlighted the 
already existing accountability problems. It follows that accountability 
problems will not disappear should NPM be replaced: “[N]PM is not the root 
cause of the disparity between doctrine and reality, so its withdrawal would not 
resolve the accountability problem.” Likewise, Rosenau (2000, 227) criticizes 
the suggestions that without the influence of NPM the public sector would be 
perfectly able to safeguard accountability and states that “it is difficult to argue 
that the public or private partner is more accountable or that partnering […] 
increases or decreases accountability.”  
As a critique of the assumption that public sector reforms undermine 
accountability, Deleon (1998, 555) states that reforms require a different 
understanding of accountability, and that accountability might be very well 
safeguarded in alternative ways, arguing that: “Neither entrepreneurial 
experiments nor increased discretion for professional managers need result in 
diminished accountability. What they do require is accountability of a non-
bureaucratic kind, and mechanisms tailored as much as possible to the types of 
decisions and structures being held to account.” Studies that evaluate 
accountability in the context of NPM, should thus evaluate the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms tailored to preserve accountability rather than judge whether 
the traditional accountability mechanisms are still in use.  
Finally, in contrast to the suggested loss of accountability arising from a 
shortfall of accountability mechanisms, it has been advocated by some that 
NPM-inspired governance structures might exist within even tighter and more 
transparent frameworks of accountability than many public organizations 
display (Flinders 2010, 215). Domberger and Jensen (1997, 76), for example, 
conclude that empirical evidence supports the claim that accountability might 
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actually be better safeguarded because of the introduction of systematic 
performance monitoring, the construction and use of service level 
specifications, and the application of mechanisms that help to prevent or 
effectively penalize noncompliance. Similarly, Barberis (1998, 460) states that 
NPM-related innovations and techniques of accountable management have 
strengthened accountability and that these instruments have given ministers 
greater control over their departments. Table 2 summarizes the conditions that 
are expected to have a positive or negative influence on the safeguarding of 
accountability.  
 
Table 2: Conditions influencing accountability 
Positive influence Negative influence 
-Performance monitoring  
-Service level specifications  
-Tools for preventing noncompliance  
-Increased distance between decision making and execution 
-Juridical, technical and financial complexity 
-Shortfall in accountability mechanisms 
 
2.4.2 Transparency 
As is the case with all the values under consideration, transparency has a 
different meaning depending on the context in which it is used or the 
characteristics of the academic field (Otenyo and Lind 2004; Scholtes 2012). In 
the field of public administration and in the context of recent public sector 
reforms, the concept of transparency (sometimes referred to as the degree of 
openness), brings together a number of different ideas. For example, 
transparency is considered as a fundament for creating legitimacy and credible 
governance systems (Summers and Nowicki 2006); as a device through which 
the trustworthiness of a partner can be determined in the context of 
contracting for public services (Clark and Reed 2005; Finel and Lord 1999); as 
an instrument that helps to increase efficiency and effectiveness; as an essential 
premise for holding the public sector to account, for combating corruption and 
for citizens participation (Ball 2009; Curtin and Meijer 2006).  
Trying to categorize the different ways in which the concept of transparency 
is used, Libich (2006) distinguishes five types of transparency namely: political, 
goal, economic, procedural, and operational transparency. Political and goal 
transparency refer to transparency with respect to the overall intention or 
mission of a government or organization. Economic transparency entails that 
institutions share their decision-making tools with the broader public. 
Procedural transparency refers to openness and the sharing of information 
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with respect to democratic decision-making processes. Operational 
transparency refers to defining goals and performance measurement, which 
enables the public to hold the public sector accountable (i.e. Ball 2009, 300-
301).  
When comparing definitions on transparency in relation to recent public 
sector reforms and public service delivery, it shows that the core of 
transparency lies in the availability, access and sharing of information on public 
sector performance. Performance then not solely refers to output performance 
but also to input and throughput performance and concerns products and 
processes as well as behavior. Gerring and Thacker (2004), for example, define 
transparency as the availability and accessibility of information that is relevant 
with regard to the functioning of the polity. A similar definition is given by 
Final and Lord (1999, 316), who define transparency as “[t]he legal, political, 
and institutional structures that make information about the internal 
characteristics of a government and society available to actors both inside and 
outside the domestic political system.” In the context of public sector reform 
and the increase in privatization, contracting and public-private cooperation, 
Summers and Nowicki (2006) define transparency as “[a] series of actions 
creating credible governance systems, visible performance measurement 
systems, and readily available decision-making information about pricing of 
services and the amount of charity care.” 
Although it is not always clear what transparency-related aspect authors 
refer to exactly, many suggest that market-inspired reforms lead to a loss of 
transparency and, as a consequence, to severe governance problems 
(Bloomfield 2006; Kikeri and Nellis 2004; Papadopoulos 2007). 
In the context of privatization, for example, Turnovec (1999, 618) argues 
that empirical evidence indeed proves that privatization has meant a switch 
from inefficient but transparent public property to not very efficient and less 
transparent public property. Likewise, Estache (2003) argues from a 
comparative case study, that privatization indeed fails in terms of transparency 
because of a lack of regulatory oversight, inadequate ways of collecting data, 
and the absence of quantitative models that help governments to compare and 
measure private performance.  
When it comes to alliance partnerships, Papadopoulos (2007) warns of a 
loss of transparency because of a decline of supervision and involvement by 
public officials. On the basis of an empirical study on transparency in 
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concession partnerships, Hood, Fraser and McGarvey (2006, 43-44) conclude 
that the politicians or public servants that are supposed to understand the 
agreements, actually fail to do so, given the technical and financial complexity 
of these projects: “It may be that one reason for the paucity of information 
and lack of transparency [...] may be the sheer complexity of the accounting 
and contractual arrangements inherent in [...] contracts that define 
straightforward (and auditable) performance measures.” In a similar vein 
Grimsey and Lewis (2002, 246) observe: “Even those with considerable 
financial expertise may have trouble comprehending their meaning and 
significance. Yet many of the user groups are laymen. To what extent the 
information can reasonably be made explicable to the unsophisticated user is 
another challenge for the accounting treatment of PPP/PFI contracts.” 
With respect to the dimension of distance, Bloomfield (2006) suggests that 
long term contracting isolates public policy from the public sight and that it 
allows governments to make long-term decisions that lack approval by voters 
that do not comply with statutory debt limitations. Similarly, Hodge (2004, 17) 
claims that long-term partnerships allow governments to purchase 
infrastructure on a credit card out of sight of traditional financial monitoring. 
Despite the fact that the performance of private firms is supervised through 
supervision mechanisms, Hodge (2004) and Altshuler and Luberhoff (2003) 
argue that partnerships provide only limited opportunities for transparency and 
that available information is misleading, inaccurate or inadequate. Supervision, 
performance measurement, and monitoring are suggested as not providing the 
necessary information, resulting in a “lack of meaningful data” (Hood, Fraser 
and McGarvey 2006, 40).  
In contrast to the suggestion that organizational manifestations of the NPM 
or NPM practices lack transparency, Hirsch and Osborne (2000) understand 
the introduction of private-sector techniques to increase transparency. Tools 
such as performance measurement and the use of output indicators are 
considered to provide politicians and the public with more information about 
public policy, allowing for better decision-making and thereby enhancing the 
legitimacy of the state (e.g. Osborne and Plastrik 1998). Table 3 summarizes 
the conditions that are expected to have a positive or negative influence on the 
safeguarding of transparency. 
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Table 3: Conditions influencing transparency  
Positive influence Negative influence 
-Output indicators  
-Performance measurement  
-Decline of supervision and involvement of public officials  
-Juridical, technical and financial complexity 
-Lack of knowledge and experience on the part of public servants on 
juridical, technical and financial aspects.  
-Lack of knowledge of and experience with performance monitoring 
 
2.4.3 Responsiveness 
Responsiveness, or answerability, refers to the idea that the public sector and 
its services and products should be responsive to the preferences and needs of 
citizens as well as to user opinion (Blaug and Lekhi 2009). According to 
Andrews and van de Walle (2012, 9), the level of responsiveness indicates how 
well governments meet the expectations of citizens and service users. As Blaug 
and Lekhi (2009, 1) argue: “Responsiveness should not be confused with the 
extent to which an organization reacts to the public’s immediate opinions. 
There may be occasions when rapid reaction to public preferences is not an 
appropriate response.” Politicians and public servants are, in that respect, 
expected to make workable and legitimate decisions in such a way that they: 
“[d]emonstrate their capacity to meaningfully respond to the needs and 
concerns articulated by citizen-users.” 
It is suggested that the introduction of NPM practices reduces 
responsiveness since it implies an increasing distance from the public sector in 
relation to public service delivery. Some scholars suggest that the dominant 
neo-liberal agenda might contribute to the “hollowing out of the state”, and to 
“governance without government”, both implying that the public sector is no 
longer in control when it comes to influencing and constructing public policy 
(Bevir 2010; Flinders 2010; Skelcher 2010). In that respect, Box (1999, 21) 
argues that NPM intentionally separates politics from administration and that it 
allows managers to manage according to economic rationality rather than in 
accordance with the political and public opinion. As a result, politicians fear 
that they lose control over public service management and policy making 
(Bovaird 2004). The perception of a loss of responsiveness in the context of 
NPM has grown even stronger because of the importance of external advisors 
for public policy and public service delivery. In that respect Drechsler (2005, 
98) describes: “NPM specifically returns decision making to the allegedly 
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expert bureaucrat, under the cloak of efficiency, therefore removing political 
control, and that also means political responsibility, from the political sphere.”  
Empirical research (admittedly very limited) on responsiveness in the 
context of NPM demonstrates that citizens and service consumers perceive the 
level of responsiveness in public services to have indeed declined (Andrews 
and van de Walle 2012, 9). In the case of long-term contracting, there are 
scholars who argue that it decreases responsiveness since contractual 
agreements do not allow future governments to adjust contractual agreements 
retrospectively. As a result, new governments are confronted with old 
contracts and decisions that perhaps no longer fit the new socio-economic 
context and public needs (e.g. Hodge and Greve 2007; Peters 1997). In that 
respect, Deakin and Walsh (1996, 43) suggest that the apparent increase in 
transparency in long-term contracting might very well be bought at the expense 
of responsiveness given the fact that public purchasers might feel juridically 
obliged to continue with a contract and a supplier even if they would prefer to 
end the collaboration. Similarly, Ranson (2003, 468) states that long term 
contracts and their legal regime “deny a defining characteristic of the public 
sphere of capacity to revise policies and practices in response to changes in 
need and understanding of good practice.” Finally, Skelcher, Navdeep and 
Smith (2005, 574), argue that partnerships “do not accord with the doctrine of 
the primacy of politics” therewith embodying a tension “between effective 
democratic guidance and control to ensure the public interest is served and 
effective program delivery to increase community welfare.” 
In contrast to the idea that NPM implies the role of the state is shrinking, 
others suggest that the state’s role with respect to public policy and public 
service delivery has been transformed and that this transformation does not 
necessarily imply a loss of responsibility. In that respect, Pierre and Peters 
(2000) state: “We believe that the role of the state is not decreasing […] but 
rather that its role is transforming, from a role based in constitutional powers 
towards a role based in coordination and fusion of public and private 
resources.” Likewise, McGuire and Agranoff (2011, 279) argue that compared 
to traditional public administration, recent reforms have “increased the role of 
the government as facilitator and co-operating partner”, and that public- 
private networks “are of the government” rather than that they exclude 
government. Finally, Heinrich, Lynn and Milward (2009) conclude that 
government still plays a vital role in public service delivery by influencing the 
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composition of networks and their outcomes, even though they are not directly 
engaged in service provision. Table 4 summarizes the conditions that are 
expected to have a positive or negative influence on the safeguarding of 
responsiveness. 
 
Table 4: Conditions influencing responsiveness  
Positive influence Negative influence 
-Influencing outcomes 
-Influencing the composition of networks  
-Long-term contracting 
 
2.4.4 Responsibility  
According to public law, governments have the responsibility to provide 
certain services and products. The fact that governments are responsible for 
service provision does not imply that the public sector should provide these 
services themselves. Indeed, in recent years, the responsibility for much public 
service delivery has been transferred to, or shared with, private firms. Given 
the increasing involvement of the private sector in relation to public service 
delivery, several scholars wonder whether governments indeed now see their 
public responsibility realized through private action and whether they are able 
to control private action sufficiently (Debicki 2003).  
In the context of PPPs, Hood and McGarvey (2002) discuss the 
opportunity for public and private sector partners to pass the blame and dodge 
responsibility, referring to this as a “blame game.” Given the fact that private 
partners are not only responsible to the public sector but also to their 
shareholders, Child, Faulkner and Tallman (2005, 55) argue that responsibility 
itself might be at stake and that this risk is even greater when there are multiple 
private partners involved.  
With respect to the trustworthiness of contracts through which 
governments can enforce private firms to fulfill their responsibility, Brown, 
Potoski and Van Slyke (2010) demonstrate that the degree to which contracts 
do, in fact, guarantee that the public responsibility will be executed as hoped 
for, depends greatly on the completeness or quality of the contract (e.g. 
Domberger and Jensen 1997). The more specific the contractual conditions in 
terms of output and outcome, the less uncertainty there is around whether the 
contractor is meeting the contract terms. Nevertheless, although complete 
contracts explicitly defining the service-related goals, costs, and rules of 
interaction between the procurer and contractor seem favorable because they 
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reduce uncertainty and possible conflicts, they are seldom preferable, in fact, 
because they leave no room for flexibility and innovation. Less specified 
contracts contain broader parameters that allow for innovation, further 
negotiation, and flexibility although they may trigger opportunistic behavior by 
the procurer or the contractor (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2007, 608). 
Table 5 summarizes the conditions that are expected to have a positive or 
negative influence on the safeguarding of responsibility. 
 
Table 5: Conditions influencing responsibility  
Positive influence Negative influence 
-Complete contracts  -Incomplete contracts  
-Share holder responsibility  
 
2.4.5 Quality  
As many scholars attest, it is difficult to define what quality actually refers to 
(e.g. Domberger and Jensen 1997; Howie, Heaney and Maxwell 2004). 
Zeithalm (1988, 3) defines quality as “[a] judgment about a product’s overall 
excellence or superiority.” In this definition, quality is understood as a 
subjective value, which is the opposite of objective quality that is defined as: 
“Measurable and verifiable superiority on some predetermined ideal standard 
or standards” (Zeithalm 1988, 3). It has been argued that there is no such thing 
as objective quality and that quality always implies a subjective judgment 
(Maynes 1976). In that respect Domberger and Jensen (1997, 74) explain: 
“Quality may be identified in terms of certain performance characteristics, but 
their assessment may require subjective judgment rather than mere 
accumulation of facts. Cleaning is perhaps a good example: what constitutes a 
high standard of cleanliness may vary from one observer to another.” 
In order to establish the level of quality, Maynes (1976) argues it is 
necessary to have clear points of reference. The quality of a service or product 
is evaluated high or low depending on the relative excellence among 
substituting services and products (Zeithalm 1988, 5). In relation to 
establishing a clear set of values for the purposes of comparison, Domberger 
and Jensen (1997, 74) argue that it is very difficult to compare service quality in 
the context of contracting since there is often no data available on service 
quality before governments decide to contract out specific services. As a result, 
it is difficult to establish whether the quality of service delivery has improved 
or not. 
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Subjective or perceived service quality is understood to be influenced by the 
difference between expectations and actual performance (Bolton and Drew 
1991). It is suggested that public managers can influence perceived quality by 
applying service quality management. Service quality management implies that, 
using various techniques, the gap between expectations and actual delivery can 
be minimized (Mwita 2000, 19). A necessary premise is that expectations are 
well articulated and that performance indeed can be measured. In that respect, 
various scholars suggest that the ability to make judgments about delivered 
quality depends greatly on the ability of public managers to assess the service 
quality (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2006, 326; Deakin and Walsh 1996). In 
general it is assumed that the more quantifiable the expected and actual 
outcome, the easier it is to establish the level of quality. In contrast, when 
expectations are difficult to define quantitatively, it will be more difficult to 
determine the quality of the delivered services, which, in turn might influence 
the perception of delivered quality. 
In relation to NPM and service quality, some suggest that in the search for 
financial optimization, private firms will only provide minimum levels of 
quality. This “quality-shading hypothesis” assumes that private firms strive for 
financial optimization rather than service quality (Evatt Research Centre 1990). 
In a similar vein, Box (1999, 19) suggests that although market-like reforms 
might have increased efficiency, concerns with respect to the quality of service 
delivery remain.  
In contrast to the quality-shading hypothesis, several empirical studies 
indicate that privatization might actually enhance quality. An empirical study in 
the water sector demonstrates that privatized water firms provided better 
service quality than did their “previous public incarnations” (Galiani, 
Gertlerand and Schargrodsky 2005, 113). Likewise, in a comparative study on 
service quality in the electricity industry, Fumagalli, Garrone and Grilli (2007) 
conclude that privatization has not led to a reduction in service quality. In the 
context of contracting, comparative studies provide the same evidence that 
suggests that service quality seems to have improved because of output 
formulation and the introduction of performance monitoring (Domberger, 
Hall and Li 1995). With respect to PPPs, Hodge and Greve (2007, 549) 
observe that, despite the claims on service quality in the context of PPPs, 
empirical evidence is very limited.  
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Although non-compliance by private firms in terms of quality can be 
avoided by using performance measures, monitoring mechanisms and 
sanctioning, Peat and Costley (2001, 57) argue that the actual application of 
such tools has proven to be problematic in practice. In the context of 
contracting, Domberger and Jensen (1997, 71-72) believe that performance 
measurement by the public sector is the crux of the contracting failure 
suggesting that the public sector is not able to measure performance. Various 
case studies indeed confirm this suggestion and show that governments 
experience problems with monitoring because of a decline in management 
capacity and a lack of financial, technical, or strategic knowledge (de Bettignies 
and Ross 2009; Savas 2000; Van Slyke and Hammonds 2003). Domberger and 
Jensen (1997, 71-72), however, argue that this is not always the case and that 
the quality of contract monitoring depends on the quality of the public 
organization or public servants which can vary per context. Table 6 provides 
an overview of the conditions that are expected to have a positive or negative 
influence on the safeguarding of quality. 
 
Table 6: Conditions influencing quality  
Positive influence Negative influence 
-Ease of assessing service quality  
-Ease of establishing expectations (quantitative) 
-Output specifications  
-Performance monitoring 
-Difficulty in assessing service quality  
-Difficulty in establishing expectations  
-Financial optimization 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to discuss and define the concepts of PPPs and 
public values and to take a closer look at the relationship between both 
concepts as expressed in public administration literature.  
 The chapter began with the concept of PPPs. The term PPPs is used as an 
umbrella term to refer to a wide range of public-private cooperation 
configurations. In this study, PPPs are defined as Design-Build-Finance-
Maintain-Operate projects. In DBFMO projects, the cooperation between the 
public and private sector is organized through a long-term performance 
contract in which the responsibility for the design, construction, financing, 
maintenance and operation of a public service are transferred to a private 
consortium that is usually comprised of various private firms. 
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 With respect to the concept of public values, section 2.3 demonstrated that 
the public values discussion holds a prominent place in the public 
administration literature and that public values as a research object remain 
highly ambiguous. With respect to the first part of the central research question 
(what happens to public values in public-private partnerships), section 2.4 first of all 
showed that there are many contradicting assumptions on the relationship 
between NPM and public values. Whereas some argue that public values are at 
stake, others argue the exact opposite. Despite the numerous assumptions 
there is only a very little empirical examination. In that respect, Andrews and 
van de Walle (2012, 4) indeed argue: “Academics have repeatedly emphasized 
the need for evaluating NPM […] empirical assessments, however, are scarce.” 
Furthermore, section 2.4 showed that not only is there little empirical 
knowledge of public values in the context of NPM in general, indeed there is 
scarcely any empirical knowledge at all of public values in the context of 
DBFMO, with the single exception of transparency. Section 2.4 outlines many 
contradictory assumptions on public values in the context of privatization and 
contracting. To what extent any of these assumptions hold true for DBFMO 
remains a question unanswered.  
 While the first part of the research question aims at describing what 
happens to public values in DBFMO, the second part (what conditions are 
influential) tries to assess what conditions influence the public values’ trajectory 
in DBFMO. Section 2.4 put forward various conditions that are assumed to 
have a negative or a positive influence on the safeguarding of public values in 
the context of NPM. Conditions that are assumed to have a negative influence 
on public values are the increased distance between decision making and 
execution; a shortfall in accountability mechanisms; juridical, technical and 
financial complexity; lack of experience and knowledge of performance 
monitoring; complexity of service level specifications; and long-term 
contracting (see Table 7). Conditions that are expected to have a positive 
influence on public values are: output specifications; monitoring; performance 
related pay; service quality management and long-term contracting. Indeed, 
some conditions (such as long-term contracting) are expected to have a 
positive as well as a negative influence on the same public value (see Table 7). 
Moreover, some conditions are expected to favor a specific value while 
harming others. The conditions set out in section 2.4 are those thought to be 
related to NPM, privatization and contracting rather than specifically to 
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DBFMO. It thus remains to be seen whether these conditions indeed play a 
role in what happens to public values in DBFMO.  
 
Table 7: Influencing conditions per value    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
Accountability  -Performance monitoring  
-Service level specifications  
-Tools for preventing 
noncompliance  
-Increased distance between decision making and 
execution 
-Juridical, technical and financial complexity 
-Shortfall in accountability mechanisms 
Transparency  -Output indicators  
-Performance measurement  
-Decline of supervision and involvement public 
officials  
-Juridical, technical and financial complexity 
-Lack of knowledge and experience on the part of 
public servants on juridical, technical and financial 
aspects.  
-Lack of knowledge of and experience with 
performance monitoring 
Responsiveness -Influence on composition 
networks  
-Influence on outcomes 
-Long-term contracting 
Responsibility -Complete contracts  -Incomplete contracts  
-Share holder responsibility  
Quality  -Expectations that are easy 
to establish (quantitative) 
-Output specifications  
-Performance monitoring 
-Service quality that is easy 
to assess 
-Difficulty in establishing expectations  
-Financial optimization 
-Service quality that is difficult to assess  
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3 Methodology 
 
3.1 Introduction9 
The central research question of this study is: What happens to public values in 
public-private partnerships and what conditions are influential? The theoretical and 
conceptual foundation of this research question was further elaborated in 
Chapter 2. Chapter 3 connects theory, concepts, and research questions by 
merging all three into a research approach. The central research question will 
be answered by conducting a multiple case study including four PPPs in the 
Netherlands. The case study approach is compatible with the explorative 
research question and in line with the suggestion that public values as well as 
PPPs should be studied in their specific context (Bovaird 2004; Carroll and 
Steane 2000). This chapter describes and explains in further detail the research 
approach and methods adopted in this study. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 describes how this 
specific study approaches the concept of public values and how it manages the 
quest to determine the conditions influencing public values in PPPs. Section 
3.3 introduces the case study approach and describes the process of case and 
respondent selection. Section 3.4 explains the method of data collection 
followed by section 3.5 providing the data analysis strategy. Section 3.6 
considers the research approach in terms of generalizability and reliability and, 
finally, section 3.7 treats some ethical considerations.  
 
3.2 Studying public values in PPPs 
The first part of the central research question (what happens to public values in 
public-private partnerships), refers to the question of whether the public values 
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, responsibility, and quality are 
threatened, safeguarded or strengthened in the context of DBFMO. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, current public administration literature does not 
provide a definite answer to this question.  
A possible explanation for the lack of convincing empirical knowledge on 
this relationship is the ambiguity of the public values concept. Formulating a 
theory on a concept that has a great deal of uncertainty attached to its meaning 
and definition is difficult. A second reason might be the immaterial character 
                                                            
9 Parts of this chapter have been published (Reynaers 2013). 
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of the public values concept. As with all immaterial concepts, public values 
cannot be measured on an objective interval scale. Besides, as we have seen in 
Chapter 2, there is often no specific knowledge about the ‘amount’ or ‘level’ of 
public values that exist in traditional governance structures. When a clear 
reference is not available, it is difficult to determine whether public values are 
equally, less or more represented within a particular structure.  
The ambiguousness of the public values concept makes it difficult to use it 
as an analytical tool. As Bozeman (2002, 150) describes: “Clearly, a lack of 
consensus on public values tempers our ability to develop simple analytical 
tools.” Precisely because of this ambiguity, it is necessary to define the exact 
way in which the selected values are understood in each particular study.  
Accountability is defined as the ability of the procurer to account for (1) the 
content of the project in financial, juridical, and technical terms, and (2) to 
account for actual performance during the construction and operation phase. 
This definition is loosely based on Armstrong (2005, 1) who defines 
accountability as “the obligation on the part of public officials to report on the 
usage of public resources and answerability for failing to meet stated 
performance objectives.” Rather than only considering public resources and 
failure, the specific DBFMO context makes it interesting to look at financial, 
juridical and technical terms and performance all together. 
As with the definition of accountability, in this study transparency also 
concerns the juridical, financial, technical and operational aspects of the project 
and is defined as the availability to public servants of accurate information on 
the juridical, financial, technical, and operational aspects of the project. This 
definition is loosely based on Summers’ and Nowicki’s (2006) definition who 
define transparency as “[a] series of actions creating credible governance 
systems, visible performance measurement systems, and readily available 
decision-making information about pricing of services and the amount of 
charity care.” In this study both the availability and the accuracy of information 
on different projects aspects are considered.  
Responsiveness is defined as the ability of elected officials and public 
servants to determine, influence, and adjust the contractual agreements and the 
output specifications before and after contract closure. The definition is loosely 
based on that of Blaug and Lekhi (2009, 1) who define responsiveness as the 
“capacity to meaningfully respond to the needs and concerns articulated by 
citizens-users.” This definition is adapted to the specific DBFMO context in 
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which there are clearly two distinct opportunities for public servants and 
officials to respond to such needs, namely before and after contract closure.  
Responsibility is defined as the degree to which the consortium complies 
with the contractual agreements and the output specifications. This is loosely 
based on Harper’s (1996, 596) definition which states responsibility to be 
“conformance to a rule of behavior.” In the case of DBFMO, the contract is 
the embodiment of the rule of behavior. 
Quality is defined as the degree of satisfaction of the procurer in relation to 
the asset and its actual operation by the consortium. This is loosely based on 
Zeithalm’s (1988, 3) definition of quality as “[a] judgment about a product’s 
overall excellence or superiority.” The definition used in this study considers 
quality as a subjective rather than an objective judgment, given that it is very 
difficult, as described in section 2.4.5, to objectively determine the actual 
quality  
Given the absence of an objective scale that prevents empirical 
measurement of the ‘amount’ or ‘level’ of public value present, interview 
respondents are asked about their personal experience with public values in the 
context of DBFMO. Since several respondents also have experience with 
traditional procurement, their experience sometimes reflects a comparison 
between traditional procurement and procurement according to DBFMO. 
However, Table 8 presents the definitions of accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness, responsibility, and quality as used in this study. 
Table 8: Definitions on public values in this study 
Value Definition 
Accountability The ability of the procurer to account for (1) the content of the project in financial, 
juridical, and technical terms, and (2) to account for actual performance during the 
construction and operation phase.  
Transparency The availability and accuracy of information available to public servants on juridical, 
financial, technical, and operational aspects of the project.  
Responsiveness The ability of elected officials and public servants to determine, influence, and 
adjust the contractual agreements and the output specifications before and after 
contract closure. 
Responsibility The degree to which the consortium complies with the contractual agreements and 
the output specifications. 
Quality The degree of satisfaction of the procurer in relation to the asset and its actual 
operation by the consortium. 
 
In relation to the second part of the research question, (what conditions are 
influential), the multiple case study approach, for which four cases that differ in 
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various dimensions are selected, allows for exploring what conditions might be 
of influence (see paragraph 3.3.1). Table 7 (section 2.5) summarized the 
influential conditions derived from Chapter 2’s literature review. Given that 
very few of the conditions summarized in Table 7 directly stem from literature 
on DBFMO, an inductive approach allows for conditions to emerge that are 
specific to the DBFMO context. Testing conditions does not allow for the 
emergence of different conditions that might actually exist in this new context. 
Given the inductive approach, the conditions are not systematically addressed 
implying the possibility that conditions other than the ones derived from the 
case studies might also have an influential role.  
 
3.3 The case study approach  
The case study approach, which is considered to be especially appropriate 
when theory and research are both at an early or formative stage, allows for the 
examination of the complexity and particularity of an event, process, 
institution, organization, social group, or phenomenon within its natural 
context and specific time frame, through the use of various data collection 
methods (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 1987; Eisenhardt 1989; Stake 1995; 
Yin 1981). Case study research enables the researcher to understand the way in 
which different actors and groups think, the existence of contrasting 
perspectives and perceptions, the way in which actors cope with contrasting 
perspectives and perceptions, and the way in which conflicts are defined and 
solutions are found (Swanborn 2010). 
The examination of complexity and particularity refers to the understanding 
of the action of, and interaction between, related units such as human beings, 
policy programs, organizations and social groups or, indeed, public values and 
PPPs. It is argued that in order to fully understand “the nature and complexity 
of the processes taking place” specific contextual features of a case need to be 
taken into account (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 1987, 370). Context 
influences the object of study and the other way round. Understanding the 
object of study is therefore only possible when studied within and with regard 
to its context. 
Given the lack of convincing empirical evidence on public values in 
DBFMO, this study adopts an inductive case study approach (Eisenhardt and 
Graeb 2007). In contrast to deductive case studies that are used for theory 
testing, the purpose of inductive case studies is to develop theoretical 
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propositions, derived from case-based evidence by “recognizing patterns of 
relationships among constructs within […] cases and their underlying logical 
arguments” (Eisenhardt and Graeb 2007, 25). Moreover, the multiple case 
study approach allows for a comparison between cases which clarifies whether 
findings derived from a single case are “idiosyncratic” i.e. particular to that 
specific case or “consistently replicated by several cases” (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007, 27).  
 
3.3.1 Case selection and description 
In order to understand what happens to public values in PPPs, it is important 
to include the preparation phase (during which contracts and output 
specifications are developed), the construction phase (including the design and 
realization), and the operational phase (including the maintenance and 
operation) given that the public values’ trajectory might very well change over 
time. Selecting cases that are not yet operational would only provide part of the 
story. By the time of case selection (June 2010) only a handful of projects met 
the requirement of having gone through all three stages. Eventually four 
projects, whose characteristics are summarized in Table 9, were selected.  
Table 9: Case characteristics  
 The Highway The Detention 
Center 
The Wastewater 
Project 
The Ministry of 
Finance 
Product Construction and 
operation of 
highway 
Construction and 
operation of 
detention center 
Construction and 
renovation of 
water cleaning 
installation and its 
operation 
Renovation and 
operation 
Ministry of 
Finance 
Sector  Infrastructure  Utility  Infrastructure Utility  
Procurer Directorate-
General for Public 
Works and Water 
Management 
Government 
Buildings Agency 
Water Board 
Delfland 
Government 
Buildings 
Agency  
 
Client  Directorate-
General for Public 
Works and Water 
Management 
district Friesland 
The Ministry of 
Security and 
Justice 
Water Board 
Delfland 
The Ministry of 
Finance 
 
  
The highway project concerns the construction and operation of a highway. 
The detention center project concerns the construction and operation of a 
detention centre. The wastewater project concerns the construction and 
renovation of water cleaning installations and their operation. The project of 
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the Ministry of Finance consists of the renovation and operation of the office 
of the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance and the detention center 
both concern the type of buildings that house public utilities or services 
whereas the wastewater and highway project concern infrastructure. The 
Ministry of Finance and the detention center have the same procurer (the 
Government Buildings Agency) but different clients (respectively the Ministry 
of Finance and the Ministry of Security and Justice). Whereas the Ministry of 
Finance, the highway and the detention center have national procurers and 
clients, the wastewater project has a regional procurer and client. Finally, as 
noted in Chapter 1, all four cases form part of a national pilot program. This 
program was introduced by the Dutch government in order to (1) find out 
whether DBFMO would lead to better results, (2) to optimize the DBFMO 
structure, (3) to find out what institutional aspects impede the use of DBFMO 
and (4) to develop knowledge that could be used in future projects.10 
 
3.3.2 Respondent selection and description  
With respect to the selection of respondents, three criteria were fundamental. 
First, it was important that they all either were, or had been, directly involved 
with the DBFMO project. Second, given that most actors are only involved 
during one phase of the project, it was important that the selected respondents 
taken together covered the preparation, realization and operation phase. Third, 
following Weihe (2008), it is argued that it is necessary to include actors who 
worked for, or on behalf of, the state (i.e. procurers, project directors, contract 
managers, external advisors, lawyers, technicians, financial experts, auditors, 
architects) as well as actors who worked for, or on behalf of, the consortia (i.e. 
project directors, consortium members, subcontractors, external advisors, 
contract managers, lawyers, technicians, financial experts, architects, technical 
advisors). Conducting interviews with actors from the procurer’s side as well as 
from the consortium side, results in a more complete impression of the 
experiences with public values in DBFMO.  
Project descriptions published on the internet provided the first route to 
contact project members. After the first interviews were conducted, the 
selection of respondents followed the chain sampling technique that is also 
                                                            
10 Voortgangsrapportage PPS. Van incidenteel naar structureel. Available through:  
     www.ppsbijhetrijk.nl, date of access 21-5-2013. 
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known as the snowball technique (van Meter 1990). Snowball sampling is a 
nonprobabilistic sampling approach (Guest, Bunce and Johnson 2006, 62) 
which entails that interviewees recruit or recommend other relevant 
interviewees. As such, the group of respondents grows as if it were a snowball. 
The reason for following this strategy is that it was initially impossible to find 
out who had been involved in the partnership projects. The selection of new 
respondents stopped as soon as data saturation was achieved, that is, as soon 
as the interviews would no longer provide new data for the development of 
conceptual categories (Francis et al. 2010, 1230).  
For reasons of safety and security, permission to make personal contact 
with respondents for the detention center was withheld and the project 
director from the Ministry of Safety and Security selected the respondents for 
that particular case study. With the exception of the detention center case, for 
each case the respondent selection criteria (involvement, achieving 
representatives of all project phases and being procurer or consortium related) 
have been taken into account making it highly plausible that the samples per 
project are representative for each case.  
Eventually 66 people were interviewed. As Table 10 shows, the number of 
state, consortium, or external actors differs in each case. State actors are those 
actors with the official status of public servant. Consortium actors are those 
actors that work for the consortium or for a company that forms part of this 
consortium. External actors are those that work on behalf of either the 
consortium or procurer without forming part of the consortium or having the 
status of public servant. Service users are not consulted given that the scope of 
this study concerns the interaction between the procurer and consortium and 
the effect of this interaction on public values.  
 
Table 10: Characteristics of respondents 
The Highway The Detention 
Center 
The Wastewater 
Project 
The Ministry of 
Finance 
State: 12 
Consortium: 5 
External: 1 
Total: 18 
State: 9 
Consortium: 2 
External: 0 
Total: 11 
State: 4 
Consortium: 5 
External: 3 
Total: 12 
State: 10 
Consortium: 8 
External: 7 
Total: 25 
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3.4 Data collection 
With respect to data collection in case study research, various methods such as 
interviewing, observing, analyzing documents and conducting surveys can be 
used and combined in order to construct a rich data set that focuses on the 
specific research issue as well as its context (Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead 
1987). A case study is not a method in itself nor does it have a qualitative 
character by definition. Case study research is qualitative or quantitative 
depending on the nature of the collected data. As mentioned earlier, this study 
adopts a qualitative approach, which means that only qualitative data obtained 
through in-depth interviews and project-specific documents is used. The 
following paragraphs describe the process of data collection in more detail.  
 
3.4.1 Documents 
The study started with the examination of project-related and DBFMO-related 
documents provided by the procurers, consultancy bureaus, and consortia 
through their websites. Amongst the selected documents were model 
contracts, internal and external evaluations, and project descriptions. During 
the interviews, respondents were asked to provide other documentation of 
interest such as, for example, the output specifications, and internal 
evaluations. Appendix I provide an overview of the collected documents per 
case. In total, about 870 pages were consulted. 
 
3.4.2 Interviews 
With respect to interviewing, the first step in the process of data collection 
consisted of inviting respondents to participate. All respondents received an 
invitation by email in which the research topic was briefly introduced and in 
which the reason for their selection was explained. On acceptance, interviews 
were planned, either with respondents themselves or with their secretary. Of 
the 67 invitations sent, only one person refused to participate. Three 
respondents were interviewed twice, yielding 69 interviews with 66 
interviewees. The interviews were conducted between September 2010 and 
March 2012 and had a semi-structured character. Whereas structured 
interviews have an exact set of questions that have to be followed precisely, 
semi-structured interviews use a topic list or framework of themes that are 
discussed and explored during the interview without a fixed order.  
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Semi-structured interviews allow for the incorporation of new ideas and 
questions while interviewing, which, in this case, was a necessary premise since 
most respondents have only been involved during a specific part of the PPPs 
project and represented different disciplines. The questionnaire was therefore 
adapted depending on the respondents’ involvement and function and on the 
specific answers, respondents gave.  
The interviews all started with a general introduction of the research project 
and the aims of the interview. Thereafter, all respondents were asked for 
permission to record the interviews. During two interviews, recording was not 
possible because of technical problems. In these cases, the answers were 
captured in writing. Respondents were informed that in order to ensure 
anonymity, their names would not be attached to citations. The interviews each 
lasted between one and two hours and were transcribed verbatim resulting in 
230 pages of data (238,000 words). All interviews were conducted in Dutch 
with the exception of one that was conducted in English.  
The interviews started with questions about the background of the 
interviewee such as his or her function and their role within the partnership 
project. After that, the interview progressed in line with the different project 
phases. For example, if an interviewee had been involved from the beginning 
of the project, they were first invited to reflect on the preparation phase in 
terms of public values. After that, similar questions were asked for the 
construction and operational phase. The aim of the interviews was to uncover 
respondents’ experience with public values in DBFMO and interviewees were 
invited to further explain and illustrate their general statements. Appendix II 
provide an overview of the topics discussed during the interviews.  
During most interviews, the atmosphere was pleasant and interviewees were 
very willing to answer the questions. Respondents were open about both their 
negative and their positive experiences. When possible or considered 
necessary, interviewees were confronted with statements from other 
respondents without mentioning them by name. As such, the respondents were 
able to reflect on apparently contradictory statements as well as statements that 
endorsed their own views.  
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3.5 Analysis  
Qualitative data analysis is a “[p]rocess of organizing data into categories and 
identifying patterns (relationships) among categories […]” (McMillan and 
Schumacher 1993, 479). This process of categorization is also known as coding 
(e.g. Boeije 2005; Miles and Huberman 1994; Strauss and Corbin 1998; van 
Staa and Evers 2010; Wester 2004). Coding refers to the labeling of text 
fragments. Depending on whether the study adopts an inductive or a (more) 
deductive approach, the labels or codes are derived either from the data itself 
or from theory (LeCompte and Schensul 1999; Strauss and Corbin 1998).  
The process of coding consists of three phases: open coding, axial coding 
and selective coding. Open coding consists of marking, labeling and saving text 
fragments under a specific code that covers the content of the fragments. Axial 
coding consists of the reorganization of codes, which means that codes can be 
combined, separated into sub-codes, and renamed. As such, codes represent 
valid values per dimension (Hak 2007, 6). Finally, selective coding implies that 
relations and patterns among codes are determined through a process of 
‘constant comparison’ (Boeije 2005).  
Whereas McMillan and Schumacher (1993, 479), define qualitative data 
analysis as an inductive process, the inductive and deductive approach are 
frequently combined. Combining inductively obtained codes with codes 
established prior to the analysis allows flexibility with respect to empirical 
‘reality’ on the one hand and theoretical guidance on the other (van Staa and 
Evers 2010). This study adopts such a combined approach. This implies that 
prior to the analysis a framework of codes concerning the five values under 
scrutiny in this study was constructed and that this framework, after the 
analysis, was combined with codes that emerged from the data itself. In this 
way, data-driven and theory driven codes are combined (Fereday and Muir-
Cochrane 2008). The following paragraphs describe in further detail how the 
interviews and documents have been analyzed.  
 
3.5.1 Documents 
The documents served in the first place to provide information about the 
background of the selected cases in terms of contractual structure, risk 
distribution, scope, time frame, etc. In addition, the documents (especially the 
evaluations) provided insight into experience of the procurement and 
construction phases. Although they did not always directly concern public 
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values, the insights derived from these documents were invaluable in preparing 
the interviews with those involved in the selected PPP projects. The 
documents were coded manually by using the following codes: accountability, 
transparency, responsiveness, responsibility, quality and conditions (see 3.5.2).  
 
3.5.2 The interviews 
The analysis of the interview data started with the “within-case analysis” which 
means that each case was analyzed separately (Eisenhardt 1989, 540). The idea 
of the within-case analysis is to understand a case as a unique entity, which 
“allows the unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to 
generalize patterns across cases” (Eisenhardt 1989, 540). The within-case 
analysis provides sufficient familiarity with separate cases, which helps the 
eventual cross-case comparison.  
During the first phase of the analysis, interview citations were coded with 
one of the following labels: ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’, ‘responsiveness’, 
‘responsibility’, ‘quality’ and ‘conditions’. The second phase of the analysis 
searched for patterns within the answers under each label. All citations under a 
certain label were compared and, depending on their content, regrouped and 
given a new label (i.e. sub-code). For example, citations under the code 
‘transparency’ that addressed the issue of financial transparency were 
regrouped and given the label ‘financial transparency’. In this way, these 
citations were separated from other citations that, for example, addressed 
transparency with respect to performance. The final step in terms of coding 
consisted of regrouping and re-coding the sub-codes. Citations under ‘financial 
transparency’ as a sub-code of ‘transparency’ were regrouped if triggered by 
their content. If the sub-code ‘financial transparency’ contained citations that 
expressed both satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the financial transparency 
observed, the sub-code was given further sub-coding for ‘satisfaction’ and 
‘dissatisfaction’.  
All the citations were coded and regrouped after which the meaning of the 
findings per sub-code was interpreted in terms of public values. Once the sub-
codes had been fully interpreted, it was possible to begin the interpretation of 
the findings for each principal code. After that, overall findings were interpreted 
in terms of public values. Finally, the interpretations of the findings were 
compared with the general assumptions about public values in DBFMO to be 
found in public values literature. For the cross-case comparison, the 
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interpretation of the findings for each value were compared with the overall 
findings in terms of public values followed by a search for similarities and 
differences between the four cases.  
 
3.6 Generalization and reliability  
Every methodology has its strengths and weaknesses: case study research is no 
exception to that rule. Case study research is often criticized for its low 
potential for enabling generalization because, usually, only a limited number of 
cases are included. Sample research allows for statistical generalization of 
research findings to a greater population. Case study research does not allow 
for such generalization, which leads some to believe that case study research 
does not contribute to the development of scientific knowledge. In that 
respect, Firestone (1993) and Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) argue that case 
study research does allow for generalization but one of a different kind. Instead 
of statistical generalization, case study research allows for theoretical or 
analytical generalization. Whereas statistical or sample generalization refers to 
extrapolation from a randomly chosen sample to a larger population, 
theoretical or analytical generalization implies that particular findings are 
connected or applied to a certain theory. Findings from one case can be 
generalized to other cases that have not been studied but fall under the same 
theory. In this study, for example, findings from four DBFMO projects are 
compared in order to formulate patterns that are potentially valid for other 
DBFMO projects.  
This study does not aim at formulating a general theory or universal law 
about public values in DBFMO. Instead, it aims at discovering patterns and 
mechanisms by studying “segments of reality” intensively and this is, indeed, 
“more modest and restrictive” in comparison to studies that do aim at 
constructing all encompassing theories about a certain phenomenon (van 
Braam 1989, 36). Rather than providing a general theory, this study provides 
explanatory conditions and mechanisms that are observed in actual partnership 
projects in the Netherlands. The conditions that could potentially influence 
what happens to public values in DBFMO are generated inductively and are 
therefore a miscellany, and only those influential conditions generated from the 
data collected are taken into account. As such, the causal link between 
influential conditions and public values is not fully comprehensively 
established. This does not imply that the contribution of this study is thereby 
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unimportant. On the contrary: the miscellaneous nature of uncertain causal 
relations provides useful and meaningful knowledge that builds on, 
complements and combines existing knowledge on public values in DBFMO. 
Besides, the multiple case study approach allows for determining whether 
findings are DBFMO-specific or project-specific. DBFMO-specific findings 
are directly related to the elements of DBFMO such as its long-term character, 
the use of monitoring mechanisms and output specifications. Case specific 
findings have to do with aspects that are not necessarily related to DBFMO 
such as sector and product.  
With respect to the reliability of case study research, it is argued that the 
subjectivity of the researcher is problematic. The subjective role of the 
researcher is expressed through the use of semi-structured interviews or the 
interpretative data analysis approach. Eisenhardt (1989, 539), however, argues 
that this subjectivity should not be regarded as problematic but rather as an 
advantage: “The flexibility is not a license to be unsystematic. Rather, this 
flexibility is controlled opportunism in which researchers take advantage of the 
uniqueness of a specific case and the emergence of new themes to improve 
resultant theory.” In the study which underpins this thesis, part of this 
subjectivity is compensated for by 1) taping all interviews 2) transcribing them 
verbatim 3) and by providing the topic list for the semi-structured interviews 
(see Appendix II).  
The data collection method of qualitative interviewing is sometimes 
considered less reliable because of the possibility of receiving socially desirable 
answers (Weiss 1994, 1-3). In order to minimize the possibility of receiving 
that kind of answer, a certain anonymity about the whole process was 
generated during and after the interviews in order to create a comfortable 
atmosphere in which the respondents felt at ease and that confidentiality was 
being preserved. During the interviews, for example, previous respondents’ 
names were not mentioned when presenting findings derived from earlier 
interviews to new interviewees. Additionally, respondents’ names are not 
attached to citations nor are job titles or roles mentioned (see paragraph 3.7).  
 
3.7 Ethical considerations 
Neither the publication of research findings nor the selected research methods 
should ever cause harm to respondents. Researchers, however, can experience 
a tension between, on the one hand publishing interesting findings and, on the 
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other hand taking into account the position or reputation of respondents. In 
this study, this tension could be felt with respect to the relationship existing 
between respondents in the same partnership project. Most respondents have 
been, or still are, working together in the projects. In view of this ongoing 
relationship, every effort has been made not to frustrate it in any way and 
various precautions were taken while collecting data and re-sorting the 
findings. During the interviews, for example, as already mentioned, previous 
respondents’ names were not divulged to subsequent interviewees when they 
were being presented with findings derived from the earlier interviews. When 
the findings are presented, the sources of specific citations are not given. 
Providing names and affiliation would make it easy for insiders to identify 
individuals who had made specific comments. Whereas these precautions 
guarantee anonymity for outsiders, complete anonymity for insiders cannot be 
guaranteed since there always remains the possibility that insiders will 
recognize the views expressed and link a particular citation to a specific 
colleague.  
Since the start of the detention center project, groups and individuals who 
do not agree with the government’s detention policy have threatened several of 
the respondents. As a premise for including this case in the underlying study, 
the principal contractor at the Ministry of Justice requested complete 
anonymity for respondents. For the same reason, there was an agreement in 
place to provide the procurer with the opportunity to examine the chapter 
concerning in order to satisfy themselves that the degree of anonymity was 
indeed satisfactory. 
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4 The Highway 
 
4.1 Introduction11 
This chapter presents the findings of a case study on a DBFMO project to 
build and maintain a highway in the north of the Netherlands. The chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a short introduction to the project 
and describes its scope and content. Section 4.3 and subparagraphs, present the 
findings organized by value. Section 4.4 provides the conclusion.  
 
4.2 Project description 
The highway project was to broaden a highway and construct an aqueduct 
between Leeuwarden and Drachten in the Northern Province of Friesland. 
The road that formerly connected the two cities could not cope with the 
increase in traffic and posed a threat to road safety. To overcome this problem, 
the single lane road (1x1) had to be converted into a two lane road (2x2).  
Around the turn of the century, the national knowledge center publiek-private 
samenwerking (PPS) considered nine projects for procurement according to 
DBFMO principles, including the highway project discussed in this chapter. 
The national department of waterways and public works, Rijkswaterstaat (the 
executive organization of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, 
hereafter RWS) expected DBFMO procurement to help to increase efficiency 
and innovation, and to obtain a better price-quality ratio. After a procurement 
process conducted under European procurement law, RWS and a consortium 
consisting of several companies, signed a twenty year contract in December 
2003. The consortium is responsible for the design, construction, financing, 
maintaining, and operation of the road until the year 2023. The construction 
started around May 2004, and in October 2007, the road came into use.  
The scope of the contract covers, amongst other things, the design and 
construction of the road; the maintenance of the road, crash barriers, borders, 
trees, public gardens, public lightning, tunnels, and viaducts; and the operation 
of a bridge, an aqueduct, and its pump cellar. The consortium also supports 
RWS if accidents occur, provides RWS with advice in relation to special 
transport, and measures the traffic intensity of the trajectory. It is also 
responsible for detecting and solving irregularities, and for reporting on 
                                                            
11 Parts of this chapter have been published (Reynaers 2013). 
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performance to RWS. For reasons of finance and for safety considerations, 
RWS decided not to include accident management and de-icing in the scope of 
the contract. The local RWS district Friesland, manages the contract and 
receives support from the central RWS organization if necessary.  
 
4.3 Findings 
 
4.3.1 Accountability  
During the preparation phase the procurer defines the technical, financial, and 
juridical requirements of the tender, produces draft versions of the contract, 
and designs the output specification and the financial model. RWS hired 
external advisors to provide support during the preparation of the tender, since 
they had little knowledge or experience of the specific requirements of 
DBFMO procurement. An interviewee illustrated the point: “We didn’t know 
anything about the whole process of procurement so we hired an enormous 
number of external advisors.” Several interviewees reported that the procurer 
came to depend on these external advisors and lost control of the preparation 
process. As a respondent put it: “I do wonder sometimes, who is the boss, 
who is in control? They [external advisors] or RWS? When you work with 
external advisors, you sometimes wonder why we [RWS] exist at all.”  
 The significant role external advisors played during the preparation process 
seemed to hinder the ability of the procurer in accounting for the eventual 
content of the project parameters. Despite the fact that the procurer had been 
involved during the preparation phase and the fact that contractual agreements 
and the output specifications reflect the actual ins and outs of the project, 
interviewees had their doubts about whether they themselves were able to 
explain the exact content and conditions. As one interviewee put it: 
“Everything is down on paper but imagine, this was our first DBFMO project 
and we did not have a clue. The external advisors can explain everything 
perfectly but I do have my doubts whether anyone within the organization 
[RWS] knows what all the agreements entail.” Another respondent, signaled 
the differences between accountability on paper and accountability in practice: 
“Everything is set out in writing but really…to be honest I did not know what 
I was doing at the start.” With respect to the financial aspects of the project the 
contract management team was not convinced of the ability of its own 
organization to account for what was happening. A respondent said: “It is 
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difficult to understand DBFMO. I think there is not one person in the whole 
organization who understands all the aspects put together. Especially when you 
start talking about the financial component. That is just too difficult to 
understand.”  
After the bidding process, the project was awarded to a consortium 
consisting of several companies. The procurer and the consortium had come 
to an agreement on the project parameters, and the management of the 
contract during the construction and operational phase was transferred to a 
contract management team from the Friesland District RWS. The involvement 
of one set of actors in the procurement process and a different set in managing 
the contract was considered problematic in terms of accountability since the 
contract management team was faced with managing a complex contract they 
were barely knowledgeable about. In that respect a respondent wondered: 
“The district responsible for contract management only got to know the initial 
decisions of the national department of RWS later on. You might wonder 
whether this is good for the credibility of an organization on the long run.” 
This apparently sudden and little-coordinated transfer of the project 
management from the national to the regional level left the newly appointed 
contract management team not only with a difficult coordination task but also 
with several questions about the actual project content. As a respondent put it: 
“We are all designers, technicians, or builders and suddenly we have to behave 
like contract managers. I do not know whether it is fair to ask that from us. 
You cannot expect me to account for all these things when I have absolutely 
no clue what I should do as a contract manager.” Similarly, another respondent 
argued: “I have to act like a contract manager but to be honest, how can you 
expect that from someone who has no experience of it at all? You need to 
make sure people know how contract management works.” Overall, the initial 
quality of the contract management team appeared not to be as desired. A 
respondent explained: “You cannot guarantee to be accountable when you 
have absolutely no clue what you have to do as a contract manager. And I 
know that with this project there were certain people in that position. That is 
not their fault; it is the fault of those managing the reorganization. They 
introduce a system, and they think it will work on its own. They do not even 
think about the human factor behind the system. But if I don’t know what to 
do, the system will fail.” 
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Using agreed monitoring mechanisms, the contract management team holds 
the consortium accountable for its performance. In turn, the contract 
management team is accountable to RWS and eventually to the ministry. 
However, aspects of the monitoring mechanism appeared not to function 
properly at the start of the construction and operational phase. As a result, 
neither the consortium nor the contract management team, were able to 
account fully for what was being done by the consortium. Nor were they able 
to explain what they got in return for spending public money. A respondent 
described it: “In the beginning we were not able to explain exactly what was 
done and where our money went to. That had to do with the fact that it was 
the first time we had done this. The mechanisms still had to be adjusted.” This 
is illustrated by irregularities during the operating phase when the consortium 
was not able to prove formally that the road was available. The consortium has 
the obligation to report to the procurer on the availability of the road. When 
the condition of the road is as requested, the road is considered to be available 
and the procurer is obliged to transfer the availability fee to the consortium. 
Even when the road had already been available in technical and practical terms 
for a couple of years, the consortium was not able to formally prove its 
availability for the simple reason that the monitoring intervals were too large. 
Since the monitoring reports could not be produced, the availability fee could 
not be formally justified. During the operational phase, the procurer solved 
this problem by using an agreed financial mechanism to fine the consortium 
six million Euros for not applying the monitoring process as requested. But 
despite these initial difficulties with accountability, interviewees believed those 
difficulties had been overcome. As an interviewee put it: “We still have to 
show the internal auditor what we pay for. We owe that to the taxpayer, and 
now we do well in that respect.” 
The development from RWS as executor of public works to a coordinator 
and supervisor of public works carried out by private parties has had its impact 
on the composition of its workforce: while technicians were being fired, 
contract and process managers were being hired. This loss of in-house 
technical expertise might hinder accountability with respect to the technical 
aspects of the project. A respondent argued: “You might wonder whether you 
are still able to account for your primary process if there is no technical 
knowledge available in the organization. I think that might be a great risk.”  
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 The consortium is responsible for the road until 2023. The long-term 
character of the project might harm the ability of the procurer to account for 
the project in the long run, given that key actors that initiate, design, and 
monitor the project leave the organization. Respondents indicate that with the 
exodus of the key figures involved, the project memory gets lost. When 
members of the contract management team leave the organization, future 
contract managers are expected to have a difficult task in terms of 
accountability given the financial and juridical complexity of the long-term 
contract. A respondent illustrated: “Imagine you have a contract for 25 years 
and a young contract manager is responsible for the last two years. Do you 
really think he will be able to explain or understand what happened during the 
other 23 years?” In that respect, respondents indicated that only one person in 
the RWS organization knows the exact ins and outs of the project. As an 
interviewee put it: “Through all the different project phases, we have to be able 
to trace a red line, like a skewer going through the project. Here we only have 
one person that has been involved in all the project phases. We haven’t 
organized that well, and the consortium hasn’t either.” 
 
4.3.2 Transparency 
The relatively intensive preparation phase in which the procurer carefully 
develops the financial, juridical, and technical project aspects facilitates 
transparency in relation to the project’s start conditions. In comparison with 
projects that are not procured according to DBFMO principles, the long-term 
and integrated character of the DBFMO contract forces the procurer to 
prepare the project in great detail, given that mistakes made during the 
preparation phase can have grave implications during the rest of the contract 
period. A respondent said: “I think that with these types of contracts we think 
through what we want much more clearly. Normally we think three to four 
years ahead and then see what happens. If the design is not quite finished, we 
can fix it during its operation. That is where trouble begins. With DBFMO, I 
have to think very carefully about what I want and that makes the start of the 
project far more transparent in terms of direction, deadlines, content, and 
costs.”  
 Although the specific procurement fosters transparency in terms of 
financial, technical and contractual start conditions, the replacement of input 
specifications by output specifications makes it less than transparent how the 
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consortium is going to meet the requested standards. Whereas input 
specifications specify, for example, how many cubic meters of sand should be 
used, output specifications only specify what qualitative standard the procurer 
expects. As a result, the procurer only has a general idea what the consortium 
will actually deliver. An interviewee illustrated: “When we sign the contract we 
do not know what precisely they will deliver. We know what we have agreed 
upon in output terms, but what that will look like in practice remains quite 
vague.”  
The idea that output specifications no longer provide the transparency of 
input specifications can be modified given that output specifications 
sometimes stipulate specific solutions to specific problems. As a result, the 
shift from input to output steering is still considered to provide sufficient 
transparency for the consortium to live up to the procurer’s expectations. As a 
respondent argued: “Yes, perhaps we are not 100% aware of what is going on. 
But controlling is not our goal: we just want people to be able to use the road, 
and I think that construction companies do have an idea of what that entails.” 
Another respondent stated: “If you go to the bakers and you ask him to bake 
you an apple pie, you are not going to tell him how much sugar he has to use, 
right? Of course, it is perhaps a bit more complicated with a road, but still, we 
should not over emphasize the problems.”  
In relation to financial transparency, DBFMO procurement makes 
transparent how much money is spent, but it does not make transparent what 
the money buys. The level of the availability fee, fines, and variable costs are 
known prior to the actual build and operation. In normal conditions, the 
amount of the availability fee should be predictable for the duration of the 
contract. But the availability fee not only includes costs incurred at the time. It 
also includes costs that are likely to be incurred during the rest of the contract 
period: the procurer pays ahead for services that have not yet been provided 
and has no guarantee that the consortium will ever provide these services. 
Even though the consortium can reasonably be expected to replace certain 
elements, the procurer has no guarantee that it will actually do so. As such, 
there may be financial transparency - but only up to a point. A respondent 
described: “I doubt whether there is one single person at RWS that 
understands a thing about the financial aspects of the project. At one point we 
made a calculation, and we know what we are paying, but why are we paying 
that specific amount? No one will be able to tell you. It is like going to the 
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supermarket and every month you pay 50 Euros but you do not know what 
you get for your money.” 
Since the availability fee is based on the contract and on output 
specifications that are designed at the start of the project, every service or 
product not included in the initial scope but subsequently requested is charged, 
and recorded separately. Where traditional projects provide the procurer with 
an overall budget, DBFMO requires a transparent registration of the extra 
services and costs since they have a direct effect on the availability fee and the 
overall financial mechanism. The registration of extra work produces a greater 
financial awareness on the part of the contract management team. As an 
interviewee put it: “We now see the prices for the rest of the contract duration 
and you suddenly realize what a public service costs. When you have no overall 
budget résumé, you don’t see these costs.”  
 During the operational phase, the consortium uses an ISO-certified quality 
monitoring system, approved by the procurer, to provide information and 
monitoring reports to the lenders and to the contract management team. In 
general, the contract management team is satisfied with the role of the 
monitoring and reporting system in terms of transparency, especially because 
such methods are seldom used in traditional projects. An interviewee illustrated 
the point: “Perhaps because of certain distrust, we demand much more in 
terms of transparency than we would ask of our own people.” Nevertheless, 
the consortium’s monitoring activities have on occasion appeared to be 
insufficient and the procurer has detected inaccuracies in the monitoring 
reports. As a result, the contract management team has adopted additional 
measures and occasionally tests the credibility of the monitoring system as well 
as the overall performance. On the accuracy of monitoring reports, one 
respondent said: “On paper everything is correct, but how can they explain 
that we sometimes apply the same test and get different outcomes? When we 
confront them with the contradictory reports of third parties their response is 
to say that the third party doesn’t understand how it works so their figures 
don’t make sense.” These discrepancies may be the result of a different 
interpretation of norms, differences in measurement techniques, monitoring 
system failure, or pure manipulation. When monitoring and additional test 
results do not coincide and the procurer and consortium do not agree about 
the interpretation and consequences, an independent evaluation is carried out 
by a third party. The very fact that this project is monitored from these 
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different angles facilitates transparency in relation to the actual delivery. A 
respondent illustrated the point: “We now work with an integrated project 
management team consisting of various experts from RWS side and the builder 
and the consortium director. So we follow perfectly what is going on.” 
The contract, the output specifications, and the monitoring reports facilitate 
transparency in terms of the availability of project information. It has been 
suggested by respondents, however, that the enormous amount of project 
information does not necessarily contribute to transparency. In the words of 
one respondent: “The output specifications and adjustments alone are a meter 
thick. That, plus all the reports from the consortium, makes a big book. Yes, it 
is information, but I think it is information overload. But that is what happens 
with projects that last 20 years or even longer.” The procurement team is thus 
challenged to process, exchange, and safeguard project information in a 
meaningful and transparent way.  
 
4.3.3 Responsiveness 
During the preparation phase, the procurer has the opportunity to make its 
influence count while formulating the project parameters. Because of a lack of 
knowledge and experience of DBFMO procurement, RWS hired various 
external advisors to provide support. Respondents argue that there was only 
little direct involvement of RWS employees itself. As a respondent put it: “If 
you are not careful, DBFMO becomes a party for the external advisors. We 
ought to be in control, and yet we let external advisors design our control 
mechanism.”  
 The contract, output specifications, and the financial model are designed as 
a coherent and interlinked system. Given the fact that contractual changes have 
an immediate effect on the financial model and imply an administrative and 
financial burden, they ought to be avoided as much as possible. As a 
respondent explained: “Budget-wise it [change] is something you want to 
avoid.” Although it might not be desirable to change the contract after contract 
closure, practice shows that the contract is subject to continuous change. A 
respondent illustrated: “We thought, as long as the contract is perfect we can 
control the consortium. But then you start the construction, you realize that 
the contract is not perfect and that you do have to change things. That made 
us act with greater care.” The apparently rigid character of the contractual 
agreement does therefore not seem to hinder the procurer’s ability to influence 
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the development of the project. Besides the ability of the procurer to change 
the contract, a contractual clause allows the procurer to take over the 
consortium’s mandate when safety and security are at stake. As an interviewee 
described it: “If we think there is an unsafe situation, we are allowed to close 
the road immediately. We sometimes close the road fictively, which means 
people still use it but the consortium gets no money for the availability of that 
lane.” 
 Despite the possibility of changing the contract after contract closure, the 
actual process of implementing these changes appears to hinder the ability of 
the procurer to intervene directly. The contract defines the scope of the project 
and obliges the consortium to perform in accordance with the scope of the 
contract. Because it is not always clear whether a request from the procurer 
falls within the original scope, the consortium does not automatically have to 
do as the procurer says. A respondent explained: “It doesn’t matter whether we 
build it or whether a consortium does. If there is a problem, it is our job to 
solve it. But when we want something to be done, we can’t force the 
consortium to do it when it’s not in the contract. Then we have to begin 
discussions, whereas you really just want them to do what you think needs to 
be done.” 
Long-term integrated contracting does not seem to provide any room for 
maneuver when the procurer wants to cut back its costs. The consortium’s 
business case is based on the initial contract and output specifications and it is 
on this that the calculations are made which will win back the initial 
investment. When, for example, the procurer requests the consortium to turn 
off lighting during the night, the procurer is not automatically allowed to 
decrease its availability fee. In that respect an interviewee argued: “With the 
financial crisis, these contracts do not allow you to save money. We are 
committed for the next 20 years to pursuing a certain quality and to paying a 
certain amount for it. We cannot change that. That might be good in terms of 
quality but is bad in financial terms. And if there were to be only DBFMO 
contracts, then there would be no flexibility at all.” Long-term financial 
commitments decrease the opportunities for future governments. As an 
interviewee put it: “With DBFMO, you suddenly have financial room to start 
new projects and politicians love that. However, you can only play that game 
once. The next minister has no room for maneuver. It has already been 
decided where the money goes.” In the same manner, respondents argued that 
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long-term contracting sometimes clashes with ever changing political demands 
that are not always compatible with the contract. A respondent said: “If you 
have a contract for twenty years and politicians make decisions that might 
affect your contract, this might be problematic. You cannot change the 
contract for free, certainly not when it implies that the consortium has to make 
an investment.”  
The apparently inflexible character of the contract was used (or, perhaps, 
abused) by RWS to outmaneuver other administrative bodies that would 
normally be involved in the decision-making process about the construction of 
a road. By means of illustration, when the consortium began the construction 
of a bridge, the Province (which must give its approval) argued it did not meet 
the quality standards that RWS had agreed upon with the Province. The 
consortium adhered rigidly to its agreement with RWS and was unwilling to 
upgrade the quality of the bridge without being financially compensated. RWS 
required the Province to prove that any such formal agreement between them 
existed, and the Province appeared unable to do so since it had been agreed 
informally. Under normal circumstances the Province and RWS would perhaps 
have been able to reach a compromise but the contract formed a strong 
impediment to such compromise. In this respect, a respondent explained: 
“With DBFMO, you actually isolate a project from its political context. 
Whether that is good or not depends on what you find important. But ask 
yourself, is it really necessary that every government has influence on all the 
projects we have? I think it would be chaos. We as RWS have our agreements 
with the consortium, so when the Province wants something else, we tell them 
we can’t do it because we have a contractual agreement. So you have fewer 
political-administrative games.”  
The contractual character of the project sometimes hindered adequate 
decision making when it came to public officials’ responsiveness in terms of 
safety and security. After the construction of the two-lane road next to a two-
lane road that was already in use, the consortium decided not to make the new 
road available officially yet, since the availability fee would only come into 
effect at the time of the official deadline. This decision, correct in juridical 
terms, was anything but in practical terms. Two subsequent car accidents were 
caused by ghost driving. In the end, RWS was held responsible for the 
dangerous situation and a respondent argued in connection with this: “RWS 
should have been more alert to risks. We should have said that we would pay 
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for the earlier availability of that road. However, because you are in such a 
judicial structure, you do not think about practicalities in the first instance. The 
agreement was fine in judicial terms, but a bad decision in practice. In the 
beginning we were very rigid. Instead of thinking in simple practical solutions, 
we always looked at the contract. So the question wasn’t ‘what does this road 
need’, but ‘what does the contract tell us?’” 
 
4.3.4 Responsibility  
In general terms, the procurer is satisfied with the way the consortium executes 
its contractual responsibility. Discussions about whether or not the consortium 
is responsible for certain things do persist but are perceived as constructive. A 
respondent illustrated the point: “If we could convince [the consortium 
manager] that it was their responsibility, they would take it. Sometimes we ask 
an independent third party, and they [the consortium partners] accept that 
decision. In that respect, the discussions with the consortium have always been 
very constructive.” It was suggested by several respondents that a perfect 
contract does not exist and will not solve the possible responsibility problems 
of responsibility. Instead, it was argued that what counts is not the contract but 
the willingness of people to make the project a success. As an interviewee put 
it: “I can guarantee you, the contract doesn’t matter. You can have a very bad 
contract and great people and your project becomes a success. Or you can 
have a perfect contract with terrible people and your project will be a disaster.” 
Despite overall satisfaction about the way in which the consortium carries 
out its responsibility, conflicts between the procurer and consortium have 
occasionally arisen as a result of the ambiguity of either the contract or the 
output specifications. To illustrate this, a respondent said: “Sometimes we 
think is it very obvious that the consortium is responsible for a certain task. 
But the consortium won’t solve a problem voluntarily when it costs them 
money. So we have a lot of discussion about that.” The procurer as well as the 
consortium can be accused of interpreting the norms for their own benefit. In 
that respect a respondent explained: “We will always explain things for our 
own benefit and the consortium for theirs.” Similarly another respondent 
argued: “They always want more and we always try to do what must be done, 
for the lowest price. After all, we are still a private company.”  
In addition to ambiguous norms, gaps in the contract sometimes also 
provoke discussion between the consortium and procurer. Even though the 
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contract has been prepared carefully, it appears that it does not always include 
all the elements that make up public responsibility. As a result, while the 
consortium fulfills its contractual responsibility, the procurer is not satisfied. In 
that respect an interviewee stated: “Although you think you have written down 
everything, we still have blank spots in the contract. The consortium fulfills its 
contractual obligation but it appears that that is just not exactly what we 
wanted.”  
 The procurer is satisfied with the fact that responsibility related discussions 
are usually held among the consortium partners rather than between the 
consortium and the procurer. Although the consortium provides an integrated 
project proposal in which the different project disciplines are optimally fine-
tuned, the integration between consortium partners can dissipate during the 
project. As a result, when the operating company experiences difficulties 
because of a mistake made by the constructor, the consortium partners point 
the finger at each other. If none of the consortium partners is willing to share 
or take its responsibility, service delivery might be at stake. Although this 
blame game was played occasionally, the consortium board planned the 
internal financial and juridical responsibility in such a way that the construction 
company was held responsible for its contribution during the operational 
phase. A respondent described the situation: “Of course, our members tried to 
blame each other when things had to be done. But we always found a solution. 
We considered the project as a whole, so we did not separate out the budget 
lines. I know other consortia have separated out the budgets, and then you are 
lost. You need to have someone that can play with the overall budget. And if 
he or she thinks the construction company should invest one Euro so that the 
cleaning company can gain two, then you organize it like that.”  
 
4.3.5 Quality  
Overall, the procurer is satisfied with the quality of the road and the services 
delivered. As one interviewee put it: “If you overlook the managerial mess 
around the contract and you take your car and visit the road then I say: it’s 
perfect. We don’t do anything and it works.” With respect to the maintenance 
of the road, interviewees suggested that the consortium does a better job in 
that respect than RWS, mainly because the consortium integrated all the 
different maintenance tasks. As a result, there is less disruption for road users 
and greater road availability. An interviewee illustrated the point: “If we look at 
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maintenance, then we must admit they do it so much better than we do. 
Before, we would send a different guy for all the different tasks. Now, they 
have invented a type of car that carries out all those tasks automatically in one 
trip. So we no longer have to close the road, and its availability increases.” 
Interviewees also suggested that the consortium is more capable of rapid 
problem solving then is their own organization. A respondent said: “They 
work as a company and time is money, so the sooner things are solved, the 
better. Here we don’t have that stimulus, so we do things a bit slower.”  
Prior to the start of the project, some RWS employees were skeptical about 
DBFMO procurement with respect to quality. It was suggested that, as a result, 
the procurer requested higher quality levels than would normally be the case. 
As a respondent said: “Sometimes we asked more than you might expect in 
theory. I remember that we asked them to build a bridge that could resist wind 
force 9, which is simply impossible.” Likewise, another respondent illustrated: 
“I don’t like to admit it, but on reflection we should not have tried to create a 
heaven on earth by demanding more of the consortium then we asked of 
ourselves. Of course, we do have to control, and we must be critical, but 
sometimes, I have to concede, we became overenthusiastic and began 
exaggerating.” In that respect, it appears that discussions about quality do not 
always have to do with the technical quality of the road, but rather with the 
discrepancy between what is offered by the consortium and the expectations of 
RWS. As an interviewee put it: “They have a fixed idea of what it must look 
like and anything different becomes the subject of discussion. When this 
happens, we are not talking about quality but about whether a purple bridge is 
more beautiful than a yellow one.” It was also argued that reasonable solutions 
provided by the consortium were sometimes overruled by RWS since they 
simply wanted to hold on to their own solution. A respondent explained: 
“Sometimes they had very good solutions that were perhaps even better than 
ours. But we are proud and we do not always want to recognize that private 
parties might be a bit smarter.” 
During the operational phase, the ambiguity of certain output specifications 
led to discussions about whether the consortium was or was not providing the 
requested service quality. Respondents indicated that it is not always possible 
to formulate the expected service level unambiguously. An interviewee argued: 
“Sometimes it is just very difficult to formulate your demand on paper. So you 
try, but it remains vague. And that always causes trouble in a contract 
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relationship. If your service level is not clearly defined, you will get into 
trouble.” It appeared that the norms RWS uses internally were too vague to 
work as contractual norms. As one respondent illustrated: “You get what you 
ask for, but sometimes there is confusion about what that might be. It might 
be very clear to me, but the consortium will always try to interpret it in such a 
way that they benefit from it. So if you do not write down explicitly what you 
want, you might not get it at all.” As a result of the ambiguity of certain service 
level specifications, the solutions provided by the consortium did not always 
correspond to the procurer’s expectation, nor did employees of RWS agree 
among themselves whether the solutions proposed met the requested quality 
standard. As an interviewee put it: “Here you clearly see two types of public 
officials. On the one hand, those that believe in looking for alternative 
solutions, and on the other, officials that believe there is only one solution: the 
RWS solution and that is very often the most expensive one.” 
 For the duration of the contract, RWS pays the consortium an availability 
fee. When availability is not as supposed to because of maintenance, repair 
activities, or irregularities with respect to service levels, RWS receives a 
discount on the availability fee (i.e. a fine is imposed on the consortium). The 
level of the discount or fine depends on, amongst other things, traffic intensity 
at the time of non-availability. In addition, RWS can fine the consortium for 
irregularities with respect to internal process management and irregularities in 
connection with safety and security. The financial mechanism does indeed 
seem to allow the procurer to influence the service quality in terms of 
availability. As an interviewee described the situation: “Every time the road is 
unavailable, they get a fine. I struggle continuously to stimulate them to give us 
what we want. Sometimes, the output specification is not enough and when 
repeated requests also fail, I at least have the financial mechanism to spur them 
into action. So when it’s not going the way we want, I look for how we can 
hurt them financially.” Another interviewee argued: “It does give us an extra 
weapon in order to give a steer on the quality of the asset.” However, it was 
suggested that the effectiveness of the financial mechanism and the use of 
financial incentives depends largely on the quality of the calculations made by 
financial experts during the project preparation. In order to stimulate the 
consortium financially, the procurer must know what discount is a true 
stimulus and what is not. Various respondents expressed their concerns about 
the accuracy of these calculations.  
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As regards the consortium’s actual role in assuring service quality, it was 
suggested that the key to success lies not in the hands of the consortium but in 
the hands of the procurer. A respondent argued: “Many people think that we 
are responsible for quality, but it is the RWS itself that decides what it wants 
and how much that might cost. You cannot expect me to deliver gold if you 
pay me bronze. In the Netherlands, they let us compete on price but not on 
quality. So if I offer them a Fiat and they are fine with that, they should not 
complain later that I didn’t give them a Ferrari.”  
The fact that this DBFMO project was one of the first and therefore an 
opportunity for the consortium to build a strong reputation may have 
influenced the effort and commitment of the consortium. A respondent 
argued: “I think they want to deliver a good product because their reputation is 
at stake. If this project is a success, they might win other tenders. If this project 
fails, they can forget about that.” The intention to build reputation might have 
influenced the quality delivered, but the fact that the product was not a 
complicated one may also explain why the procurer was relatively satisfied with 
the quality. A respondent suggested: “I think it was quite clear what we 
expected. It is in that sense also a simple product: a road, a bridge, and a 
tunnel. It’s not rocket science.” 
 In the longer term, the consortium remains responsible for the quality of 
the road until the end of the contract and is obliged to deliver the road and 
related assets in line with the output specifications. With respect to this long-
term responsibility for quality, several public servants wondered whether the 
consortium would still comply once the initial requirement to invest in asset 
quality had been met. Although bank guarantees cover these risks financially, 
there are practical issues towards the end of the project. A respondent queried: 
“At the end of the contract, it might become very exciting. Will they invest 
again in the road or will they wait until the contract finishes?”  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
With respect to accountability, the findings indicate that the intensive 
integrated approach to project preparation facilitates accountability in terms of 
the availability of information on agreements, norms, rules, and prices. The 
dependency on external advisors and the juridical and financial complexity of 
the project hinders accountability in terms of public servant understanding and 
their ability to explain what the agreements, norms, rules, and prices actually 
82 
 
entail. Failure of the monitoring mechanism also hinders accountability but 
financial mechanisms that allow the procurer to impose fines are significant in 
getting the consortium to deal with irregularities and solve problems. A lack of 
experience with contract management reduces the procurer’s ability to account 
for project performance during the operational phase although the 
professionalism of the contract management in this case improved over the 
lifetime of the project. Accountability mechanisms only facilitate the 
safeguarding of accountability if designed, implemented and managed 
adequately during the entire contract period. In the long run, the exodus of key 
actors and replacement of technicians by juridical and managerial staff might 
impede accountability.  
 Compared with traditional procurement, the long-term integrated character 
of the DBFMO project seems to increase transparency with respect to the 
juridical, financial and technical start conditions of the project. Although the 
replacement of traditional input specifications with output specifications means 
a loss of transparency in input terms, there is far greater transparency in terms 
of output expectations. A financial model that clearly indicates the level of the 
availability fee, fines, and variable costs facilitates transparency as does the 
registration of extra work and related costs. However, since the availability fee 
includes future costs that perhaps will never be incurred by the consortium, it 
is less transparent what public money is actually buying. The use of monitoring 
mechanisms seems to increase transparency in comparison with traditional 
procurement, though the accuracy and availability of information seems to 
depend on the design and implementation of the monitoring plan. The 
multitude of project information hinders transparency in the sense that public 
servants experience difficulties in understanding and processing this 
information constructively.  
 Dependency on external advisors impedes responsiveness during the 
preparation phase and although the flexibility of the contract in theory 
facilitates responsiveness, that same contract limits the procurer’s ability to 
steer the project directly, except when safety and security are at stake. Because 
of the contractual character of the project, goal displacement can hinder 
responsiveness and long-term planning indeed restricts the procurer’s ability to 
be responsive to changed financial circumstances. 
 The contract and the financial mechanism seem to facilitate responsibility in 
ensuring that the consortium executes its contractual obligations. Where the 
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interpretation of output specifications and the terms of the contract admit 
ambiguity, there is scope to dispute responsibility, both among consortium 
members and between procurer and consortium. Budgetary incentives 
discourage non-compliance and encourage responsibility on the part of the 
consortium.  
 The integrated nature of the project, the application of fines, the 
opportunity to build a strong reputation for the consortium, and the relative 
straightforwardness of the project, all seem to facilitate and even improve 
quality. The involvement of a private consortium seems to increase the service 
level quality expectations in comparison with traditional projects. Where 
quality suffers, it can be attributed to ambiguous, incomplete norms and the 
procurer’s low budget. Table 11 summarizes the influential conditions per 
value.  
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Table 11: Influencing conditions per value    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
Accountability  -Contract 
-Project preparation  
 
-Dependency of procurer on external 
advisors 
-Financial complexity  
-Lack of experience of contract 
management  
-Lack of guidance in transition phases 
-Lack of knowledge of contract 
management  
-Long-term character of project  
-Mal implementation of monitoring 
mechanism  
-Personnel changes per phase 
Transparency  -Contract 
-Integrality of output specifications 
and financial mechanism  
-Integrated performance monitoring  
-Intensive and integrated project 
preparation  
-Long-term and integrated project 
character  
-Long-term financial planning 
-Monitoring reports 
-Output specifications  
-Information overload 
-Output specifications  
-Subjectivity performance monitoring 
reports 
 
 
 
Responsiveness -Contractual clauses that allow for 
intervening 
-Influence with respect to 
formulation of output specifications 
and contract 
-Room for contractual changes  
 -Dependency of procurer on external 
advisors 
-Goal displacement  
-Lengthy implementation of contractual 
changes 
-Long-term contract  
Responsibility  
 
-Willingness of project members -Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications  
-Demarcation consortium 
Quality  -Financial incentives 
-Higher norms  
-Integrality contract  
-Long-term commitment  
-Output specifications 
-Reputation  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Budget 
-Inaccuracy in calculating fines  
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5 The Detention Center 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of a case study on a DBFMO project to 
build and maintain a detention center. The chapter is structured as follows. 
Section 5.2 provides a short introduction to the project and describes its scope 
and content. Section 5.3 and subparagraphs, present the findings organized by 
public value. Section 5.4 provides the conclusion. 
5.2 Project description 
In the Netherlands, detention centers are used to accommodate people who 
have been denied access at the Dutch border as well as illegal foreigners who 
refuse to return voluntarily to their country of origin. Around the turn of the 
century, the national knowledge center publiek-private samenwerking (PPS) 
considered nine projects for procurement according to DBFMO principles, 
including the detention center. After the bidding process was complete the 
Ministry of Justice, the Government Building Agency (Rijksgebouwendienst, 
hereafter RGD) and the national Custodial Institutions Agency (Dienst Justitiële 
Inrichtingen, hereinafter DJI), signed a DBFMO contract with a private 
consortium on March 2008. The consortium has become responsible for the 
construction and operation of the detention center until June 2035. 
 The detention center has a maximum capacity of 576 detainees. The center 
furthermore contains 95 offices, a visitor center, and 210 parking spaces that 
are all designed, constructed, furnished, and are maintained by the consortium. 
In relation to the operation of the center, the consortium provides 
infrastructure such as cameras and fire alarms that support internal safety and 
security. In addition, the consortium delivers groceries and food for detainees. 
Under no condition is the consortium allowed to have direct contact with the 
detainees. As a result, the distribution of food and groceries as well as the 
cleaning of the areas where detainees reside is taken care of by DJI itself. The 
actual supervision and the application of sanctions; the provision of 
psychological or physical assistance; the provision and organization of daily 
activities; and the provision and management of ICT, do not form part of the 
scope of the contract and remain with DJI. As is the case with all detention 
centers in the Netherlands, the detention center in question is externally 
monitored by organizations such as the Inspection for the Application of 
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Sanctions; the Health Care Inspectorate; the External Security Audit; and the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. While the contract has been prepared by 
both DJI as a client and the RGD as the official procurer, DJI is responsible 
for the daily management of the contract.  
5.3 Findings 
5.3.1 Accountability  
During the preparation phase, DJI decided to take the lead with respect to the 
preparation of the contract and output specifications. The RGD supported 
DJI and only a few external advisors were asked for advice. As a result, the 
project organization that was responsible for preparing the bid was able to 
oversee and control the project and that allowed them to account directly for 
the different aspects of the project. As a respondent intimated: “From the 
beginning we have tried to keep it [the project preparation] here and to 
externalize only when necessary. I only want external advisors for specific 
juridical problems. For the rest, I want to be in control. There are other 
procurers that rely only on external advisors and you might wonder whether 
they know what is going on.”  
 Given the fact that hardly anyone that was involved during the preparation 
phase is involved during the construction and operational phases, the ability of 
DJI to account might be at stake in the long run when key actors that know 
the contract and its development leave the organization. As a respondent put 
it: “On the DJI side, I am the only person who knows about the details of this 
contract. But one day I will leave. So what happens after that? Who will be able 
to explain what we are doing? I don’t think anyone has an answer to that 
question.” Similarly, another respondent explains: “We have a contract, bills, 
and pages full of maps but when people leave, knowledge disappears. Not only 
knowledge of things that we agreed upon but knowledge about the way in 
which we do things here. When that memory disappears it might be more 
difficult to explain what we are doing and why.” 
 The diffusion of information about the project not only appears to be 
limited within the organization of DJI but also seems to be suboptimal 
between the RGD and DJI since the latter experienced little support from the 
RGD during the preparation phase. A respondent argued: “Despite the fact 
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that the RGD is the official procurer, I missed real support at the central level 
from the RGD in relation to the formulation of the contract and output 
specifications.” It was suggested that much valuable information on the 
preparation of the project got lost. As a respondent illustrated: “Knowledge 
about the bidding phase and the process of developing the contract and the 
output specifications had to be safeguarded. Not only for us, but also for 
future projects. But that attempt has failed at DJI as well as at the RGD. 
Perhaps that is because we do not work together and we depend on externals 
for our knowledge.”  
 The consortium is contractually obliged to monitor and supervise its own 
conduct. To that end, they monitor and measure availability and performance 
and record complaints made by DJI employees. The recording of complaints 
either follows a formal or informal route, depending on the apparent gravity of 
the problem. The informal procedure is followed when the so-called ‘handy-
man’ is able to solve the problem directly. If this is not the case, the complaint 
is registered formally which (in theory), has direct financial consequences. The 
obligation of the consortium to monitor performance and to report on that, 
allows DJI to supervise the project. In addition, the procurer carries out 
random tests when considered necessary. The procurer experienced problems 
with performance monitoring at the start of the project. As a respondent 
argued: “They [the consortium] have too little control over performance 
monitoring. Most of the time we tell them what is going wrong whereas they 
should be able to manage that themselves. The idea is that we no longer have 
to tell them what is wrong. Their system should tell them. But the reality is that 
we sometimes still need to take them by the hand to show them that they have 
not understood the contract.”  
 With respect to the ability of the procurer to account for the project, there 
is a distinction to be made between having information and understanding 
information. Whereas the procurer is able to demonstrate what has been 
agreed upon by referring to the contract and the output specifications, it is 
suggested that the procurer might not always understand the content of the 
contract and the practical consequences of decisions made throughout the 
contract period. As a respondent put it: “Yes, we have a contract in which 
everything makes sense and it is all in writing, but that does not mean a thing if 
you do not manage that information from start to finish. You have to 
understand changes, adaptation, and the dynamics of the contract and the 
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financial model. You have to know how to specify, technically and 
qualitatively, and you have to keep on negotiating. In this case we did not 
realize that. But we have to make sure that, throughout the remaining project 
phases, we understand what’s in the contract.” Likewise, it was argued that 
accountability doesn’t simply mean being able to demonstrate what has been 
agreed upon on paper but rather being able to demonstrate that what has been 
agreed upon makes practical sense. As a respondent explained: “You need to 
have people that understand the concept. If people don’t understand 
something, for example thinking in terms of risks and outputs, then they just 
write something down. Perhaps that is enough for some, but for me there is 
also a qualitative aspect. What you write down has to make sense. And that is a 
point of concern here.”  
 
5.3.2 Transparency 
The procurer and the consortium experience both a greater burden of 
administration and an increase of transparency in comparison to traditional 
procurement, given that the long-term integrated performance contract 
requires the procurer to define the juridical, technical, and financial project 
parameters prior to the start of the project. A respondent made the point: “In 
traditional projects, things are never specified this carefully and it might help us 
to control these projects better.” The detailed output specifications facilitate 
transparency in the sense that it is clear what the procurer expects as output. 
However, the output specifications do not per se provide transparency. That 
seems to depend on the specifications being complete and unambiguous. The 
relatively little experience of writing output specifications does not seem to 
have contributed to their quality in those respects. As an interviewee put it: 
“The output specifications are by no means perfect but it was the first project. 
It was a process of trial and error.”  
 The output specifications contain quantitative norms for technical 
requirements such as the thickness of windows and the amount of salt and 
sugar meals may contain. The output specifications also contain norms that are 
more ambiguous. With respect to cleanness, for example, a respondent 
commented: “How can I describe how dirty something can be? I can write 
something down, but what does it mean? On each window, there can only be a 
specific amount of fingerprints. That is a norm but it is so difficult to do 
something with that in practice.” The ambiguity of the output specifications 
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does not seem to facilitate transparency. As a respondent explained: “Those 
output specifications are very broad and you can interpret them very 
differently.” Consequently, the procurer has not always been satisfied with the 
way in which the consortium has interpreted the specifications. As a 
respondent put it: “The idea of DBFMO is that you specify in output terms. 
So you might expect -or at least hope- that the consortium, will interpret that 
space correctly.”  
During the building and operating phase, the consortium monitors its 
performance through a monitoring plan that has been designed by the 
consortium and has been approved by the procurer. The introduction of 
performance monitoring seems to have improved transparency in comparison 
with traditional procurement. As a respondent described the position: “The 
fact that we have to show performance reports is much more transparent then 
before. In traditional projects, we normally don’t even have a monitoring 
system. We just suppose that everything is OK.” Some consortium members 
suggested that the amount of registration and reporting requested by the 
procurer is relatively high. A respondent explained: “Most of the time I already 
have an idea about how we are performing but the procurer wants to be sure 
and I find they exercise a great deal of control over the project. I think that’s 
because of the nature of the building: you cannot afford to have problems in a 
detention center.”  
Although performance monitoring facilitates transparency in the sense that 
project information is available, this does not guarantee that this information is 
accurate. For example, during the operational phase, security guards 
complained about the air quality in their offices, suggesting that bad air quality 
caused headaches and other problems. The procurer’s measurements indicated 
that the air quality was indeed not as it should be, but the consortium’s 
measurements indicated otherwise. A respondent made the point: “The 
consortium said ‘everything is fine’, but when we conducted a test, it appeared 
not to be fine. How is it possible that we have different outcomes? You can 
imagine that we had something to talk about.” Given that the consortium and 
procurer could not agree on the test results, an external consultant was called 
in to investigate whether or not the air quality was in line with the quality 
requested. The external consultant’s results indicated that the amount of 
oxygen was insufficient and that the climate control installations had to be 
repaired. Although the consortium was not happy with the results, they 
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accepted that the tests conducted by the external consultant were conducted 
properly and eventually agreed to repair the installations. Some respondents 
suggested that DJI began to develop the monitoring plan too late when RGD 
had advised beginning it earlier. DJI, indeed, acknowledged that they were not 
fully aware of the importance of the monitoring plan and the necessity to start 
designing this as soon as possible.  
The pre-determined availability fee facilitates transparency in the sense that 
it is clear how much money will be spent per month and how much during the 
complete duration of the contract period. However, it appears to be less 
transparent what that money actually buys since the availability fee includes 
costs over the whole life cycle of the project. As a respondent explained: 
“Some installations last five years. The contract lasts 20 years so in theory, they 
should replace the installations four times. The consortium considers that in its 
bidding and it lets us pay for it. Later, however, you see that it does not want to 
make hard agreements on that replacement.” Likewise, another respondent 
argued: “I know how much I spend but I do not know what I spend that 
money on. If I look at what I pay them each month, I would expect to see 30 
people working here but that is absolutely not the case.”  
The availability fee is determined on the basis of the output specifications. 
Requests for products and services that were initially not included in the 
output specifications need to be recorded carefully since a change in the output 
specifications implies a change in the availability fee. Compared to traditional 
projects, the recording of extra work and costs seems to be transparent. As a 
respondent put it: “DBFMO makes it very transparent what policy changes 
cost. Normally we hardly ever record that.” However, despite the recording of 
extra work and related costs, respondents say that is it not always easy to make 
sense of all the recorded information. A respondent put it: “When we change 
things, we need to document that. But even if we do that it becomes all very 
messy.”  
Services and products that are not included in the original output 
specifications are charged separately by the consortium. The way in which the 
consortium calculates these prices is considered not to be very transparent. As 
a result, the procurer is often not able to determine whether the consortium 
calculates costs that were already included and paid for in the initial bid. As a 
respondent said: “Right now we have problems with the way in which the 
consortium calculates its prices for extra work. We do not know whether these 
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prices are in line with market prices or whether they represent extra costs for 
risks that were already paid for or not. Even when we take a closer look at the 
calculation, I can’t tell you how they came up with the price.”  
The lack of transparency with respect to pricing goes hand in hand with the 
procurer’s perception that prices charged by the consortium are often too high. 
As a respondent put it: “These prices are not normal. They calculate a price for 
the tiniest risk; even if it is obvious that there is no risk at all and we don’t 
always check whether those prices conform to market prices. So I think we 
sometimes pay more than necessary.” Another respondent gave an illustration: 
“The prices are high and I don’t know how they calculate them. When 40 
clocks are going to cost me 25.000 euro, I have no chance of explaining that to 
the tax payer and I don’t think we know how the consortium works out the 
prices for the extra things they add in after the contract has been signed. At 
least I do not understand their calculations and I do not have the feeling that 
anyone here knows if these amounts are fair or not. We receive a bill of 
100.000 euro for replacement of something without any further explanation. 
Then I see 10.000 euro for collective maintenance and 34.000 euro for 
preventive maintenance but what is the difference? I can’t figure out what I‘m 
paying for. When you ask the consortium for an explanation, they tell you that 
it’s an estimate.”  
In that respect, it has been argued it is also not transparent whether there 
are savings in public expenditure. A respondent pointed out: “My job is to 
control our expense but there is no actual control on these prices. We do not 
know whether we are making a profit in comparison with normal projects or 
whether we are spending much more.” It was also argued that, although 
performance related pay might suggest financial transparency, there is no 
guarantee that the bills sent by the consortium are correct. As one respondent 
argued: “We have a fixed price for cleaning, but I have seen bills in which they 
suddenly charge a higher price. So if you do not keep an eye on them 
continuously, they take advantage of you and there goes your profit.”  
5.3.3 Responsiveness 
During the preparation phase, the technical, juridical, and financial parameters 
of the project were developed by various project teams comprised of 
employees from DJI and the RGD. DJI decided to hire only a few external 
advisors in order to be able to oversee and control the project. As such, the 
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influence of the procurer during the preparation phase was suggested to be 
significant as was demonstrated in section 5.3.1.  
 Through the output specifications the procurer is able to influence the 
consortium by demanding a certain outcome that, ideally, ensures the 
consortium’s performance in accordance with the specifications. Output 
specifications, by definition, thus allow for a margin of interpretation. 
However, although not ideal, the procurer sometimes did use input 
specifications in order to make sure the consortium would provide a certain 
product or solution. In that respect, it was argued that the output specifications 
where sometimes so detailed, that the consortium had very little freedom.  
 During the building and in the operational phase, the contract and output 
specifications have been regularly adapted as a result of their incompleteness or 
inexactness. As a respondent described the situation: “We have about 200 
contractual changes now. That tells you something about the quality of the 
output specifications and the contract.” The lack of experience and knowledge 
when it comes to writing outputs seems to have hindered the development of 
decent specifications. As a respondent put it: “There is hardly any attention to 
the quality of the people in those teams. If someone does not function very 
well, we tend not to say anything about it. Perhaps we should say something 
more often.”Although, not ideal, the ever-changing political context sometimes 
leaves DJI with no other option than to change the contract. In that respect, 
various interviewees wondered whether it is intelligent to procure a detention 
center according to DBFMO principles given the influence of the political 
context. As a respondent said: “We first had Verdonk as the minister, and she 
had a different philosophy from the minister that we now have. When we 
started, the message was sober. Make sure the detainees leave as soon as 
possible, so provide no luxury. Then the attitude changed: detainees are not 
criminals, so make their stay comfortable. So we painted the walls, and 
decorated things a bit, but imagine that the Socialist Party wins the elections. 
They are against detention centers so what do we do with the contract then?” 
Another respondent suggested: “These procedures take so long that once you 
have formulated the output specifications, the political or administrative 
context requires adjustments. So it is logical that the output specifications that 
we wrote in 2005 no longer strike a chord today. But we don’t discuss how we 
are to make sense of that in relation to DBFMO. We cannot automatically go 
with the flow because we cannot expect the consortium to do as we say. We 
93 
 
always get into discussion and eventually we pay a high price for the 
contractual changes.”  
 The fact that contractual changes imply extra financial spending is thought 
to help the procurer avoid spending public money without thorough 
consideration. In this case, for example, the procurer requested the consortium 
to deliver 40 clocks that were not asked for in the output specifications. When 
the consortium presented the bill, the procurer decided not to get the clocks 
from them. A respondent described the situation: “Forty clocks. How much 
can that cost? Well the consortium calculates as follows: good materials, 
batteries that have to be changed by someone, 50 screws, plugs, a hole in the 
wall, we have to change summer and winter time so that during 25 years makes 
20.000 euro. But we are not going to pay that. We become more aware of the 
costs involved but I still don’t think it has to cost that much. In this case we 
said no, but sometimes we just have to accept their offer.” Another respondent 
said: “They do whatever you want them to do as long as you pay for it and 
sometimes they just make up absurd prices for simple things. 21.000 euro for 
an extra water tap? They always use the argument of risk capital but sometimes 
that is just unfair because there is no risk. We pay the highest price every time 
and I can tell you ten stories in which the prices charged by the consortium 
were absurd.” In this context, because of a lack of experience and knowledge 
of DBFMO procurement, the procurer does not always appear to be a serious 
negotiator. As a respondent opined: “They just need better people on those 
contracts. If you see that guy from the consortium, he just makes mincemeat 
out of our contract managers and we are supposed to negotiate with him? That 
to me is a fundamental problem.”  
Despite the fact that it is possible to change the contract, the procurer is not 
able to influence the consortium directly since it is not DJI but the contract 
that dictates what should be done. Although the contract is, or should be, a 
representation of the procurer’s preferences, interviewees argued that this is 
not always the case. A responded said: “I sometimes felt like the contract 
dictated what would happen and that it was no longer about us. Normally I 
could say that I wanted to have this and that on Monday, and it was there on 
Monday. Now we sometimes take 3 months for simple contractual changes 
because with DBFMO, if I change a little thing in the contract, it also affects 
the financial system and the monitoring system. So you feel like you are no 
longer boss in your own house.” In a similar vein, another respondent 
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suggested: “If I want to change something or if I want something to be done, it 
costs much more energy than before. I can no longer expect them to do what I 
want directly.”  
 Being aware of the fact that they could no longer influence the consortium’s 
performance, the procurer had already decided during the preparation phase to 
exclude certain services such as mental and physical care, from the scope of the 
project. As an interviewee explained: “These contracts are good for standard 
things but in a detention center you are often confronted with situations that 
you cannot predict, that you cannot quantify in a contract or in output 
specifications. Sometimes we need people to work extra hours because the 
situation requires it. If we do not do that, we might cause a political riot. But I 
cannot expect the consortium to be sensitive to that.” Another respondent 
explained: “The director is responsible for health and safety, so we didn’t want 
to give away control over these things. You have to be able to explain to the 
minister what went wrong and you can’t just say ‘Well, I no longer control my 
primary process. This is an extremely vulnerable process. If you put it out on 
the market place, you cannot just ask for certain things to be done. If we did, 
and we asked a provider to do something, they would always look first at the 
contract in order to see who is responsible and who should pay.” Although the 
procurer has no direct influence on the general service delivery of the 
consortium, a contractual clause allows the detention center director to force 
direct action by the consortium when considered necessary with respect to the 
primary process. As a respondent explained: “The director is responsible and 
he is allowed to give instructions. When safety and security are at stake, for 
example, he can say ‘you have to do this’, and the consortium has to do so. 
Afterwards, we will see who should pay the costs. But he almost never does it 
because most of our problems are of a ‘softer’ kind.”  
5.3.4 Responsibility 
At the start of the project, the procurer expected that the contract, the output 
specifications, and the financial mechanism would ensure that the consortium 
would perform in accordance to the output specifications. However, 
compliance did not seem to be guaranteed by these mechanisms alone. As a 
respondent explained: “When I started this project my boss told me that I did 
not have to worry because it was all organized. I have never worked as much as 
I work now. And that’s just purely coordinating the contract. I don’t deliver 
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services myself, but I do have an organization that controls the service delivery 
and I think, for the effort I have to put in, I might as well be delivering the 
service myself!” Another respondent made the same point: “We had the idea 
that we wouldn’t have to do a thing. We have a contract that sets everything 
out and everything will get done. If not, you call them up and tell them to do it, 
but it doesn’t work like that. You can write a nice contract and say 
‘construction company, you are now responsible for taking care of our people’ 
but it is not that simple. You can have very good contracts but if the people 
working with those projects have a different mentality, these contracts are 
useless.”  
 The limitations of the contract and output specifications as vehicles for 
coordination became visible during the construction and operation when the 
procurer realized that the consortium was not living up to expectations. As a 
respondent put it: “We have the idea that they just don’t run as fast as they 
should. I know that the directors of the consortium and the procurer have had 
conversations about the consortium’s attitude. They always say they cannot do 
this or that while we would like to hear that they will be proactive: tell me that 
you are going to see what you can do.” The ambiguity of the contract and 
output specifications seems to trigger discussions on whether the consortium 
performs as it should. While the procurer believes that the output 
specifications are clear that the consortium is responsible for delivering a 
particular service or product, the consortium frequently argues otherwise. A 
respondent illustrated the point: “The contract states that the consortium is 
responsible for food supply. This includes standard meals but also mentions 
vegetarian and halal food. Jewish people want kosher food and these meals are 
much more expensive. The consortium says that we did not explicitly ask for 
kosher meals and that they therefore will not deliver them without any 
financial compensation. We asked for food irrespective of religion or 
philosophy, and we spoke about vegetarian and halal food by way of 
illustration. So based on what we have in writing, you might argue kosher 
meals are included. But you can also argue otherwise because we did not 
explicitly ask for kosher food. So the output specifications are interpreted 
differently. And we do not know who should pay for these meals.” 
 The output specifications by definition contain a margin of interpretation 
and the consortium as well as the procurer seems to try to exploit this room 
for interpretation. A respondent explained: “It is difficult to develop output 
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specifications that are interpreted in the same way. Our experience is that these 
texts mean something different in the bidding phase than in the operational 
phase.” Whereas during the bidding phase, the procurer agrees the service level 
proposed by the consortium, it has been suggested that they expect a higher 
standard once the contract has been signed. The consortium therefore accuses 
the procurer of wanting to get the maximum out of the contract without 
offering a reasonable price. The consortium, however, is accused of the same 
thing. Overall, it appears difficult to find a correct balance between specifying 
too little or too much. As a respondent put it: “Take the example of material 
for personal hygiene. If you say that you want them to deliver a toothbrush 
and soap but you do not write down that you want towels, then you do not get 
towels. It is better to ask for the materials to wash and dry yourself with 
because then they cannot refer to specific products that you have listed. There 
is a lot of discussion about that, some lasting about a year and a half. But we 
just don’t win these arguments.”  
Not only do ambiguous output specifications cause discussion about 
responsibility, ambiguous descriptions of risk also trigger discussion. For 
example, the contract states that the consortium is responsible for cleaning and 
maintaining the walls. The walls are often dirty because detainees lean on them 
with their shoes. When the procurer argued that the consortium should clean 
or repaint the walls, the consortium argued that the dirty walls are not the 
result of normal use but rather of vandalism. Since the risk of vandalism is not 
transferred to them, the consortium argues they are not responsible.  
Apart from the ambiguity in norms and risks, the procurer blames the 
consortium for systems malfunction while the consortium argues it is not the 
system but the way the staff uses the system that causes problems. For 
example, the procurer experienced problems with the safety system that 
controlled the opening and closure of doors. When a guard requests the central 
security department to open a certain door, there is an inbuilt delay of a few 
seconds before he is able to open the door. If guards start pulling that door too 
soon, the system may not work at all. A respondent explained: “We gave the 
procurer instructions but many of their personnel leave and newcomers do not 
know how to use these systems. We say that is their fault. They say we should 
have explained the system better or that we should have delivered a different 
system.”  
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 Discussions about responsibility do not only occur between the procurer 
and the consortium but also among consortium members. It appears that, 
although the consortium as a whole is responsible for the contract, the 
different subcontractors do not always act in accordance with it. As a 
respondent put it: “At the beginning we work together but in time every 
company goes its own way. No one wants to be responsible for someone else’s 
work.” Similarly, another respondent described the situation: “The project 
director of the consortium has to be able to trust its partners. If they tell him 
the quality of the paint is fine, he has to trust them. But you see, they are able 
to screw each other easily. Within the consortium, they are just not fair to each 
other. The builder fails but he does not care because he leaves. And that 
becomes our problem.” Frequently consortium partners blame other 
subcontractors for irregularities in service delivery. As a respondent illustrated 
the point: “We have big windows here. One day, there was a great deal of 
sunlight streaming into the offices because the curtains we asked for had not 
been delivered. When we confronted the consortium with the fact that they 
had not delivered curtains or sunscreens, they said it was not their fault but 
that of their supplier. They try to convince us that it is not their fault but 
someone else’s. But I don’t care about their supplier. The consortium is 
responsible.” 
 The contractual structure demarcates the technical and financial 
responsibilities such that the construction company has no financial interest in 
the operational phase. The internal organization of the consortium therefore 
does not seem to reinforce awareness of an integrated and shared 
responsibility. As a respondent argued: “The contractual organization is very 
important. I have been involved in many projects and I see that when the 
consortium acts as one entity, you have fewer problems. When the contractual 
structure of the consortium separates the design–build and maintenance– 
operate group, problems arise.” The consortium decided to let the general 
project interest prevail over the individual interests of the various consortium 
members. A respondent described the situation: “For now we have made the 
decision to consider first and foremost what is in the interest of the project; 
only later will we see who should pay. In the beginning the first thing we 
wanted to know was who was responsible. As a result, our service delivery was 
sometimes interrupted.” These problems are seen as stemming from a lack of 
experience with the new way of procurement. In traditional projects, firms 
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work separately. DBFMO obliges them to work together. A respondent 
argued: “The problems during the operational phase were a result of ignorance, 
I think. Not everyone knew what the contract entailed, how the mechanism 
worked and what it meant to have an integrated long-term contract. For us as a 
consortium it was a first project too, and we had to learn during the project.”  
  
5.3.5 Quality 
Although the procurer is satisfied with the overall functionality of the asset, it 
is less satisfied with its quality in esthetic terms. It is argued that the detention 
center looks much older inside than one would expect given its recent 
completion. A respondent illustrated the point: “We cannot complain about 
the quality in general but I think they could have done a better job. You might 
wonder, for example, whether it is smart to paint the walls white. You can see 
that they already look very dirty. When we say, ‘paint those walls’, we get the 
answer ‘how are we going to pay for that?’. The same goes for the way in 
which the cells are furnished. When you open the wardrobe, the door hits the 
bed, which causes damage.” Similarly, another respondent argued: “You expect 
a certain quality and you think you have expressed that clearly in the output 
specifications. But when I look at the building, some parts look ten years old 
yet we have only been using the building for two years.”  
 In relation to the operational start of the center, interviewees from both the 
procurer’s as well as the consortium’s side argue that the quality of service 
delivery was, with some exceptions, rather disappointing. Complaints vary 
from what was asked for not being delivered to the malfunctioning of 
installations. For example, the procurer experienced problems with the climate 
installation that did not provide for a sufficient level of oxygen and therefore 
did not meet the requested quality level. A respondent explained: “The quality 
of the operation was very bad in the beginning. The transition from 
construction to operation was not organized well and the quality of the 
building was also not as we expected in first instance. Recently the consortium 
has hired extra people to improve all of this, but that took a while.” These 
problems might have been caused by relatively little attention being paid during 
the preparation phase to the actual operation of the center. A respondent said: 
“I think that much more attention is given to design and build then to 
maintenance and operation. If you pay more attention to that latter part, the 
service delivery will be better.” Over time, many of the problems experienced 
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at the start of the project have been solved and the number of fines has 
decreased.  
Despite the irregularities, the procurer sees improvement to quality too. For 
example, the procurer is satisfied with the way in which the consortium has 
organized food supply by developing a digital supermarket that allows 
detainees to buy and pay for groceries themselves. This innovative solution is 
considered an improvement in comparison to the way in which groceries were 
traditionally ordered and distributed. As a respondent put it: “Food supply is 
going great. Before, we had 650 shopping lists, one for every detainee. They 
had to be filled in and collected, and products had to be bought and 
distributed. It often appeared that detainees ordered products for which they 
had no budget. This meant phone calls and bureaucracy. The consortium came 
up with a touch screen and every detainee has their own pass with money with 
which they can order and pay directly. That saves time and money and it gives 
the detainees the feeling of freedom and personal responsibility.”  
The idea that by procuring the project according to DBFMO principles, the 
procurer would lose control seems to have increased the procurer’s 
expectations with respect to quality and their effort at controlling quality. As a 
respondent put it: “We sometimes demand much more then we would demand 
of our own organization. But because you give away control, you want to make 
sure it is perfect. And because of that, everything got quite tense during the 
first year of the operation.” Another interviewee described the situation: “The 
service levels are not higher but we control and safeguard them better. 
DBFMO creates a situation in which you work together but at the same time 
you are each other’s enemy. I mean, they are not from our own organization.” 
 With respect to quality in relation to safety and security, the consortium and 
the procurer have the obligation to prove that the technical solutions and 
chosen materials are in accordance with the national norms of the RGD which 
is ultimately responsible for safety and security of all detention centers. 
Although special attention was paid to the validation of security and 
incombustibility, it was argued that this is not DBFMO-specific given that 
these standards apply to every detention center no matter the way in which it 
has been procured. Despite the fact that the quality of the solutions and 
material was in accordance with the norms of the RGD it was argued that the 
consortium sometimes did not come up with the solutions they were expected 
to provide. A respondent illustrated the point: “Security is our priority so we 
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wrote down that there is a recovery time of zero seconds to fix a security 
camera. This implies that they will be fined immediately once a camera fails. In 
stipulating this we hoped to encourage the consortium to place two cameras in 
every corner. But they haven’t. Then I think, haven’t we been clear?”  
 In relation to the financial mechanism that in theory can help the procurer 
to ensure or improve service quality, the effectiveness of the system did not 
appear to be guaranteed. As a respondent described it: “I was too naive in 
thinking that with fines of a hundred thousand euro they would improve 
service delivery. That is not true in this case.” The fact that the financial 
incentives do not always help to stimulate the quality of the service delivery has 
perhaps to do with the initial tolerance of the procurer with respect to the 
application of the fines. As a respondent admitted: “At the beginning we were 
tolerant about fines. We played with the fines to get what we wanted. I do not 
know whether that was smart and I know that in other projects, they are 
stricter with this.” Not using the financial mechanism as it should be seems to 
impact on quality during the operational phase. A respondent confirmed this: 
“The fact that they do not use the financial mechanisms as they are supposed 
to makes it very difficult to steer quality.” The procurer, however, argued that 
fines related to safety, are always applied since irregularities that concern safety 
and security might harm the primary processes. Another respondent said: 
“With respect to safety we use the highest fines. I cannot tell my minister, 
sorry it was the consortium. Citizens will not accept that. Neither will 
politicians.”  
 When it comes to safeguarding quality, the procurer as well as the 
consortium indicated that the price that the state is willing to pay influences the 
quality level. Although during the bidding phase bids are awarded on both 
price and quality, it was suggested that price is the most important factor. As a 
respondent put it: “I have been involved in many projects and we almost 
always select on price. If there is relatively little money provided for the 
operation, then it is logical that the operation will be bad. If we want quality, 
we should select on quality and not on price.” One interviewee explained: 
“They sometimes forget what price they paid us: if you don’t invest in golden 
taps, we won’t give you golden taps.”  
Given that the consortium is obliged to hand over the detention center in 
accordance with the output specifications at the end of the contract period, the 
procurer is hopeful that quality in the long run will be safeguarded. A 
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respondent summed up: “I believe that once the contract is over, we will have 
a good building and that quality will not have suffered. I don’t think, however, 
that we will have saved any money, but that is another question.”  
Whenever service delivery is not as agreed upon, the financial mechanism 
should allow the procurer to stimulate the consortium to overcome 
irregularities. It does not always work that way. As a respondent argued: “If 
you want to make sure they do what they have to do, we have to make sure we 
are able to control them the right way. And in that respect, we still have a lot to 
learn.” Since the procurer does not know exactly how much money the 
consortium earns or loses with the provision of services or products, it is 
difficult to determine the correct level of fines. As a respondent said: “I am not 
a financial expert but they tell me a fine is a percentage of the profit of the sub-
contractor. But I think it is pure intuition and guesswork. We have tried to 
standardize fines and recovery periods. But I did not get the feeling that we 
had any idea what their price or investment actually was.” Another respondent 
said: “The level of the fines is just an estimate and it is no surprise that this 
system sometimes does not work. Calculating the level of the fines is difficult: 
they cannot be too high or too low. We use a standard but the consortium tells 
me the fines are too high.”  
The failure of the financial mechanism not only has to do with difficulties in 
determining the level of fines but also with the irregular application of fines. 
Whereas the procurer could fine the consortium for every irregularity, they 
appear to not always do so. As a respondent explained: “The fines do not 
always have a direct effect. Sometimes, when fines are as high as the complete 
availability fee for one month, you have to ask yourself whether it makes sense 
to use them. But then again, if you do use them, you see that suddenly the 
directors come and visit our center to see what their consortium is doing.” The 
irregular application of fines does not seem to support the effectiveness of the 
financial mechanism. A respondent put it this way: “I understand that when 
you talk with the consortium you start to believe that they are very unhappy 
but I would advise nobody to listen to that. You should definitely use the 
financial mechanism whenever you can. Lawyers and financial advisors say that 
all the time. Do what the contract says. No mercy. That is also my style but I 
do realize that reality is not quite so one-dimensional. This is the stuff of 
contract management and it’s very difficult.” In terms of how the contract 
management team applies the fines, DJI suggest there is hardly any knowledge 
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exchange on that with the RGD. As a respondent suggested: “The fines are 
not always applied and I must say that I do not know what they think of that at 
the central level. We also do not get much information about what we should 
and should not do in that respect.” 
5.4 Conclusion 
The findings reveal that during the preparation phase only a few external 
advisors were hired and this seems to facilitate the procurer’s accountability for 
the start conditions of the project. However, although the involvement of the 
procurer might have been high, this does not guarantee its ability to account in 
qualitative terms for the preparation phase. In this respect a distinction can be 
made between accountability in terms of the availability of information on 
agreements, norms, rules, and prices and accountability in terms of public 
servants understanding and being able to explain what those agreements, 
norms, rules, and prices actually entail. The fact that only a very few people 
were involved during the preparation phase and there was little diffusion of 
project information within DJI and between the RGD and DJI, might turn out 
to be a threat to accountability in the long run when key actors leave the 
organization.  
 The integrated approach to preparation required by the nature of the 
project seems to increase transparency in comparison with traditional projects 
in terms of the juridical, financial, and technical project parameters as well as 
the expected output level. The level of transparency provided by the contract 
and output specifications, however, is not always guaranteed given the fact that 
they sometimes contain ambiguous norms. The transfer of responsibilities to 
the consortium seems to have triggered the procurer’s concern for 
transparency and seems to have increased the level of transparency requested 
of the consortium and provided by it. The obligation for performance 
monitoring seems to increase transparency in comparison with traditional 
projects where such monitoring is often absent. However, the accuracy of 
monitoring reports is not guaranteed given the relative subjectivity of the 
measurements and interpretation of the monitoring results. While long-term 
financial planning provides for financial transparency, the pre-determined 
availability fee does not make transparent in any detail what the money buys. 
The registration of extra work and costs is considered to be more transparent 
when compared with traditional projects, although the procurer has difficulty 
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making sense of this information and overseeing the amount of paper work 
required.  
 The relatively small number of external advisors hired and the involvement 
of the RGD and DJI seems to have facilitated responsiveness during the 
preparation phase. In order to ensure that the consortium would provide a 
specific solution in certain circumstances, the procurer sometimes used input 
rather than output specifications. During the construction and operational 
phase, the procurer has been able to change both the contract and the output 
specifications. However, given that every adaptation influences the level of the 
availability fee, adaptations are preceded by negotiations that impede the 
procurer from influencing the operation immediately. By intentionally 
excluding certain services and products from the contract, the procurer has 
guaranteed its own responsiveness in respect of those elements.  
 The consortium provides what has been agreed upon in the contract and 
output specifications although neither document always guarantees 
compliance. Problems in that respect are the result of incomplete, incorrect, or 
ambiguous formulation of certain output specifications and risk distribution 
that allows for different interpretations of what the consortium is actually 
responsible for. Not only do the consortium and procurer have discussions on 
who is responsible for what: Consortium partners also experience problems in 
that respect. The dependency on sub-contractors, the absence of cooperation, 
and the contractual demarcation that separated the financial involvement and 
the risks of the consortium partners at times restrict the consortium’s 
responsibility for service delivery.  
 The quality provided in terms of the project’s technical and functional 
assets, is considered good whereas the procurer is less positive about its 
esthetics. The quality of the operation was considered disappointing because of 
non-delivery and the malfunctioning of systems. In addition, the interpretation 
of the output specifications by the consortium did not always match the 
expectations of the procurer in terms of quality. But at the same time, some 
innovative solutions provided by the consortium did surpass the procurer’s 
expectation in terms of quality. And over time the quality of the operation 
improved. The application of fines positively influenced the quality delivered 
although the effectiveness of the financial mechanisms could not always be 
guaranteed because of inconsistent fining and wrongly estimated levels of fines. 
Table 12 summarizes the influential conditions per value.  
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Table 12: Influencing conditions per value    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
Accountability  -Little dependency of procurer on 
external advisors 
-Project preparation  
-Few people involved during project 
preparation 
-Poor diffusion of information  
-Lack of performance monitoring  
-Lack of understanding available financial, 
juridical and technical project information 
-Outflow of personnel  
Transparency  -Integrality of contract  
-Integrality of output specifications 
and financial mechanism  
-Long-term contract 
-Long-term financial planning 
-Performance monitoring 
 
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Incomplete contract  
-Lack of experience in output specification 
development  
-Lack of knowledge in financial aspects of 
project  
-Late development of monitoring system 
-Long-term financial planning  
Responsiveness -Contractual clauses that allow for 
intervening 
-Excluding essential tasks from 
scope of contract 
-Influence with respect to 
formulation of output specifications 
and contract 
-Little dependency of procurer on 
external advisors 
-Room for contractual changes 
-Lack of experience of output specification 
development  
-Long-term contract 
Responsibility  
 
-Contract 
-Output specifications 
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Ambiguity in risk distribution  
-Demarcation within consortium 
-Little experience of integrated 
performance management in consortium  
-Unwillingness of project members  
Quality  -Contract 
-Higher norms  
-Integrality of contract  
-Long-term commitment  
-Output specifications  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Budget 
-Inaccuracy in calculating fines  
-Inconsistent application of fines 
-Little attention paid to operational phase 
during preparation phase  
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6 The Wastewater Project 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of a case study on a DBFMO project to 
construct, renovate, maintain, and operate wastewater installations. The 
chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides a short introduction to 
the project and describes its scope and content. Section 6.3 and the following 
subparagraphs, present the findings organized by value. Section 6.4 provides 
the conclusions. 
 
6.2 Project description 
The Netherlands is divided into 25 water boards that manage the water quality, 
water level, the condition of waterways and water barriers, and water 
purification. Each water board consists of a general and an executive board, 
directed by a dike warden who is appointed every six years by the government. 
The general board consists of democratically elected members whom select 
members for the executive board that, together with the dike warden, function 
as if they were the mayor and municipal executives of a town.  
According to Dutch water board law, water boards have the responsibility 
for cleaning wastewater before discharging it into open water. European rules 
dictate the standards for pollution, nitrogen, and phosphate removal. Around 
1995, a Dutch water board district faced European sanctions for not meeting 
these standards. The water board responsible faced a complex problem. Not 
only did they have to make sure that European norms were implemented 
correctly, they also needed to increase their capacity given the expansion of the 
already densely populated water board district next to the North Sea. Time was 
running out, money was scarce and knowledge with respect to the construction 
of a new and larger water purification system was not available. The estimated 
costs of about 650 million euro were considered to be far too high and the 
water board decided to investigate how norms could be met for the lowest 
possible price. In the search for more economic alternatives, the possibility of 
DBFMO was discussed and explored between 1998 and 2000. Various 
members of the general board as well as the Union of Water Boards, the 
Province and the National Department of Waterways and Public Works 
(Rijkswaterstaat, here after RWS), did not support the idea of construction by 
DBFMO. The State Secretary, however, approved and encouraged the 
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DBFMO initiative, paving the way by adapting the legislation. Despite the 
initial resistance, the general board eventually approved the plans for DBFMO 
on October 2000. On December 4, 2003 the water board signed a DBFMO 
contract with a Dutch-French consortium that will last until 2033. This project 
is the very first DBFMO project in the Dutch water sector as well as the largest 
purification installation in Europe.  
The scope of the contract entails the renovation of an old water purification 
installation and the construction of a second and far larger purification 
installation at a different location in the water board district. In addition, the 
consortium is responsible for the maintenance of the asset and the actual 
execution and management of the water purification process. Public servants 
who worked at the renovated water purification plant now work for the 
consortium and, as such, lose their status as public servants. The water board 
remains responsible for the public task of purifying water and owns the asset 
from day one. In order to manage the contract, the water board formed a 
contract management team to take care of the daily supervision of the contract. 
From March 2007, both water purifications installations were in use.  
6.3 Findings  
 
6.3.1 Accountability  
During the preparation phase in which the procurer prepares the contract and 
output specifications, it seemed necessary to hire external advisors since the 
procurer had only little or no knowledge of DBFMO procurement and its 
requirements. Although in the case of traditional procurement, the procurer 
would also depend on external advisors, because of the juridical, financial, and 
technical procurement requirements of the DBFMO, the need for external 
expertise was even greater. A respondent described the situation: “We have 
had externals for everything. There were a few public servants involved but 
almost all expertise was hired in. We did some things ourselves but we simply 
do not have that type of knowledge. In a traditional project you also need 
externals but you do not need all the juridical and financial knowledge that 
DBFMO procurement requires.” Although the dependency on external 
advisors was considered as hindering accountability, interviewees suggested 
that national as well as local governments tend to hire in external advice 
because it is too costly to internalize such knowledge. An interviewee 
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illustrated: “It is always a risk to hire externals but that’s the way it goes. You 
have to trust them because you cannot do it yourself and I do not want to have 
that knowledge in my own organization because it’s not worth the costs 
involved: we build a water installation every 100 years.” In order to be able to 
account for the project at all, the procurer needed external advisors to help 
with the necessary development of the juridical, financial, and technical 
parameters. A respondent put it: “We simply needed external knowledge. 
Otherwise, we would be just too exposed. That sounds strange, but there was 
no knowledge [internally] and if we had done it ourselves, that might have 
caused big problems. We spent millions and millions on hiring international 
experts to help us with the preparation of the project so that we could be held 
accountable; so that we could always explain and defend what we were doing.” 
Although on paper the procurer is able to account for the project, 
accountability in the sense of understanding what the contractual agreements 
entail seems not to be by definition safeguarded. As a respondent put it: 
“Accountability is not safeguarded per se. You have a contract but that does not 
speak for itself, literally. You need to have people in your organization who are 
able to understand it and who are able to indeed account for what we have 
agreed upon.” The fact that key actors often leave the organization after a 
certain period does not seem to facilitate accountability. A respondent 
explained: “When project managers leave, it is difficult to retain their 
knowledge.” In a similar vein, a respondent argued: “There are very few people 
that are constantly involved. You try to write everything down but the contract 
does not give all the answers. I predict that in the future there will be only few 
people here that are familiar with the project details.”  
The procurer’s ability to account for the project during its construction and 
operation was not initially helped by the contract management team’s lack of 
experience with DBFMO procurement. This team consisted of public servants 
who were assigned as contract managers after reorganization and they had no 
experience of contract management. An interviewee stated: “Their project 
director was very smart, but the rest? I wonder whether they all understood 
what was going on. You have to understand all the components: juridical, 
technical, financial and I think that the public side’s financial and juridical 
knowledge was underdeveloped. And you see that in the contract too. They 
often ask questions where the answer is already in the contract.” Due to 
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personnel changes and by training, the professionalism of the contract 
management team did increase during the project.  
The contract management team is often faced with questions about 
accountability from the general board who do not understand the contract in 
the way that the contract management team does. In that respect, a respondent 
argued: “There are people who understand absolutely nothing about this 
project and who ask questions about that. For some reason, they think 
accountability would be better preserved if we did it all ourselves. But I can tell 
you one thing: in traditional projects, there are many not-so-clever public 
servants who have no idea about the content of their project.” Given the long-
term character of the project and the fact that the composition of the general 
and executive board changes during the contract period, the contract 
management team finds itself obliged to account for the project with each 
change. As a respondent illustrated: “Once you sign a contract, political 
interest wanes. And then, with every reconstitution of the water board, you get 
the same questions, but they just do not know what the project is about.”  
6.3.2 Transparency 
The fact that the decisions made during the preparation phase have an impact 
throughout the contract period seems to stimulate the procurer to prepare the 
project very thoroughly in comparison with traditional procurement. As a 
respondent explained: “With this contract, 95% is organized before you start. 
You do not see that in traditional projects because we do not tend to think 
about maintenance.” Similarly, another respondent stated: “DBFMO is much 
more transparent and predictable because at the outset you have already 
thought about the future. If you were to plan a project yourself, you would not 
write everything down because you only think a few years ahead.” Ironically, 
the detailed contract and output specifications make the mistakes very 
transparent too. An interviewee explained: “With this type of contract, 
certainties as well as uncertainties become transparent. You can see what we 
have organized and what we have forgotten, what we have done well and what 
mistakes we have made.” Moreover, the long-term character of the project 
seems to increase transparency in that the expectations of the procurer are 
understood over a long period of time. As a respondent put it: “I have been a 
public servant all my life and I can tell you we are not to be trusted! No matter 
what we agree upon, we eventually want to change it. That is not good. With 
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DBFMO, at last there is stability; a government commits itself over a long 
period of time. These contracts bring stability, transparency.”  
 Logically, the replacement of input specifications by output specifications 
decreases transparency in terms of input while at the same time increasing it in 
terms of output. As a respondent illustrated the point: “When you use output 
specifications it is not transparent how the consortium is going to avoid smells 
coming from the water tanks but at the same time it is transparent in the sense 
that they know what norm they have to meet.” Using output specifications 
does not simply by definition provide for complete transparency. In this 
respect, a respondent argued: “You have to accept that it is simply impossible 
to write down everything that’s going to happen over the next 25 years. Output 
specifications are perhaps not as transparent as inputs, but transparency is 
never guaranteed when the future is involved. We have tried to think about 
future scenarios but the future remains unpredictable.” It was suggested that 
the quantitative national and European norms concerning water quality 
provided for sufficient transparency in order to direct the consortium’s 
performance. A respondent said: “We have used many quantitative norms and 
I think they are straightforward enough for the consortium to understand what 
we want.”  
 During the construction phase, the consortium is obliged to monitor, 
register, and report on the project’s progress to the procurer which seems to 
enhance transparency compared to work experience on the old plant. As a 
respondent argued: “Everything becomes clear: if you see what reports we 
have to make. Normally we don’t have that.” Another respondent explained: 
“You have to show what you have done, what you are going to do and how. If 
there are changes or irregularities, you also have to mention that. The procurer 
has always been satisfied with these reports.” The consortium appeared very 
willing to provide as much as transparency as necessary with respect to the 
construction and operation in order to satisfy the procurer and to establish a 
reliable reputation. A respondent argued: “We welcomed the procurer’s control 
mechanisms because this had to be a successful project. We saw a possible new 
market in front of us. So we were happy with all of their control and 
feedback.”  
 During the operational phase, the consortium used a certified quality system 
that registered and monitored their performance in terms of, amongst others, 
the amount of purified water produced. Besides the consortium’s monitoring 
110 
 
activities, the procurer and the Province conducted incidental tests and asked 
for external audits. The procurer is satisfied with the amount of transparency 
generated by the various monitoring activities. As an interviewee put it: 
“Monitoring works well, I must say. We know much more about this project 
than we did about our own installation. For example, we never registered 
adequately the amount of dirt removed from the water and now it appears that 
we used mistaken figures as the basis of the financial reward for dirt removal. 
The consortium is happy with that because they do nothing and yet meet the 
standard. That perhaps shows how we used to work here.”  
 Although the monitoring reports provide information about the procurer’s 
performance, the accuracy of these reports is not guaranteed per se and it was 
argued there always exists a chance that reports are manipulated. However, it is 
suggested that the monitoring activities from the procurer help to avoid such 
manipulation. A respondent put it this way: “We send them reports but are 
they transparent or accurate? You hope so. But you can manipulate everything. 
You can even manipulate your own bank account. You have to trust each 
other. That is the essence. If they are not going to trust our reports they can 
always conduct their own tests and compare our numbers with theirs.” 
Likewise, another respondent explained: “Are all those reports accurate? I 
cannot say. But we feel that they are correct. If I pay for water plants and I do 
not see them, something is wrong, obviously. The consortium has to report 
properly. We check things throughout all the different project phases. That was 
not always easy, and you cannot say that you have complete control but there 
have been no significant problems until now. I would not dare state that 
everything is correct but I always read their reports and when it seems that I 
don’t have to worry, then I don’t.” 
 Despite the fact that the consortium and procurer worked together on the 
creation of the quality management system, it did not directly provide the level 
of transparency expected. As well as there being technical flaws, the 
suboptimal functioning of the monitoring system was ascribed to the way in 
which the monitoring system was used by personnel working at the renovated 
plant. Former public servants did not seem to realize that monitoring was 
essential in DBFMO. An interviewee explained: “We had to take over the 
former employees of the renovated plant and they had problems with 
monitoring and reporting. Suddenly they were expected to control and check 
where they had never done that before. They had a difficult time with that.” 
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Similarly, another respondent described the situation: “We had some problems 
with the system in the beginning. The team at the renovated plant was a team 
of former public servants. They have since learned a lot about reporting and 
how to work transparently. They were not used to recording, controlling, and 
reporting. Perhaps they knew what they were doing but they never made their 
work transparent in the sense of documenting everything.”  
 DBFMO implies a structural and intensive role for private consortia and 
that seems to have prompted the water board to require transparency. An 
interviewee described: “With PPPs the public partner is very skeptical. With 
traditional projects, they think that because they do it themselves they do not 
need to have so much control.” Although the procurer might have requested 
more transparency than would normally be the case, respondents argued that 
there was surprisingly little supervision carried out by the contract management 
team. Apparently this had to do with the trust between the procurer and 
consortium. As a respondent described: “What was surprising was the small 
amount of supervision the water board felt it needed to provide. In the 
beginning there were only two or three people supervising. You would expect 
them to have had slightly more interest because they had the overriding 
responsibility to the community to guarantee that everything was ok. But I 
think that during the preparation phase, the water board had been comfortable 
with the level of expertise and control that the consortium partners had 
delivered. I have seen other projects where there is much more supervision.” 
Another respondent said: “The water board’s level of supervision was 
insignificant. They put a great deal of trust in the project company and relied 
on them to deliver.” In addition, the procurer and consortium communicated 
frequently and both parties proactively sought cooperation with respect to 
transparency. As a respondent described it: “In this project, there was a lot of 
contact and cooperation between the procurer and the consortium and they 
controlled the project jointly. I have been involved in several projects but to 
me, in that respect, this has been the most successful project until now.” 
Although the contract management team is satisfied with the level of 
transparency and monitoring, water board employees are often critical. An 
interviewee argued: “They often do not trust it [the monitoring report]. When 
they say a report is vague and not transparent I tell them that all the 
information is there and that they should just read it. We work with these 
reports every day and we have confidence in them but other people keep 
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asking: ‘Why don’t you control more? How can you trust them?’ Our response 
is to say: ‘That is a feeling.’ If it goes terribly wrong, we will notice.” 
 The long-term planning provides for financial transparency for the procurer 
as well as for the consortium. As a respondent described it: “I won’t say the 
financial mechanism is perfect, but it’s nearly perfect. For us as a consortium, 
there are rarely surprises and that is a nice context to work in.” Likewise, 
another respondent said: “We have a transparent financial system. Everything 
is written down and when we change the contract, the financial mechanism is 
adapted too and that is all carefully recorded.” Whereas the contract 
management team felt comfortable with the level of transparency in relation to 
the financial aspects of the project, that was not always true of the general 
project board. During the project, several external auditors were brought in to 
evaluate the project’s financial impact and sustainability. Despite a positive 
evaluation of the current financial position (in terms of costs, indexing, and 
tariffs), the auditor concluded that the water board had failed to calculate the 
long term financial consequences. An interviewee described the situation: “Our 
system is not used to calculating economic impact over a thirty year period. 
They should have done that because you need to know the consequences for 
your tariffs. We made some suggestions but our calculations were not 
thorough enough. We thought it unnecessary: we didn’t think others did that. 
In retrospect this shows our lack of experience, but at the time we were in a 
hurry and just wanted the best possible solution for the lowest price. What it 
meant for our overall financial situation was not an issue because we simply 
had to get the job done.”  
 In terms of the financial justification of the project as a whole, the water 
board’s internal auditor found it difficult to understand the way the project was 
organized financially. A respondent described the position: “Our financial 
auditor still has difficulties. His system is just not yet ready for DBFMO. In 
this example you see that the institutional change that DBFMO requires have 
not been implemented at all organizational levels.” Given the nature of the 
performance contract, the level of the availability fee may fluctuate so that 
monthly bills from the consortium are not equal. A respondent argued in that 
respect: “The variable costs are most problematic for the auditor. Their 
financial department finds that difficult. They are used to receiving the same 
bill every month. But they pay very little attention to exactly what the bills are 
for.” 
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6.3.3 Responsiveness 
The number of external advisors that was hired and their apparent influence 
on decisions making and the development of the output specifications seems 
to have hindered responsiveness in the sense that important decisions were not 
made by the water board itself but rather by external advisors. As a respondent 
put it: “It is impossible to describe how many advisors there were during these 
meetings. Big meetings about big decisions and they were all prepared and 
made by external advisors. That is fine, if that is the choice you make as a 
procurer. Is it smart? I don’t know.” 
 Although the consortium is ideally given enough room to interpret the 
output specifications in such a way that they come up with innovative and 
optimizing solutions, in this project it was decided that the consortium would 
be given little room for maneuver since the new type of procurement was 
already considered a radical and risky departure. As a respondent argued: “The 
idea of DBFMO is that you give the consortium the opportunity to come up 
with innovative and creative ideas. But in that respect we made a compromise: 
DBFMO, but with traditional purification processes. We wanted security.” 
During the construction and operation phases, the procurer was able to 
change the contract and output specifications as long as it did not disadvantage 
the consortium in financial terms. In contrast to the suggestion that after 
contract closure, the procurer has no influence on the contract, a respondent 
argued: “A contract offers more space for change then you might think. The 
contract provides clauses that allow us to change performance expectations if 
we want to. We have to pay for it of course, but we can ask whatever we want 
and the fact that we have a contract, does not mean we sit still. We have a joint 
project with the consortium in which we try to search for technical 
optimization. So the fact that we have a contract doesn’t stop us from 
innovating.”  
Despite the fact that it is possible to change the contract, it is not ideal to 
do so too often and, given their administrative and financial implications, 
contractual changes must be well considered. In contrast to the contract 
management team, general board members did not always understand the need 
for this reluctance to make changes to the contract. As a respondent described: 
“I think that general board members do not always understand what it means 
to have a DBFMO contract. They often ask questions whose answers are in 
the contract already, or they suddenly want to change things that you cannot 
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simply change without changing the financial model. They find this strange.” 
After elections the composition of the general board changes. This means that 
the contract management team is faced with the same questions about 
responsiveness from the new board. As a respondent stated: “That political 
reconfiguration is sometimes very annoying. Every four years we need to 
explain that they cannot change whatever they want. It is difficult for 
politicians. They want to have something of their own and have an opinion 
about anything when suddenly they get confronted with a contract that is 
already in place.”  
Although the procurer is able to change the contract and output 
specifications if they are willing to pay for it, it appears that the contract does 
not leave room for implementing cutbacks demanded by the national 
government. For example, because of the financial crisis, the Dutch national 
government forced all water boards to cut costs. Given that the consortium’s 
business model is based on the availability fee agreed upon during the bidding 
phase, the procurer is not able to change the financial parameters to reduce 
remuneration. A respondent illustrated the point: “If The Hague [the political 
capital of the Netherlands] says that we cannot raise prices or that we should 
save money then that is difficult. There is no room for cutbacks and with 
respect to variable costs: We are not able to influence the amount of dirty 
water we receive. We cannot influence that and we are no longer able to lower 
the cost price because that is set down in the contract.” Political influence 
seems to decline because of long-term contracting not only in relation to 
financial housekeeping but also in relation to other aspects of the project. As a 
respondent described it: “This is infrastructure and it lasts about 100 years: 
You should not want to change our decisions every 5 years. Normally everyone 
wants to have their say. But we have done that in 2003 to last until 2033. Thirty 
years of little political intervention. I think that is good for the continuity of the 
project.” 
  
6.3.4 Responsibility 
Despite startup problems, the consortium was able to deliver the asset in 
accordance with the output specifications and prior to the official agreed date 
for which they received a bonus. A respondent said: “At the beginning, we 
were nervous: Would they take their responsibility seriously? Had we outlined 
well enough what we wanted them to do? And although the consortium did 
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not seem very proactive at the beginning, their director made sure it always 
performed well.” The initial non-proactive attitude of the consortium might be 
explained by the ambiguity of the contract and output specifications. Although, 
in general, the consortium and procurer were satisfied with the quality of the 
output specifications and contract, at times both documents appeared not to 
provide clear indication of what needed to be done and by whom. A 
respondent described the situation: “Sometimes it was unclear what the 
contract required: should we interpret it in one particular way or in another? 
When the consortium tried to make us accept responsibility we said: the 
contract is clear on this point so we are not going to do what you ask, were you 
guys sleeping when you signed the contract?”  
 With respect to the operational phase, startup problems were solved rapidly 
and the degree of discussion about responsibility between the procurer and the 
consortium appeared to have been very small. The procurer and consortium 
painstakingly discussed the distribution of risks and responsibilities during 
special risk sessions, and this might have helped to prevent non-compliance. 
As a respondent argued: “I think this case was a success in avoiding non-
compliance because we held risk sessions with the consortium. So we talked 
about risk and responsibility very carefully. We knew who was responsible for 
what because we communicated.” Besides, the relatively well-defined output 
specifications seem to have left little interpretative space for discussion to arise. 
As a respondent argued: “The scope and output specifications are very 
important. If they are clear, you can hardly expect big problems. And that area 
was organized well in this project.” Another respondent put it simply: “We just 
have quantitative national norms. Everything is measureable. So that is 
relatively easy.”  
 Despite the general satisfaction with the way in which the consortium 
carried out its operating responsibilities the procurer had to confront one 
significant problem that concerned a bad odor originating from the water 
tanks. Once the water purification plants were in use, local residents 
complained of an odor coming from the water purification area. During the 
design phase, the consortium had taken the decision to cover the water plants 
with floating roofs that did not fully close off the water plants. Unfortunately, 
these roofs were not able to stop the bad smell spreading. Since it was 
impossible to measure objectively whether there was a smell, the consortium 
was obliged to investigate the complaints by hiring a specialist company to 
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determine whether local residents were affected by a smell escaping from the 
water purification installations. Since the contract stated that the consortium 
was responsible for managing possible problems relating to odor, the procurer 
had no intention of getting closely involved with the issue. Although the 
procurer was no longer responsible for the actual operation, local residents did 
expect the procurer to step forward. For this reason, the procurer decided to 
cooperate with the consortium. As a respondent explained: “We as the water 
board felt partially responsible, though technically it was the consortium’s 
responsibility. So when local residents started to complain, we worked together 
to demonstrate that we are a responsible water board with a responsible 
partner. The consortium did a good job in that respect.” Although the 
consortium was not pleased with the eventual test results that showed there 
was indeed a problem to solve, they took their loss and replaced the roofs. 
Although the consortium was willing to finance the replacement of the roofs, 
the Province threatened the consortium with a financial penalty, arguing that it 
took the consortium too long to overcome the problem of the smell. The 
Province argued that the consortium should have solved the problem within 
three months but the Council of State reasoned that this was technically 
impossible. As a result, the Province was not allowed to penalize the 
consortium and the consortium was given six months to repair the problem.  
Discussions about responsibility between the procurer and the consortium 
were perceived to be rare whereas discussion about responsibility seemed to 
occur more often within the consortium. The consortium was contractually and 
financially divided into two groups: a design and build group and maintenance 
and operate group. The quality of the work provided by the design and 
construction companies might have great financial and qualitative implications 
for the maintenance and operation of the installations that would be taken care 
of by the operating company. The financial separation implies that the design 
and build companies have no financial interest during the maintenance and 
operating phase nor vice versa. Although this financial demarcation might 
function well when there are no interface problems, it did not seem ideal in 
this project. A respondent explained why: “With the pumps, for example, we 
have had a lot of discussion. The construction company used a type of pump 
that was more expensive to maintain. In theory, that means an extra 
investment from the operating company. We solved that problem internally 
and it did not harm the service level itself but rather our own budget.” In 
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relation to the organization of the consortium and responsibility, the 
consortium argued that in retrospect, they would not have chosen to separate 
design and build and maintenance and operation into two groups. A 
respondent explained: “In normal projects you do not depend on each other as 
much. In DBFMO we form one organization. DB and MO is one. At least, 
that’s the theory. We have discovered that it is perhaps better not to separate 
DB from MO, so that one feels more responsible for the other. But in this 
project we haven’t done that. The construction company is not used to taking 
responsibility for the MO part but bit by bit they will get used to that.”  
The inclusive and cooperative attitude of the contract management team 
helped the consortium to solve their internal problems in such a way that 
actual service delivery did not suffer from the discussion between the 
consortium partners. A respondent explained: “In my opinion, we cooperated 
well, thanks to the contract managers on the public side. They would say: We 
see there’s a problem and we see that you are searching for a solution so we 
won’t use the fines. They always reminded us what their norms were but did 
not threaten us with fines and this gave us a bit more time to solve the 
problems.” Corroborating this, another respondent explained: “We use the 
fines to keep them sharp but only when it is absolutely important to us. We are 
not going to tease them with fines for things that are minor.” In addition to the 
constructive cooperation between the procurer and the consortium, the 
detailed interface agreement between the construction and operating 
companies seems to have helped prevent problems with respect to internal 
responsibility from arising. As a respondent explained: “We had a very detailed 
interface agreement. We wrote down what the design and build party had to 
deliver to the maintenance and operating side. That was a very professional 
document that I do not always see in other projects.”  
 
6.3.5 Quality  
With the exception of the floating roofs that caused the odor problems at the 
start of the operational phase, the procurer is satisfied with the quality of the 
renovation and construction of the water plants. As a respondent put it: “We 
have had hardly any questions about the quality of their work and we are very 
happy with the quality they deliver.” The quality of the construction, the 
design, and the technical solutions was suggested to be even higher then would 
have been the case if the procurer itself had been responsible for coordinating 
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the construction. As a respondent argued: “PPPs is a great stimulus for 
technical optimization. I think that if we had done it ourselves, we would not 
have been able to deliver what they have. We miss that stimulus, while a 
commercial party always searches for an optimum.” 
Again, with the exception of the odor problem, the procurer is satisfied 
with the quality of the operation, possibly due to the careful preparation of the 
operational phase. A respondent explained: “We had scarcely any problems 
with the operation. There may be problems with it in other projects but the 
operation side is our primary process so we invested a lot in its preparation. 
The problem with the bad odor was actually the only big problem. When that 
was solved, we were able to look back on a successful project.” The 
consortium started relatively early on preparing for the operational phase. As a 
respondent explained: “What was quite unusual in this project was that the 
operating team started work about 3 months after the project started while 
their first deadline would not be for 18 months. I think they realized that the 
operational stage had to be prepared carefully.”  
The level of fines used by the procurer has been low throughout the 
project. As a respondent put it: “I think the consortium has been fined, but I 
cannot remember when and what for.” Another responded confirmed this: 
“Once in a while they receive a fine. In general, they are not that high. 
Sometimes the output is not as expected because of bad luck, for example the 
bad odor problem, and sometimes there are technical problems. Sometimes the 
production capacity it too low and sometimes they exceed emission norms. I 
know the procurer is satisfied. Sometimes little problems are exaggerated but 
in general, they are pleased and we also communicate that to each other.” 
Communication and the apparent good relationship between the procurer and 
the consortium seem to have helped the quality of the project. An interviewee 
argued: “As far as I can see, and I have not shared this with others, this project 
has the best relationship between procurer and consortium that I have seen in 
the last ten years and that determines the overall quality.”  
The fact that the process of water purification has no direct connection to 
users might have positively influenced the procurer’s opinion with respect to 
the quality of the operation. As a respondent explained: “The consortium does 
what it has to do and there are no public servants or citizens involved in the 
execution of that process. Many people don’t even know that we purify water.” 
Another interviewee expanded on this view: “In PPP projects concerning 
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public utility buildings [such as a school, or a detention center], the perception 
of the user is very important. The users judge whatever the consortium does. 
Some like the coffee, others do not. In this project, you don’t have that user 
involvement. It is much more objective. We measure the quality of the water 
that enters and the quality of the water that goes back into the sea again.” 
Besides, the technical character of the operational phase, in allowing for the 
use of quantitative output specifications, seems to have provided relatively little 
room for interpretation of the output expectations. This may have helped the 
procurer to assume the consortium would provide what was expected. As a 
respondent put it: “The fact that it concerns a simple product, a simple 
organizational structure and a technical process that allows for standardizing 
output norms has had a great influence on the overall quality.” 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
The dependency on external advisors seems to facilitate accountability on 
paper while hindering accountability in terms of the procurer understanding 
the ins and outs of the contract and output specifications. The fact that only a 
few people have been involved during the preparation and later there is an 
outflow of key actors also hinders accountability. The lack of experience and 
knowledge on the part of the contract management team did in the first 
instance impact negatively on accountability but, with training and staff 
changes, their capacity to account for the project increased. 
 The integrated and long-term nature of the project stimulates transparency 
because of the detailed project preparation required. The replacement of input 
specifications by output specifications implies a decrease in transparency with 
respect to inputs but an increase in terms of the expected output. Performance 
monitoring stimulates transparency and since the procurer is looking for 
transparency, the consortium is motivated to provide it to satisfy their client. 
The various monitoring activities provide the procurer with sufficient project 
information although monitoring is not always carried out correctly. Despite 
the procurer requesting greater transparency, it carries out relatively little 
supervision. The long-term financial planning provides for financial 
transparency although the impact of the project on the rest of the water 
board’s financial housekeeping was not transparent.  
 The great number of hired externals seems to have hindered responsiveness 
during the preparation phase. The procurer is able to change the contract 
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during the construction and operational phases although there is a reluctance 
to change too much given the administrative and financial impact of 
adaptations. Long-term integrated contracting does not provide room for 
financial cutbacks since the consortium’s business case is based on the initial 
contract and output specifications.  
 The consortium provided as expected during the construction and 
operational phases with the exception of the problem with the bad odor. The 
quality of the output specifications that entail quantitative technical norms, the 
various risk sessions held with the consortium, and the intensive 
communication between the procurer and consortium seem to have provided 
the consortium with insight into the procurer’s expectations on areas of 
responsibility. Discussions with respect to responsibility between the 
consortium partners were managed effectively by the consortium’s contract 
manager who tried to overcome problems arising from financial demarcation 
by forcing consortium partners to share responsibility for the overall project. 
The detailed interface agreement between the consortium partners further 
facilitates responsibility.  
 With some exceptions, the procurer is satisfied with the overall quality of 
the asset and service delivery provided by the consortium. Integral long-term 
procurement seems to have facilitated technical optimization. The careful 
preparation of the construction and, especially, the operational phases has 
guided the consortium in such a way that the expected quality has indeed been 
delivered. The fact that the primary process of the water cleaning plants is 
isolated from any direct users and the technical character of the operation 
process, seem to influence the procurer’s perception of quality positively. Table 
13 summarizes the influential conditions per value.  
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Table 13: Influencing conditions per value    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
Accountability  -External advisors  
-Training contract management team 
members 
-Dependency of procurer on external 
advisors  
-Lack of knowledge of content of 
contract  
-Lack of knowledge of procurement  
-Outflow of personnel 
Transparency  -Externalization  
-Long-term financial planning 
-Long-term contract 
-Performance monitoring  
-Quantitative output norms  
-Reputation  
-Output specifications  
-Suboptimal use of monitoring 
mechanism 
Responsiveness -Influence with respect to formulation 
of output specifications and contract 
-Room for contractual changes 
-Dependency of procurer on external 
advisors 
-Long-term contract 
Responsibility  -Constructive communication between 
consortium and procurer 
-Cooperative attitude of procurer 
-Interface agreement in consortium 
-Risk sessions  
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Demarcation within consortium 
 
Quality  -Clear scope 
-Early preparation of operation phase 
-Integrality of contract  
-Quantitative output norms 
-Technical difficulties 
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7 The Ministry of Finance 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of a case study on a DBFMO project 
concerning the renovation, maintenance, and operation of the office of the 
Ministry of Finance. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 provides 
a short introduction of the project and describes its scope and content. Section 
7.3 and underling subparagraphs, present the findings organized by value. 
Section 7.4 provides the conclusion. 
7.2 Project description 
When it became clear in May 2001 that simply repairing the climate system 
would not be enough to heal the apparently ‘sick building’ of the Ministry of 
Finance, it was decided that either new premises had to be built or that the 
existing accommodation had to be thoroughly renovated.  
After consideration, the ministry opted for renovation through which a 
healthy, comfortable, assessable, attractive, flexible, efficient, effective, safe, 
and sustainable working environment had to be achieved. Around the turn of 
the century, the national knowledge center publiek-private samenwerking (PPS), 
considered nine projects for procurement according to DBFMO principles. 
These included the work on the Ministry of Finance. By 2004, minister of 
Finance Gerrit Zalm and State Secretary Wouter Bos had decided that the 
renovation of the Ministry of Finance would be the first national DBFMO 
project in the utility building sector.  
Preparation for the procurement was undertaken by the Ministry of Finance 
in cooperation with the Government’s Building Agency (Rijksgebouwendienst, 
hereafter RGD) and the European tender was announced in 2004. After a long 
and intense process of procurement preparation, consultation, negotiation, and 
decision making a DBFMO contract between the Dutch state (represented by 
the RGD as official procurer and the Ministry of Finance as client) and a 
private consortium, was agreed in November 2006.  
The consortium thereby became responsible for the design and 
implementation of the actual renovation. The scope of the contract also 
included providing reception, catering, cleaning, sport facilities, bike rental, 
waste management, energy supply, and elements of security. Mail delivery, 
specific parts of security, and ICT were not included in the contract. In 
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November 2008, the renovated ministry came into use. A contract 
management team from the Ministry of Finance was assigned to manage the 
contract and was supported by the RGD.  
 
7.3 Findings 
 
7.3.1 Accountability  
During the preparation phase, the RGD and a project team from the Ministry 
of Finance prepared the tender as well as the design of the contract and output 
specifications. Given that this renovation was to be the very first national 
DBFMO, the procurer invested much time and money in the preparation of 
these documents since they might function as an example for upcoming 
projects. To provide the specific juridical and financial knowledge needed for 
DBFMO procurement, the procurer hired a number of external advisors. As a 
respondent put it: “We were not able to do it ourselves. DBFMO asks for 
juridical and financial expertise so we hired that on the market. And when we 
had to make decisions we hired not one but ten lawyers. I think we were just 
very afraid of losing control.”  
 Despite the extent of external support for the procurer during the 
preparation phase, the procurer was intensively involved. A respondent 
describes the situation: “We had externals, but it was our credo as procurer 
that we always had to be one step ahead, so we always had to know what we 
were doing, and we always had to have 80% of the work finished before we 
went on to the next step.” The prudence of the procurement team was not 
appreciated by everyone, but it seems to have strengthened the procurer’s 
ability to account for the project preparation. As a respondent put it: “You 
have to prepare those projects carefully, if not, you just don’t know what 
you’re doing. Because of the intensive preparation, this project started slowly: 
too slowly according to some. They referred to it as the project of endless 
waiting. Even the Secretary-General commented that nothing was being done. 
In these circumstances it is important to say ‘no’ to your superior to and 
explain that the preparatory phase is most important. We wanted to be in 
control and we wanted to understand what we were doing.”   
 It was suggested that since the Ministry of Finance was the guardian of 
PPPs this project simply had to be successful. Neither cost nor effort was 
spared. As a respondent commented: “It is logical that our preparation was 
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thorough. The Ministry of Finance is a very well organized ministry and we 
work hard here. We are used to working with rigid deadlines and with money 
so in a sense, the effort put into DBFMO was not new. And we had very good 
people: the project director and his assistants were first class. They were 
knowledgeable and worked very hard to make the project a success. They 
understood what they were doing and they made it our project.” In the same 
vein, another respondent said: “The private sector parties told us they were 
surprised how professional we were. We prepared the project very well and we 
always wanted to be one step ahead. We kept the minister informed and we 
made sure the decision-making process was visible to the project group and 
that everything was written down and accessible in the archives.”  
 If the ability of the procurer to account for the project depends on the 
procurement being carried out in a professional manner, accountability could 
be at stake when procurers are less professional. In that respect a respondent 
argued: “When you have less enthusiastic, less professional people with less 
knowledge and expertise, then these contracts could prove too complex. If an 
ordinary school board or an ordinary city council member were to be 
responsible for procurement, they might not understand what they are doing at 
all. If you want to guarantee that those people working on the project can be 
held accountable, then it is necessary that they stay committed and that they 
invest time in the preparation of the project.”   
 During the transition from project preparation to construction and 
operation, almost all the key actors left the procurer’s team. This outflow of 
personnel impacted severely on continuity and although record keeping and 
paper work was intact, this does not seem to have contributed to 
accountability. As a respondent argued: “Of course, I cannot ask them to stay 
for 25 years but it would have been helpful to have them on board as 
construction finished and the operation began: Paper is only paper and what is 
most important is that you understand the intention behind the agreements. 
This is not to deny that paperwork is also important, but not everything can be 
captured in writing. There is much in their heads.” In a similar vein, a 
respondent outlined the risk: “The risk is that people leave. That is what 
happened here. I can call them if I need their information, but it just appears to 
be difficult to preserve information with this type of contract. There is a great 
deal of knowledge that you cannot write down. We did our best to record it all 
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but it doesn’t work like that. On the consortium side that was even worse. 
After the construction phase, everyone left.”  
  During the operational phase, the consortium is obliged to report to the 
procurer on its performance. Depending on the monitoring reports, the 
procurer determines the level of the availability fee to be paid. However, there 
was inadequate monitoring during the first years of the operation which meant 
that neither the consortium nor the procurer was able to account for service 
delivery and the payments made by the procurer. As a result, the procurer was 
not able to account to the internal auditor for the financial housekeeping. As 
one respondent illustrated the problem: “We were not able to account for what 
we did and our auditor was not happy. Our administration was simply flawed. 
The monitoring system didn’t work. We have now agreed how to move 
forward while we are solving the problem. But the administrative set up wasn’t 
as it should have been.” Another interviewee explained: “Either we didn’t get 
the bills and the information that underpinned them, or we got the bills and 
the explanation was vague. We found it difficult to determine if the costs were 
accurate. The idea of a monitoring and financial mechanism is great but then it 
has to work. In this case they promised things that they never delivered. So the 
National Auditor asked us how we could justify our performance without 
reports.” 
 
7.3.2 Transparency  
The long-term integrated contract obliges the procurer to prepare the financial, 
juridical, and technical project aspects in detail. The requirement to do this 
seems to facilitate transparency. As a respondent put it: “With DBFMO you 
force the procurer to make decisions at an early stage of the project for the 
following 25 years. It forces everyone to make decisions and I think it is exactly 
that extra effort that helps us to make it very transparent what we expect.” 
Making a similar point, another respondent explained: “With PPPs you look at 
the contract 100 times. Not once, but 100 times. If not, it will cost you money. 
Traditionally, if mistakes were made public servants could simply say that 
circumstances had changed and the mistakes weren’t seen as mistakes. But 
now, if you make a stupid mistake it’s very transparent.”  
Although the careful detailed preparation of the output specifications was 
perceived to be challenging, the process seems to have facilitated and even 
increased transparency in comparison with traditional projects. As a 
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respondent argued: “We were initially shocked to see what we had to describe. 
We had to think about everything much more than in traditional projects. 
Those output specifications; you get scared when you see them. You see 
service level expectations for the tiniest things written down there. Normally 
you don’t do that in this amount of detail.” Similarly, the distribution of risks 
and responsibilities seems to have become more transparent. One respondent 
said: “Those contracts get prepared so much better than traditional contracts. 
Risk analysis is a good example. Traditionally the procurer did not even 
consider risks. Now they have to think about it.”  
 DBFMO procurement replaces input specifications by output 
specifications. Whereas input specifications define how something will be 
achieved, output specifications define only what service level or output norm 
the consortium is expected to deliver. The replacement of input specification 
by output specifications decreases transparency in terms of exactly what will 
contribute to the end product or process, while at the same time, it provides 
more transparency in terms of what will actually be delivered. As a respondent 
described: “Normally you see drawings, pictures, and artist impressions but we 
no longer have that. We can no longer predict what the building is going to 
look like. They send us a drawing but the consortium is free to say ‘although 
this solution is very ugly, I am going to use it because I still meet the output 
expectations.” The fact that the output specifications always leave room for 
interpretation seems to have increased the procurer’s demand for transparency. 
A respondent explained: “There is always a level of uncertainty but we work 
with standards and we measure whether they deliver in accordance. I think it’s 
good that there’s a gray area: that keeps us both sharp. That feeling of ‘us 
against them’ helps the project, I think.” Another respondent suggested: 
“Paradoxically, I think we control them much more than before, precisely 
because we don’t control the process ourselves. The arrangement is relatively 
vague, you have to give them a certain amount of freedom, and that is what 
you want to control. The strange thing is that we seem to know much more 
about these projects than we know about traditional projects. It’s a funny 
contradiction.”  
 During the operation, the consortium monitors its performance and reports 
on it to the procurer. Performance monitoring seems to have increased 
transparency in comparison with traditional procurement where such 
monitoring is often absent. A respondent explained: “The operation is 
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absolutely more transparent than traditional projects. You just need to see all 
those reports.” Similarly, another respondent said: “We have to measure 
everything. Some things you only measure once, others you have to measure 
during the whole contract duration.”  
 Despite the obligation to monitor it, the procurer experienced irregularities 
in terms of performance. The monitoring system, that in theory would allow 
the consortium to measure performance and to report to the procurer, 
appeared not to have been implemented as intended. As a result, performance 
could not be measured and the correct level of availability fee could not be 
determined. A respondent outlined the problem: “During construction we had 
trouble with monitoring. It was disorganized and a complete failure. You have 
to be able to measure performance and you want to steer by using the financial 
incentives. If that does not work...It took a year before they sent us the first 
bill. They had no idea.” The irregularities with respect to monitoring can be 
attributed to the lack of attention paid to the development of the monitoring 
system. A public servant illustrated the point: “It took a while before we got 
the monitoring plan that we asked for and that plan was never approved. 
When they did finally produce the monitoring plan, we found several mistakes 
had been made. And now you can see that the consortium is having difficulty 
because of inaccuracies in the financial calculations.” The fact that the procurer 
and consortium used incompatible record keeping systems even further 
frustrated the possibility of adequately monitoring performance.  
 The availability fee is based on the scope of the contract defined in the 
output specifications. Whenever the procurer requests services or products 
that are not initially included in this scope, the output specifications need to be 
adapted carefully, given the financial consequences. In comparison with 
traditional projects, the registration of adaptations and corresponding costs 
seems to be more transparent. As respondent put it: “With this project if we 
deliver extra work or the procurer wants something else, we have to write it 
down in the contract and we have to say how much it will cost them. 
Previously we didn’t do that.” Similarly, another respondent said: “Normally I 
could say, ‘we can make a verbal agreement right?’, but the procurer does not 
accept this way of doing things because they are bound to the scope of the 
contract. So we have to be very careful in that respect.”  
 In addition to the irregularities in performance monitoring, the consortium 
did not properly organize its financial administration and failed to bill the 
129 
 
procurer for extra work. A respondent gave an example: “We changed the 
contract and we agreed on a price. You might think we’d then receive a bill. 
But no. I didn’t receive a thing. Meanwhile the consortium began to complain 
that we weren’t paying them and I had to explain that I was happy to pay but 
in order to do so I at least needed to receive a bill! Eventually we got our own 
administration to calculate a price for the extra work. The consortium just 
didn’t know what they had delivered and at that point we thought: This is 
impossible!”  
 The long-term character of the contract compels the procurer as well as the 
consortium to calculate prices, fines, losses, and gains over a long period. 
Although the long-term financial planning delivers transparency on cost of the 
project over a twenty five year period (with the exception of variable costs), the 
accuracy of the calculations does not seem to be guaranteed. As a respondent 
put it: “We know how to approach prices over 25 years. But how can I know 
what the world will look like in 25 years? You don’t know and so the financial 
model is partly based on estimates.” Another respondent described it this way: 
“It’s a big puzzle with a lot of variables and uncertainties. There are many 
smart guys looking at these calculations and perhaps the financial model does 
represent reality but the financial calculations remain vague. My experience is 
that in many projects they have miscalculated completely. Especially in relation 
to technical aspects. And if you make that mistake with DBFMO, you bear the 
consequences for 25 years.”  
 
7.3.3 Responsiveness 
During the preparation phase, the procurer was assisted by external advisors. 
Although the procurement team took the lead with respect to the preparation, 
their dependency on externals seemed to harm responsiveness because 
important decisions were made by externals rather than by the procurer itself. 
As a respondent explained: “My biggest concern, and it is a fundamental 
concern, is that since decisions are being made by external advisors, you are no 
longer in charge. The procurer is completely dependent on what others come 
up with.” Another response chimed with this: “I think it is risky when external 
advisors decide about important things such as the distribution of risks itself. 
They live in a paper world: they make contracts and agreements but they do 
not know what our practical reality looks like. It is our project so we should 
decide.”  
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 Although the output specifications provide the consortium with relative 
freedom, the procurer appeared not to leave much room for interpretation. As 
a respondent explained: “The state wanted to remain in control even though 
the whole idea of DBFMO is that you transfer the responsibility for innovation 
to the market. What we did here, we cut the whole process in such small pieces 
that the market had no room for maneuver at all.” Another respondent made a 
similar point: “The procurer had the tendency to control everything. The 
contract got bigger and bigger. It almost felt like armor. But if you control it so 
rigidly, you frustrate your own growth. Effectively the client is saying: I want to 
know for sure what I’m getting for the next 30 years. So you cannot even talk 
about technical innovations. They just want to control and to change nothing.” 
The long-term integrated contract suggests that once the contract has been 
signed there is no room left for changes. However, the contract and the output 
specifications have been changed regularly. A respondent explained: “The 
procurer wanted to change things almost immediately after we signed the 
contract. Two years into the project we had changed 60% of the output 
specifications. The contract changes all the time because our organization 
changes too.” It is not only the output specifications that can change. The 
contract contains clauses that allow for altering the contract itself in the event 
of significant societal, political, or economic changes. In addition, when 
contract managers consider it necessary to intervene because of health or safety 
risks or juridical obligations, the procurer is allowed to do so. In that case, the 
consortium is liberated from its contractual obligations and is fined when 
intervention is the result of non-compliance by the consortium.  
Despite the ability to alter the contract, in comparison with traditional 
projects, the procurer does experience a loss of direct influence. Contractual 
changes are preceded by negotiation about price or other issues, and may take 
some time. An interviewee gave an example: “Normally if I say to the facility 
manager that I would like a new desk tomorrow, I get a new desk tomorrow. If 
I ask the consortium the same question, we go through a whole process: what 
is the durability of this desk? Is it worth replacing the desk given the contract 
duration? What consequences does this have for cleaning? By this time we are 
a month further down the line and the desk still isn’t there. That’s a big 
difference. We used to be our own boss and now we are only partly in charge.” 
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7.3.4 Responsibility  
The contract, the output specifications, and the monitoring mechanisms were 
supposed to ensure compliance. However, it appeared that these mechanisms 
in themselves did not guarantee that the consortium would fulfill its 
responsibility as a full service provider. As a respondent put it: “At the 
beginning we thought this would be idyllic. You sign a contract and the 
mechanisms do the job. But that’s not true.”  
 Whereas the procurement team did not face any grave problems with 
people meeting their responsibilities during the construction phase, the 
operational phase was characterized by many discussions about responsibility. 
In a nutshell, the operating company, responsible for the daily operation of the 
building, did not seem capable of providing the services agreed upon at the 
preparation stage. For example, when the renovated ministry was due to open, 
the reception area was not yet furnished and the procurement team of the 
Ministry of Finance had to work the Sunday before the official opening, in 
order to get parts of the building furnished so that people could do their work 
the next day. In addition, the monitoring system was not in place at the start of 
the operation.  
 During the operation, the consortium frequently tried to transfer the 
responsibility to the procurer. A respondent rejected that notion: “I realize 
now that some elements in their tender perhaps were not realistic but I refuse 
to take responsibility for the consortium’s failure to deliver. If you design a 
building made out of glass, fine, but don’t come to me and ask me for money 
when you realize that it costs you more to clean everything than you had 
calculated beforehand.”  
 Difficulties in terms of responsibility may have been caused by less well 
developed output specifications for the operational phase. As a respondent put 
it: “We have a contract and we have output specifications. Perfect. But we 
were not able to tell what was actually going to happen in the operational phase 
since we hadn’t prepared it such detail as we had for the preparatory phase.” 
Similarly, a respondent argued that the quality of the output specifications, the 
monitoring mechanism, and financial system are still ripe for improvement: “If 
things go wrong, we, the procurer, should blame ourselves. We apparently 
failed to write a good contract or to think about good mechanisms. Maybe we 
haven’t been clear enough.”  
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 The relatively scant attention paid to the transition from contract and 
output specification to the provision of service delivery did not contribute to 
compliance. Whereas the output specifications indicated what should be in 
place, the consortium did not automatically convert the specifications into 
concrete actions. A respondent described the situation: “You write it all down 
but if no one takes responsibility for making sure that a table actually stands 
there, then the specifications are useless. I think there were plenty of people 
working at management level and too few people with a hands-on attitude. 
Consortia need people that are able to couple paper with practice, people that 
know to connect. This project had very few of these.”  
 As well as the lack of attention paid to actualizing the output specifications, 
ambiguity in the specifications also provided grounds for discussion over 
responsibility. An interviewee said: “You often wonder, what they mean by this 
or by that. And our interpretation is not always their interpretation. And when 
they say that we did not do what we were supposed to do, our reply is that we 
complied with the output norms.” The point was reinforced by another 
respondent: “The construction company always tried saying ‘yes, but if I read 
the contract this way, then I am right’. Well, that got out of hand and we got 
stuck at that point.”  
 Poor attention to detail and ambiguity cause problems over who is 
responsible, but sometimes the consortium simply doesn’t do what it’s 
supposed to do. As a respondent explained: “Sometimes contracts or output 
specifications are unclear but sometimes the consortium simply doesn’t do 
what we agreed upon. Their attitude was not pro-active or client orientated at 
all.” The fact that this project was the very first PPP project in the 
Netherlands, might explain why the consortium appeared to lack a pro-active 
approach. It was expecting too much too soon, one respondent suggested. 
“You cannot expect companies that always thought in price suddenly to make 
a switch to thinking in terms of responsibility for the product. In that respect, 
this case is a bad example. As a private company we find it quite difficult to 
accept our responsibility for quality and that makes the procurer insecure. But 
we are in the middle of a process. We need some time to learn how to do it.” 
 The lack of clarity over responsibility was not restricted to the procurer-
consortium partnership. The partners within the consortium disagreed 
amongst themselves. One explanation is that the operating company was only 
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minimally involved during the tender phase and did not know what was 
actually expected in terms of outputs. 
 A second explanation seems to be the internal organization of the 
consortium into construction and operating teams, implying that the 
construction company is not responsible for the operation. As a respondent 
explained: “Until now the operating company has found it difficult to take 
responsibility for the design and build. And that is logical, it has no mandate or 
influence on that part of the project, but, as part of the consortium, it gets 
penalized when something to do with design and build creates a problem. In 
this case, the construction company delivered one month before the actual 
deadline but, in my view, it could have used that extra month. There were still 
a lot of unfinished details and even now we have problems because the 
construction was not finished carefully enough. It frustrates the current 
operation because instead of fixing the problem, people spend time on internal 
discussion about who is responsible and who should pay.” Another respondent 
echoed the sentiment: “The danger here is that no one feels responsible for the 
overall project. The builders leave and go back to their own reality and they 
forget there is an operating company and that the contract lasts for another 23 
years.”  
 
7.3.5 Quality  
At the outset of the project, the procurer had doubts about the quality the 
consortium would deliver. However, when the renovation was finished, the 
procurement team was very pleased, despite minor imperfections. A 
respondent commented: “There was a lot of resistance but when we saw what 
they delivered, we were all very happy: a showcase building that was even more 
beautiful than we could have imagined. It’s not perfect but in the end, it is a 
very pretty building. I am convinced that if it wasn’t for DBFMO, we would 
never have got a ceiling made of glass and the restaurant would never been 
replaced.”  
 The procurer invested time and money in the preparation phase during 
which the output specifications were developed. This relatively intensive 
preparation seems to have increased the procurer’s expectation of quality 
compared with other projects and this, in turn, seems to have had a positive 
influence on the delivered quality of the asset. As a respondent explained: “I 
think this procurer formulated its expectations very well. With other projects, 
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we have had much more to criticize in their preparation, and we are often 
surprised at what is being asked for. But we deliver whatever they want. In this 
project we haven’t seen those mistakes because they gave much more thought 
to what they were asking for.” However, for this detailed preparation to have a 
positive influence on the eventual quality the specifications must pay specific 
attention to quality. One interviewee put it this way: “We explicitly rewarded 
quality in the bidding phase. If you do not ask for quality in the output 
specifications, then you get a building from Eastern Europe.” The quality 
requested by the procurer in itself seems to depend on the financial capacity of 
the procurer. As a respondent pointed out: “If quality deteriorates, I think that 
is not a result of DFBMO but the result of a general tendency of governments 
to spend less money.” 
 Although the quality of the asset was not perfect at the moment of delivery, 
it was suggested that, given the long-term obligation to deliver the building 
according to the output specifications, the consortium will have to work on the 
imperfections throughout the entire duration of the contract, thereby 
guaranteeing to deliver the quality required by the procurer. As a respondent 
explained: “You have to consider the quality of the asset over 25 years. The 
quality on the day of delivery is just one moment in time. The procurer already 
knows that the consortium has an obligation to hand over the asset in 
accordance to the output specifications so they have to keep on working on 
the quality of the asset. In a traditional project they do not have that 
obligation.”  
 Having an integrated approach to the tender also seems to increase quality 
in comparison to traditional projects. As a respondent explained: “We can still 
make the approach more integrated but there was a positive synergy in that 
respect. For example, we have floors wired for computer throughout the entire 
building, which means that whenever the layout changes, the floor doesn’t 
have to be lifted. So there you see the construction and technical people 
working together. Normally we keep to our own little world and don’t seek to 
cooperate like that.”  
 In addition to intensive preparation, long-term obligation, an integrated 
approach, and the specific demand for quality during the bidding phase, 
cooperation between the consortium and procurer during the construction 
phase seems to have helped the quality of the renovation. The procurer and 
consortium shared a construction shed and that made constant communication 
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and fine-tuning easier. As a respondent described the situation: “I think there 
was a physical component to the success of the construction. They [procurer 
and construction company] were one team and sat next to each other on the 
construction site. They shared their ambitions and their vision for making this 
a successful and exciting project.”  
There is a final condition that seems to have influenced the quality of the 
asset: The consortium’s motivation to build a good reputation. As a 
respondent explained: “If this wasn’t the first pilot and not the Ministry of 
Finance, then some things would never been achieved. This was an excellent 
opportunity for the consortium to show what it was capable of. If it were 
successful, it could win other tenders. However, I haven’t seen anything of that 
ambition during the operational phase.” It was not only the consortium but the 
procurer, too, that was highly motivated to make this a successful project. A 
respondent opined: “It goes without saying that this would become a success. 
In fact, it would be a big shame if it had turned out to be a disaster. There were 
very motivated and professional teams here, and, to me, this project is 
therefore exemplary. You have to be careful with other projects in which 
people are less motivated. That is a concern.”  
Whereas the quality of the renovation was considered good, the quality of 
the operation was considered anything but successful. As pointed out earlier, 
this may have been due to the lack of attention paid to planning of this phase. 
As a respondent explained: “We have underestimated that completely in this 
project and we do that differently in other projects. Normally we think about 
the operation during the construction phase whereas in this project, we 
thought about it when the construction was almost finished. I think the 
problem lies in the poor communication between our partners. If there is no 
communication, then by definition it will be a disaster.” Another respondent 
argued: “We should have anticipated the operational phase better. If we had 
thought about it earlier we could have avoided a great deal of discussion.” 
The way in which tenders were awarded for the operation phase might also 
have influenced the quality of the operational phase. A respondent illustrated 
the point: “Perhaps we should have paid more attention to the operational 
phase during the project preparation. Whereas we awarded the bids points for 
picture quality, functionality, and flexibility, we awarded fewer points for 
logistics, service delivery, and monitoring because we thought the performance 
mechanisms would stimulate these aspects.”  
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The difference in quality between the operation and construction phase not 
only seems to stem from the skewed awarding of points but also from 
relatively little guidance given on the transition from construction to operation. 
Whereas the tender phase and the actual delivery of the asset where considered 
as two important moments, the operational phase seemed to be taken for 
granted. As a respondent put it: “We were very focused on a good tender 
process and on the renovation. After these two peaks, our attention wandered. 
We were very focused on the technical norms and there was little attention 
paid to the transition to maintenance and operation.”  
 Problems with operational quality might also stem from the output 
specifications where there was room for ambiguity about the service level 
expected by the procurer. As a result, the solution provided did not always fit 
the procurer’s expectation. As one respondent explained: “The output 
specifications do not always define clearly what the procurer expects. The 
procurer has a definite idea of how the final product should be but the output 
specifications do not always directly reflect that idea. We interpret the 
specifications in our own way so there is always the chance that the procurer’s 
expectations and ours don’t match. But there are different paths to Rome.”  
 Output specifications aside, the operation company found it difficult to 
prepare the service delivery since they were not familiar with the workflow at 
the ministry and the work habits of its users. Where the construction company 
remains in touch with the procurer, the operating company should be in touch 
with the actual consumer of the services to be delivered. This did not happen 
in this project. A respondent explained: “You know the procurer but you do 
not know the user. So when we began operating on the 17th of November 
2008, we did not know whether they would make a mess, whether everyone 
would eat at twelve and what they would order. You have to know their habits 
in order to organize these processes but at the start of the operation, we did 
not know what to expect. We have learned that now, through trial and error.”  
 The financial mechanism allows the procurer to stimulate the consortium to 
provide the expected quality by applying fines when actual performance does 
not meet the expected output norms. If compared with traditional projects, the 
DBFMO’s ability to use fines seems to be a stimulus for assuring quality. As a 
respondent described it: “It is very simple. If the building demonstrates 
deficiencies, they are not paid, so it is a big stimulus to deliver good quality. We 
don’t have that stimulus with traditional projects.” Another respondent 
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explained: “You can force them to take things seriously by using the financial 
mechanism. To be honest I wish I never had to use fines. That simply means 
that quality is not as agreed upon. But if you need to stimulate them to 
overcome irregularities, it really helps to have this extra pressure.”  
 The effectiveness of the financial mechanism is not always guaranteed and 
depends on the quality of its design. A possibly incorrect tariff of fines might 
have undermined the impact of the system. A respondent outlined the 
problem: “It is just very difficult to make calculations for such big projects that 
last so long. There is a risk involved. You can estimate prices and costs but I 
think the financial mechanism is as soft as butter. Fines should hurt the 
consortium in such a way that they feel obliged to do something about it. But 
if you have little information about their financial housekeeping, how can you 
determine an appropriate level of fine?” Although the output specifications 
and the contract were reviewed during the preparation phase, the financial 
mechanism was not. With hindsight, it would have been wise to have the 
financial mechanism reviewed too. As a respondent argued: “We asked 
external reviewers to check our output specifications. That is good because it 
only makes them better. We should have done that for the financial 
mechanism too.”  
 Setting aside the design quality of the financial mechanism, its effectiveness 
seems to depend on the way in which the procurer applies the system. With 
the number of problems arising during the operating phase, the consortium 
faced substantial fines. The ministry’s contract management team decided not 
to apply the fines automatically but to decide on a case by case basis whether a 
fine would help improve the quality of the service delivery. As a respondent 
explained: “At the Ministry of Finance I saw that they did not want to apply 
the fines too strictly. I understand that, because it is a pilot. But eventually you 
ruin your own service delivery because of it. If you give the consortium one 
finger, they will take your hand and they will take advantage of that. The 
procurer should not be too kind.” Perhaps because of the inconsistent 
application and the number of fines, the financial mechanisms appeared not to 
function as a stimulus at all. As a respondent put it: “There was a point at 
which the mechanism just didn’t work any longer. When we reached that 
point, we decided it was time to hire a mediator.” 
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7.4 Conclusion 
Despite the dependency on external advisors during the preparation phase, 
because of the procurer’s intense involvement and cooperation with the 
externals public servants were able to account for the ins and outs of the 
project. The fact that this project was the very first DBFMO project carried 
out by the Ministry of Finance possibly explains the procurers’ commitment, 
professionalism, and prudence with respect to accountability. Although 
accountability on paper was strong, the outflow of key actors hindered 
accountability in terms of collective understanding and being able to explain 
what the agreements, norms, rules, and prices actually entail, especially in the 
long run. The absence of adequate performance monitoring at the start of the 
operation, prevented the procurer from accounting for its spending.  
 The long-term and integrated approach to project preparation provided for 
more transparency during the start-up phase in comparison with traditional 
projects. The replacement of input by output specifications decreases the 
transparency of the inputs but enhances transparency in terms of output. The 
mere suggestion that by procuring the project through DBFMO the procurer 
would lose control seems to have triggered the procurer’s determination to 
have oversight and full transparency. But although transparency might have 
been strengthened by recording the extra work required and by performance 
monitoring, the absence of proper performance monitoring due to the 
incompatibility of the monitoring systems, together with the poor preparation 
and implementation of the monitoring plan, meant that the expected level of 
transparency was not achieved. 
 The number of external experts involved and the extent of their decision-
making power seems to hinder responsiveness. The contract and the output 
specifications did not provide the consortium with much room for 
interpretation and both were changed throughout the construction and 
operational phase. Although the procurer can alter the contract and output 
specifications, responsiveness is limited because adaptations are always 
preceded by negotiations with the consortium that prevent the procurer from 
influencing service delivery immediately. 
 The contract, output specifications, and monitoring mechanisms did not 
have the desired effect of preventing discussion of responsibility, in particular 
during the operational phase where several problems have arisen. These may 
be attributable to the scant attention paid to the operational phase during the 
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preparation and planning of the project. The internal demarcation of the 
consortium and the poor cooperation between the construction and operation 
companies has not helped either.  
 The procurer is in general satisfied with the quality of the asset although the 
building was delivered officially before construction was complete. The close 
attention paid to developing the output specifications on quality seems to have 
had a positive influence, as does the integrated approach to the project and the 
continuous cooperation of the procurer and consortium during the 
construction phase. The obligation to deliver quality over the longer term also 
seems to contribute to the ultimate quality of the asset. But the eventual quality 
of the operation was lessened by the procurer and the consortium 
underestimating the importance of both preparing the operational phase, and 
of focusing on what would happen after asset delivery. The late involvement of 
the operation company during the project, and their inexperience with full 
service provision, also hindered quality, while inconsistent application of fines 
weakened the power of the financial mechanism to address the problems that 
arose. Table 14 summarizes the influential conditions per value.  
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Table 14: Influencing conditions per value    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
Accountability  -Cooperation between procurer and 
external advisors in preparation phase 
-Pilot project 
-Dependency of procurer on external 
advisors  
-Lack of performance monitoring 
-Outflow of personnel 
Transparency  -Externalization 
-Integrality of contract  
-Integrality of output specifications 
and financial mechanism  
-Long-term contract 
-Long-term financial planning 
-Output specifications  
-Ambiguity of output specifications  
-Little attention to monitoring during 
preparation phase 
-Long-term financial planning  
-Mal implementation of monitoring 
mechanism  
Responsiveness 
  
-Contractual clauses that allow for 
intervening 
-Cooperation between procurer and 
external advisors in preparation phase 
-Dependency of procurer on external 
advisors 
-Long-term financial planning 
-Long-term contract 
Responsibility  -Demarcation within consortium 
-Little cooperation within consortium 
Quality  -Emphasis on quality in output 
specifications 
-Financial incentives 
-Higher norms  
-Integrality of contract 
-Long-term commitment  
-Reputation  
-Ambiguity of output specifications  
-Budget 
-Little attention to operation phase 
during preparation phase 
-Unwillingness of consortium 
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8 Cross-Case Comparison 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The aim of this study was, firstly, to determine what happens to public values 
in DBFMO: are they threatened, safeguarded or strengthened? The study also 
set out to identify the conditions that influence that outcome. The central 
research question, as formulated in Chapters 1 and 3 was: What happens to public 
values in public-private partnerships and what conditions are influential? 
 Chapters 4-7 presented the findings of the separate case studies. In this 
chapter, the findings of all four cases are compared. This allows not only for 
identifying similarities and differences between cases but also for identifying 
patterns in the findings, and for highlighting the combination of conditions 
that may have contributed to the findings and can therefore explain why cases 
are different or the same (Eisenhardt 1989). 
 This chapter is structured as follows. Sections 8.2.1 to 8.2.5 present the 
findings of the cross-case comparison by value, describing what happens with 
public values in DBFMO and what conditions are influential. Section 8.3 
provides the overall conclusion. 
 
8.2 Findings 
 
8.2.1 Accountability 
In this study, accountability is defined as the ability of the procurer to account 
for (1) the content of the project in financial, juridical, and technical terms, and 
(2) for the actual performance during the construction and operational phases. 
With respect to the former, the case studies show that all procurers have been 
assisted by external advisors in order to assure accountability on paper since 
they had little experience with the juridical and financial complexity of the 
procurement process. That is, the documents containing the contract and the 
output specifications do indeed provide the information on agreements, 
norms, rules, and prices which allows the procurer to demonstrate all that has 
been agreed upon.  
 However, the dependency of the procurer on external advisors seems in 
several cases to have hindered the procurer’s ability to account in practice. The 
dependency on external advisors created by the complexity of the process 
hinders public servants’ actual understanding of the agreements, norms, rules 
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and costs. The case study of the Ministry of Finance shows, however, that any 
possible threat to accountability caused by this dependency on external 
advisors can be obviated when a professional and pro-active procurement team 
takes the lead while at the same time cooperating with their advisors. For 
procurers to be able to understand the financial, technical, and juridical ins and 
outs of the project, it is vital that they stay actively involved in the process of 
project preparation. While this case demonstrated the benefit of having a 
professional, enthusiastic and proactive procurer cooperating with its advisors, 
the wastewater project provided a different scenario where the procurer 
seemed to depend greatly on their external advisors and the decisions they 
made. This might possibly be explained by the Water Board not having a 
history of experience in construction where the Government Building Agency 
(GBA), responsible for the procurement of the Ministry of Finance project, 
did. As a result, the water board needed to rely on knowledge sourced 
externally. Although in the case of the detention center relatively few external 
advisors were hired, the limited diffusion of information about the preparation 
of the project, and the fact that very few people were involved during the 
preparation phase, may turn out to hinder accountability in the long term. Key 
actors will one day leave the organization and their knowledge of the project 
will go with them. This concern was also expressed in the water project.  
 The case studies show that the procurer’s ability to account for the project 
during the construction and operational phases depends on the 
professionalism of the contract management team, the continuity of personnel 
and the design and implementation of the monitoring mechanisms by either 
the consortium or procurer. With respect to the professionalism of the 
contract management, the cases demonstrate that the more inexperienced 
contract management teams, some of whom had no experience of contract 
management whatsoever, were not always able to account for what was going 
on during the project.  
 In the case of the highway, for example, the team that was responsible for 
contract management during the construction and operational phase did not 
have sufficient knowledge of what had happened during the preparation phase. 
The result was that the contract and output specifications initially left them 
with no idea of what was expected of them or of what the project outputs 
should be. If different personnel are involved during the preparation phase, 
than during the construction and operational phases, this does not seem to 
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facilitate accountability in these latter phases. This was also apparent in the 
Ministry of Finance case. However, in all cases, the contract management 
team’s professionalism and their ability to account for the project improved 
over time. Finally, several cases demonstrated that at the outset the monitoring 
mechanisms did not always function as expected and this impacted badly on 
the procurer’s ability to account for spending and for the performance of the 
consortium. The malfunctioning of monitoring mechanisms was either the 
result of mistakes in its design or wrong implementation. On occasion there 
was a complete absence of monitoring mechanisms.  
 When considering the life cycle of accountability in DBFMO it appears that 
the safeguarding of accountability requires a different focus of attention at 
different stages in the project. In the preparation phase, understanding the 
formulation of the contract and the output specifications is crucial. During the 
construction and operational phase the key focus needs to be on monitoring 
and information management. The challenges of each phase demand, in one 
case, strong procurement skills and in the other, strong contract management 
skills.  
 Accountability is not by definition threatened, safeguarded or strengthened 
in DBFMO. Devices such as the contract, the output specifications, and the 
monitoring mechanism can, in theory, help the procurer to account for their 
action. However, as was suggested by Flinders (2010), although DBFMO has a 
strict accountability mechanism, its actual effect depends on the way in which 
it is used. And the case studies show that the use of such mechanisms is not 
always optimal. Likewise, the suggestion of Domberger and Jensen (1997, 76) 
that accountability might actually be better safeguarded in NPM-inspired 
governance structures because of the introduction of systematic performance 
monitoring, the use of service level specifications, and the application of 
mechanisms that help to prevent or effectively penalize non-compliance holds 
true - but only if those mechanisms are indeed used as intended. The cases 
demonstrate that it takes some time before the procurer is actually able to do 
that. Table 15 summarizes the conditions influencing accountability per case.    
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Table 15: Conditions influencing accountability per case    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
The 
Highway 
 
-Contract 
-Project preparation  
 
-Dependency of procurer on external advisors 
-Financial complexity  
-Lack of experience of contract management  
-Lack of guidance in transition phases 
-Lack of knowledge of contract management  
-Long-term character of project 
-Monitoring failure  
-Personnel changes per phase 
The 
Detention 
Center 
-Project preparation  
-Little dependency of 
procurer external advisors 
-Few people involved during project preparation 
-Lack of information diffusion  
-Lack of performance monitoring  
-Lack of understanding available on financial, 
juridical and technical project information 
-Outflow personnel  
The 
Wastewater 
Project 
-External advisors  
-Training contract 
management team members 
-Dependency of procurer on external advisors  
-Lack of knowledge of content contract  
-Lack of knowledge of procurement  
-Outflow of personnel 
The 
Ministry of 
Finance 
-Cooperation between 
procurer and external 
advisors in preparation phase 
-Pilot project 
-Dependency of procurer on external advisors  
-Lack of performance monitoring 
-Outflow personnel 
 
8.2.2 Transparency 
In this study, transparency is defined as the availability to public servants of 
accurate information on the juridical, financial, technical, and operational 
aspects of the project. During the preparation phase, DBFMO procurement 
provides for the gathering of such information and the lengthy duration of the 
project increases the need to collate all this information in the form of an 
integrated contract and output specifications. The requirement to do so seems 
to increase transparency in comparison with traditional projects where a long-
term perspective on project preparation is often absent. As a result, prior to 
the actual start of the project, in DBFMO there is more information available 
about the procurer’s expectations and about the details of the consortium’s 
offer than is the case in traditional projects. However, with the exception of 
the wastewater project, all the cases showed that the actual transparency of 
such preparation seems to depend on the accuracy, completeness, and clarity 
of the agreements and output specifications as designed by the procurer.  
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 DBFMO procurement replaces the use of input specifications by output 
specifications. Logically, the use of output specifications decreases 
transparency in terms of input while at the same time, increasing transparency 
in terms of output. Although not ideal in terms of innovation, the procurers 
occasionally used input specifications, to compensate for a possible loss of 
transparency. Whereas qualitative norms, that are hard to define and measure, 
harm the transparency of the output specifications, as was demonstrated in the 
case of the detention center and the Ministry of Finance renovation, 
quantitative and easy to establish norms contribute to the transparency of the 
specifications. This was demonstrated in the water cleaning and highway cases. 
The fact that the highway and water cleaning plants both concern 
infrastructure projects in which construction and operationally related norms 
are relatively easy to establish seems to explain the difference between them 
and the projects that are concerned with buildings that house public utilities 
and services. The operational phase of both of these projects seems to be more 
appropriate for capture in transparent output norms. 
 Since the availability fee is based on the contract and on output 
specifications that are designed at the start of the project, every service or 
product not included in the initial scope but subsequently requested, is charged 
and recorded separately. Where traditional projects provide the procurer with 
an overall budget, DBFMO requires a transparent registration of the extra 
services and costs since they have a direct effect on the availability fee and the 
overall financial mechanism. Not only does this registration of extra work and 
related costs provide greater transparency than in traditional projects, it seems 
to create financial awareness of the costs of policy changes. Although the 
additional work and costs must be registered, this is not unproblematic. For 
example, the procurer of the Ministry of Finance renovation project had 
trouble with the processing of this information, the submission of invoices in 
particular.  
 The long-term financial planning provides for transparency in the sense 
that, with the exception of variable costs, the procurers know how much 
money will be spent during the following twenty to thirty years. However, the 
cases demonstrate that what that money actually buys is less transparent since 
the availability fee includes past and current as well as future costs. The 
highway and detention center cases demonstrated that the procurer pays for 
the replacement of items in the future, even though the consortium does not 
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guarantee that such replacements will be provided. Although the level of the 
availability fee is transparent in the sense that what will be paid is set out on 
paper, the accuracy of this was questioned in each case. In addition, the 
detention center and highway case studies demonstrated that the procurer has 
not always been satisfied with the level of transparency provided by the 
consortium when it comes to the pricing of additional work. It appears not 
always to be clear whether charges conform to market prices or whether the 
consortium included risk related costs that were already paid for in the initial 
bid. In the case of the detention center, the procurer explicitly wondered 
whether their own organization knew if it had saved any money at all.  
 The obligation of the consortium to monitor its performance and to report 
on it to the procurer seems to increase transparency in comparison to 
traditional projects where performance monitoring is often absent. However, 
the actual contribution of performance monitoring to transparency depends on 
the design and implementation of the monitoring plan and that was often not 
optimal, especially around the start of the construction and operational phases 
in several cases. In the case of the Ministry of Finance, for example, the 
absence of proper monitoring meant that the monitoring reports and 
corresponding invoices relating to the operational phase were not provided. In 
this case and in the case of the detention center, the procurers seemed to have 
paid little attention to plans for the monitoring of the operational phase when 
the project was being prepared. As a result, monitoring plans were developed 
too late or not at all. Performance monitoring was further hindered by the 
incompatibility of the monitoring systems used by the procurer and 
consortium.  
 The monitoring reports provided by the consortia facilitate transparency 
although, in the cases of the highway, detention center, and Ministry of 
Finance, the accuracy of those reports could not be guaranteed. Occasional 
discrepancies between performance reports produced by the consortium and 
those provided by the procurer signaled the need for additional measures or 
external evaluations, as was the situation with the climate installations at the 
detention center. In the case of the water project, it was suggested that the 
consortium was very willing to provide as much transparency as requested in 
order to establish a good reputation and to win trust. Finally, although the 
performance monitoring reports provide transparency, it was suggested that 
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the sheer amount of paperwork was difficult to process, and in the case of the 
highway, for example, was actually considered to impede transparency.  
 Considering the trajectory of transparency in DBFMO, the eventual level of 
transparency achieved depends on the quality of the contract and output 
specifications and of the way in which the monitoring mechanisms are 
designed and put into practice. As with accountability, the safeguarding of 
transparency requires a different focus of action at each phase of the project: 
the formulation during the preparation phase of unambiguous and easy-to-
establish contracts and output specifications; monitoring of performance 
during the construction and operational phases; reports evaluating 
performance; and the conducting of random tests. All these different elements 
provide different challenges for the procurer and, like accountability, require 
strong procurement skills and strong contract management.  
 When contrasting the findings of the case studies with current literature on 
transparency in organizational manifestations of NPM, an ambiguous picture 
presents itself. Whereas on the one hand transparency seems to be facilitated 
and sometimes even improved in comparison with traditional procurement, 
from time to time it also seems to be at stake. In general, the findings do not 
completely endorse the views of Bloomfield (2006) and Papadopoulos (2007) 
who argue that NPM practices decrease the level of transparency. This study 
finds that the specific process of procurement in DBFMO and the requirement 
for monitoring ensure the provision of information about the project. It is 
true, however, that the complexity of the financial underpinning of the project 
frustrates transparency in the sense that those supposed to understand the 
agreements are not always able to do so (Grimsey and Lewis 2002; Hood, 
Fraser and McGarvey 2006). With respect to the accuracy and availability of 
the information provided, the case studies show that information is indeed not 
always available or accurate as suggested by Altshuler and Luberhoff (2003). 
However, the case studies do show that in general, consortia provide insight 
into performance and that any lack of information or the inaccuracy of 
information is not structural. Over time, the provision of accurate information 
can improve. The suggestion that DBFMO encourages the generation of 
meaningless data (Hood, Fraser and McGarvey 2006), is therefore not 
supported by the findings of this case study. Table 16 summarizes the 
conditions influencing transparency per case.    
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Table 16: Conditions influencing transparency per case    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
The 
Highway 
 
-Contract 
-Integrality of output specifications and 
financial mechanism  
-Integrated performance monitoring  
-Intensive and integrated project preparation  
-Long-term and integrated project character  
-Long-term financial planning 
-Monitoring reports 
-Output specifications 
-Information overload 
-Output specifications  
-Subjectivity of performance 
monitoring reports 
 
 
 
The 
Detention 
Center 
-Integrality of contract  
-Integrality of output specifications and 
financial mechanism  
-Long-term contract 
-Long-term financial planning 
-Performance monitoring 
 
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Incomplete contract  
-Lack of experience in output 
specification development  
-Lack of knowledge of financial 
aspects of project 
-Late development monitoring 
system 
-Long-term financial planning  
The 
Wastewater 
Project 
-Externalization  
-Long-term financial planning 
-Long-term contract 
-Performance monitoring  
-Quantitative output norms  
-Reputation  
-Output specifications  
-Suboptimal use of monitoring 
mechanism 
The 
Ministry of 
Finance 
-Externalization  
-Integrality of contract  
-Integrality of output specifications and 
financial mechanism  
-Long-term contract 
-Long-term financial planning 
-Output specifications  
-Ambiguity of output specifications  
-Little attention paid to monitoring 
during preparation phase 
-Long-term financial planning  
-Mal implementation of monitoring 
mechanism  
 
8.2.3 Responsiveness 
In this study, responsiveness is defined as the ability of elected officials and 
public servants to determine, influence, and adjust the contractual agreements 
and the output specifications before and after contract closure. In the 
preparation phase, DBFMO procurement requires that procurers prepare a 
long-term integrated contract and output specifications that include the 
juridical, financial, and technical parameters of the project. In all four cases, 
external advisors supported the procurer in developing both documents. These 
externals not only advised and supported the procurer, but it was suggested 
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that they also made important decisions. Dependency on external advisors 
seemed to have been greatest in the case of the water project, possibly 
explained by the fact that the procurer had no tradition of construction works, 
where the other three cases studied did have that tradition. Although during 
the preparation phase of the Ministry of Finance project a substantial number 
of external advisors were hired, the professionalism of the procurement team 
and their ambition to make this very first national DBFMO project an 
exemplary success, made sure that there was no loss of influence. In the case 
of the highway construction project, the number of external advisors was 
considered to have left little room for direct involvement by the procurer, 
while in the detention center case the influence of public servants was 
considered significant because the procurer decided to take as much 
responsibility for the preparation phase as possible.  
 Although the use of output specifications decreases responsiveness in terms 
of not being able to dictate input, in all four cases the procurers either did use 
input terms in order to assure themselves of a certain solution, or they defined 
the output specifications in such detail that limited room for interpretation was 
left the consortium. In the detention center case, for example, specific 
technical solutions and security and safety systems were requested. In the 
highway case, standard qualitative norms concerning road construction left the 
consortium with little option for creativity. In the water cleaning project, the 
consortium was urged to use traditional techniques and in the case of the 
Ministry of Finance, the output specifications for the operational phase were 
such that they left almost no room for interpretation.  
 Given the fact that contractual changes or adaptation of the output 
specifications have an immediate effect on the financial model and imply an 
administrative and financial burden, changes ought to be avoided as much as 
possible. Prudence with respect to contractual changes might seem to imply a 
diminished responsiveness but in all four cases the contract and output 
specifications have been subject to constant change. Contracts also contain 
clauses that allow the procurers to take over the contract when considered 
appropriate. Reasons for changing the output specifications or contract range 
from the incompleteness or inexactness of the contract or output 
specifications; a change in political preferences; and the implementation of 
technical innovations. In particular in the detention center case, there were 
suggestions that the changing political context influenced the detention 
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center’s internal policy and as a result the contract. Despite the possibility of 
changing the contract and output specifications during any of the project 
phases, in all four cases procurers felt themselves to be less responsive in terms 
of directly influencing the consortium’s performance. In the detention center 
case, for example, the procurer felt as if they were no longer the boss in their 
own home. In the case of the Ministry of Finance, the procurer suggested that 
the contract, rather than the procurer, was in charge. Goal displacement, in the 
sense of there being a focus solely on the contract instead of responsiveness to 
the requirements of the project, hindered adequate decision making in the 
highway case to the extent that public officials’ responsiveness to issues of 
safety and security was seriously impaired. Anticipating not being in direct 
control, procurers excluded certain elements from the scope of the contracts. 
Although the contract and output specifications should ideally represent the 
procurer’s preferences with respect to the consortium’s performance, this is 
not always the case, either because of incompleteness or ambiguity in either 
document or the possibility of the procurer’s changing preferences. Given that 
the original contract and output specifications form the basis of the 
consortium’s business case and that performance is fine tuned on the basis of 
both documents, all new requests from the procurer are subject to sometimes 
lengthy and costly negotiations that impede the procurer from directly 
demanding that the consortium delivers or provides something different. 
Furthermore, long-term integrated contracting does not seem to provide any 
room for maneuver when procurers want to cut back their costs. The 
consortium’s business case is based on the initial contract and output 
specifications and it is on this that the calculations are made which will earn 
back its initial investment. Procurers are therefore not able to lower the 
availability fee during these long-term contracts.  
  The long-term contract that lays down the juridical, financial, and technical 
project parameters for the full duration of the project seems to allow for less 
political involvement. In the wastewater case, for example, the fact that the 
contract sets out the future of the project over such a long period means that 
politicians are restricted when it comes to changing the contract. Where this 
was perceived positively for reasons of continuity by the contract management 
team, water board members found it difficult to accept that their influence on 
the project had declined. In the highway case, the contractual agreement 
between the procurer and consortium outmaneuvered the Province and was 
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believed to reduce the playing of political and administrative games with the 
project.  
 When considering the life cycle of responsiveness in DBFMO the findings 
demonstrate that DBFMO on the one hand provides opportunities for public 
servants and politicians to influence the project, while on the other the 
structure hinders responsiveness. During the different project phases, the 
safeguarding of responsiveness requires a different focus of action ranging 
from ensuring during the preparation phase that the formulation of the 
contract and output specifications are in line with the procurer’s interests, to 
adapting the contract and output specifications in negotiation with the 
consortium during the construction and operational phase, if the procurer’s or 
the political preferences change.  
 When the research findings are compared with the current literature on 
responsiveness in NPM practices, again an ambiguous picture presents itself. 
Although public servants are no longer in charge of the actual operation, their 
influence continues to be felt through the contract and output specifications, 
the application of project monitoring, and the use of fines through which 
performance can be adjusted. The suggestion that the public sector is no 
longer in control when it comes to influencing and constructing public policy 
(Bevir 2010; Flinders 2010; Skelcher 2010) is therefore not supported by the 
findings of this study. Instead, as suggested by Pierre and Peters (2000), in 
DBFMO the influence of the public sector seems to have changed, rather than 
declined: Although not providing services itself, the procurers act as facilitators 
and project coordinators, which indicates that the public-private network is still 
“of the government” (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 279).  
 However, the research findings also demonstrate that, although public 
servants have the possibility of drafting the contract, defining the output 
specifications, and of adapting both documents during the construction and 
operational phases, the sometimes costly and timely negotiations prior to the 
eventual adaptation do not allow the procurer to influence the performance of 
the consortium directly. Moreover, the actual influence of public servants 
depends on the level of input and exact role of external advisors who, for 
example, in the wastewater case, not only advised the procurer but also made 
important decisions.  
 With respect to the suggestion that NPM practices make it less likely that 
politicians can be responsive to changing circumstances (Bovaird 2004), the 
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case study results indicate that their influence is indeed hindered in terms of 
being able to make contractual changes and being able to implement budget 
cutbacks, as was also suggested by Hodge (2010) and Peters (1997). The 
lengthy term of the contract also seems to diminish the amount of political 
influence on the project as was clear in the wastewater and highway cases. 
Table 17 summarizes the conditions influencing responsiveness per case.    
 
Table 17: Conditions influencing responsiveness per case    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
The 
Highway 
 
-Contractual clauses that allow for intervening 
-Influence with respect to formulation of 
output specifications and contract 
-Room for contractual changes  
-Dependency of procurer on 
external advisors 
-Goal displacement  
-Lengthily implementation of 
contractual changes 
-Long-term contract  
The 
Detention 
Center 
-Contractual clauses that allow for intervening 
-Excluding essential tasks from scope contract 
-Influence with respect to formulation of 
output specifications and contract 
-Little dependency of procurer on external 
advisors 
-Room for contractual changes 
-Lack of experience output 
specification development  
-Long-term contract 
The 
Wastewater 
Project 
-Influence with respect to formulation of 
output specifications and contract 
-Room for contractual changes 
-Dependency of procurer on 
external advisors 
-Long-term contract 
The 
Ministry of 
Finance 
-Contractual clauses that allow for intervening 
-Cooperation between procurer and external 
advisors preparation phase 
-Dependency of procurer on 
external advisors 
-Long-term financial planning 
-Long-term contract 
 
8.2.4 Responsibility 
In this study, responsibility is defined as the degree to which the consortium 
complies with the contractual agreements and the output specifications. 
Although the output specifications, the contract, the monitoring mechanism, 
and the ability to use fines ought to prevent the consortia from non-
compliance, the research findings indicate that these mechanisms did not 
always have that effect. The contract and output specifications that indicate 
exactly what the consortium is responsible for, often appeared to be 
ambiguous or incomplete, resulting in discussion between the procurer and 
consortium about the exact interpretation of both. Whereas in the highway 
case these discussions were considered as constructive in the sense that both 
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the consortium and the procurer were occasionally willing to back down, the 
discussions were considered less positive in the Ministry of Finance and the 
detention center cases.  
 With some exceptions, the procurers of the highway and the wastewater 
project, are relatively satisfied with the way in which the consortium carries out 
its responsibility, although in these cases, too, there have been discussions over 
responsibilities. The procurers in the case of the Ministry of Finance and the 
detention center experienced relatively more problems with responsibility and 
complaints range from the absence of certain services or products to the 
absence of a pro-active attitude on the part of the consortium. In both cases, 
the operational phase in particular was perceived to be problematic. In the 
wastewater case, it was suggested that the various risk sessions resulted in a 
clear understanding of the consortium’s responsibilities. The fact that during 
the preparation phase of the Ministry of Finance project relatively little 
attention had been paid to the operational phase, might have caused the 
subsequent problems with responsibilities. In addition, it was suggested that 
there was very little attention paid to the actual translation of the output 
specification into concrete actions by the company responsible for the 
operation.  
 Although the contract and output specifications are important for defining 
responsibilities, it was suggested that the attitude of the consortium also 
influences responsibility. In the case of the highway, for example, it was 
suggested that the consortium did comply with its responsibilities without 
trying to take advantage of contractual ambiguities too often. Although the 
procurer and consortium had their discussions about responsibility, they were 
seen as constructive.  
 Besides the discussion between the procurer and consortium, in all four 
cases and especially in the cases of the Ministry of Finance and the detention 
center, consortium members often disagreed on the allocation of internal 
responsibilities. Except in the highway case, the consortia were more or less 
divided internally into two groups - design and construction and operation and 
maintenance. Given this demarcation, the design and construction group’s 
responsibility towards the other partners ceased as soon as the operational 
phase started. As a result, when irregularities stemming from the construction 
phase had a negative impact on the operation, it was the operating company 
that was faced with the financial repercussions. Whereas the consortium 
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manager of the highway case did hold the whole consortium company 
financially responsible when considered appropriate, such integration was 
absent in the case of the detention center and the Ministry of Finance. As a 
result, the consortium members of the detention center as well as those of the 
Ministry of Finance project often entered into discussion about which partner 
was financially responsible for what part of the contract. Problems of this 
nature were considered less frequent in the wastewater case and were perhaps 
rendered less likely by the early cooperation between the construction and the 
operating partner, and by the detailed interface agreement in which these two 
partners reached agreement on what the former would deliver to the latter.  
 When considering responsibility over the life span of the project, the 
findings demonstrate that the contract, the output specifications and the 
financial mechanisms are no guarantee of compliance. Ambiguous norms, 
demarcation within the consortium and the absence of an interface agreement 
all hinder clear understanding of responsibility. During the different project 
phases, the safeguarding of responsibility requires different focuses of action at 
different times from both the procurer and the consortium. These actions 
range from the formulation of unambiguous output specifications, contracts, 
and interface agreements during the preparation phase, to stimulating 
cooperation with, and between, the consortium partners during the 
construction and operational phases.  
 Debicki’s (2003) suggestion that private parties might fail completely in 
providing public services is not supported by the findings of this study since, 
despite the irregularities, the consortia in general do perform as they are 
supposed to. However, the ambiguity of contracts and output specifications 
leads to discussion and does create the opportunity to pass the blame and 
dodge responsibility, as was suggested by Hood and McGarvey (2002) and 
Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke (2010). The degree to which contracts do, in 
fact, guarantee compliance depends greatly on the completeness or quality of 
the contract. The findings of this study, suggest that, besides the importance of 
the quality of the contract and output specifications, compliance also depends 
on the attitude or willingness of the consortium and the procurer. Table 18 
summarizes the conditions influencing responsibility per case.    
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Table 18: Conditions influencing responsibility per case    
 Positive influence Negative influence 
The 
Highway 
 
-Willingness of project members -Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications  
-Demarcation within consortium 
The 
Detention 
Center 
-Contract 
-Output specifications 
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Ambiguity of risk distribution  
-Demarcation within consortium 
-Little experience within consortium of integrated 
performance management  
-Unwillingness of project members  
The 
Wastewater 
Project 
-Constructive communication 
between consortium and 
procurer 
-Cooperative attitude of procurer 
-Interface agreement within 
consortium 
-Risk sessions  
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Demarcation within consortium 
 
The 
Ministry of 
Finance 
 -Demarcation within consortium 
-Little cooperation within consortium 
 
8.2.5 Quality 
In this study, quality is defined as the degree of satisfaction of the procurer in 
relation to the asset itself and its operation by the consortium. The fact that the 
construction and operation of the asset is transferred to a private consortium 
seems to have prompted the procurers to more stringent requirements with 
respect to quality and, although not considered perfect, the quality of the 
constructed or renovated assets in general has been valued positively by all 
procurers. Although the completion of the renovation of the Ministry of 
Finance left something to be desired, the general quality was considered to 
meet or even exceed expectations. With the exception of the floating roofs that 
caused problems with the bad odor, the procurer was pleased with the 
renovation of the old water purification plants and the construction of the 
completely new water plant complex. In the case of the detention center, the 
procurer is satisfied with its construction but less satisfied with the detention 
center’s esthetics.  
 Whereas the level of satisfaction with the finished quality of the asset after 
construction or renovation is fairly uniform across all four projects, this is not 
the case when it comes to the operational phases of the projects. In the case of 
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the detention center, the quality of the operation was judged disappointing 
(with the exception of, for example, food supply). Irregularities with respect to 
quality could be the result of the scant attention paid to the operating phase 
during the project preparation; the absence of guidance with respect to the 
transition from construction to operation; and the ambiguity of the output 
specifications that did not always lead to the provision of the desired services 
and solutions. In the case of the Ministry of Finance, the poor quality of 
operation was attributed to a lack of attention to the operational phase by the 
procurer and consortium during the project preparation and construction 
phase, lack of communication about the operational phase between 
consortium partners, the lack of experience with service provision in the 
context of DBFMO and ambiguous norms.  
 In the case of the highway and the wastewater project, the operational phase 
seems to have been less problematic in terms of quality. Although in the 
former case ambiguous output specifications did lead to discussion, the quality 
of maintenance seems to be an improvement over traditional projects, thanks 
to innovative solutions and rapid problem solving. With respect to the 
wastewater project, the careful preparation of the operational phase during the 
initial stages of project planning and the direct involvement of the operating 
company in that preparation seem to have contributed to satisfactory 
operation. In both cases, the relative straightforwardness of the operational 
phase and corresponding quantitative output norms might have contributed to 
the quality of the overall project. Finally, the relative isolation from users’ 
opinion during the operational phase in the case of the wastewater project and 
the highway seems to have a positive influence on perception of quality. 
Whereas in the detention center and Ministry of Finance project it is not only 
the contract managers but also all of the users who judge the quality of the 
operation, the operation of the highway and wastewater projects are 
scrutinized less by users.  
 The DBFMO contract is a performance contract which means that the 
consortium only receives the full availability fee when the quality delivered 
matches the quality requested, as defined in the output specifications. If this is 
not the case, the procurer is allowed to fine the consortium, which means they 
pay a lower availability fee. The cases demonstrate, however, that the 
effectiveness of this system as a tool for enforcing or improving quality is not 
automatically guaranteed. In the case of the detention center, the Ministry of 
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Finance, and the highway, fines did not always lead directly to solutions. The 
inconsistent application of fines and the difficulties in accurately calculating the 
appropriate level of fines might have undermined its effectiveness.  
 In all four cases, the quality provided has fluctuated over time. Irregularities 
during the startup of the operation, for example, have been overcome during 
the operational phase as was seen in the detention center. But the opposite is 
also true: Whereas quality in the case of the wastewater purification was 
perceived positively at the start of the project, the quality of the asset was 
perceived negatively during the operational phase when the water board was 
confronted with a bad odor stemming from a problem related to the 
construction. Furthermore, what the cases show with respect to quality is that 
the initial financial investment of the procurer and the quality of their output 
specifications determines the ultimate quality that is delivered. And finally, 
since all four cases were pilot projects, the desire to build reputation in the 
hope of winning other tenders seems to have had a positive influence on 
quality.  
 The findings on quality over the life span of the DBFMO project, 
demonstrate once again that protecting quality requires a different focus at 
different times, ranging from the need for expectations and norms concerning 
all phases of the project to be translated into contracts and output 
specifications at the very outset of the project, to the monitoring and 
management of the financial mechanism during the operational phase.  
 The findings of this study do not support the quality-shading hypothesis as 
suggested by Box (1999). Although the procurers do experience irregularities in 
quality standards, quality does seem to be safeguarded or even improved when 
compared with traditional projects. This was also demonstrated by a separate 
case study on privatization in the water sector, in which firms were found to 
provide better service quality than did their “previous public incarnations” 
(Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky 2005, 113). The findings of the current 
study also support the claim by Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) that quality 
seems to be facilitated or even improved because of output formulation and 
the introduction of performance monitoring. However, the safeguarding of 
quality depends both on the ability of the procurer to translate their 
expectations into outputs and on the capacity of the monitoring mechanism to 
identify what has to be adjusted in order to match delivery with expectation.  
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 As was suggested by Peat and Costley (2001), the application of monitoring 
mechanisms and the operation of the financial mechanisms did prove to be 
problematic in practice in all cases. This can be attributed to a lack of 
management capacity and lack of knowledge of the specific logic of 
procurement (De Bettignies and Ross 2009; Savas 2000; Van Slyke and 
Hammonds 2003) although the quality of contract monitoring indeed depends 
on the quality of the public organization or public servants which can vary 
from one context to another (Domberger and Jensen 1997). The research 
findings demonstrate furthermore that, in the case of the detention center and 
the Ministry of Finance, the assessment of performance with respect to the 
operation, was rather subjective, leaving room for different interpretations that 
might be subject to discussion (Domberger and Jensen 1997). Finally, the 
highway and wastewater cases, demonstrated that quantitative output norms 
leave less room for interpretation and so trigger less discussion about the 
quality delivered by the consortium. The research findings conclusively support 
the premise that for quality to be safeguarded the procurer’s expectations must 
be clearly articulated and performance must be able to be measured (Brown, 
Potoski and Van Slyke 2006, 326; Deakin and Walsh 1996). Table 19 
summarizes the conditions influencing quality per case.    
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Table 19: Conditions influencing quality per case 
 Positive influence Negative influence 
The Highway 
 
-Financial incentives 
-Higher norms  
-Integrality of contract  
-Long-term commitment  
-Output specifications 
-Reputation  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Budget 
-Inaccuracy in calculating fines  
 
The Detention 
Center 
-Contract 
-Higher norms  
-Integrality of contract  
-Long-term commitment  
-Output specifications  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
-Budget 
-Inaccuracy in calculating fines  
-Inconsistent application of fines 
-Little attention to operation phase 
during preparation phase  
The 
Wastewater 
Project 
-Clear scope 
-Early preparation of operational phase 
-Integrality of contract  
-Quantitative output norms 
-Technical difficulties  
The Ministry of 
Finance 
-Emphasis on quality in output 
specifications 
-Financial incentives 
-Higher norms) 
-Integrality contract 
-Long-term commitment  
-Reputation  
-Ambiguity of output specifications 
operational phase 
-Budget 
-Little attention to operation phase 
during preparation phase 
 
 
8.3 Conclusion  
The research findings demonstrate that whether or not public values are at 
stake in DBFMO cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Rather, public 
values can be threatened, safeguarded or strengthened, depending on the 
project, project phase and the specific (facet of the) public value under 
scrutiny. The case studies have provided detailed insight on the dynamics 
between the trajectory of the public values during the different project phases 
and the influential conditions. The concluding sections of Chapter 4-7 provide 
an overview of the influential conditions in each case. In this chapter, each 
value section concludes with an overview of the influential conditions per 
value. The variety of influential conditions can roughly be divided into three 
groups. Aspects of the DBFMO structure itself, conditions related to staff and 
human capital (hereafter referred to as human resources), as well as project 
related conditions are what appear to influence the trajectory of public values 
and whether they are threatened, safeguarded or strengthened. DBFMO 
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related conditions are those conditions that are specific to the DBFMO 
structure such as the long-term integrated contract or the use of output 
specifications. Conditions related to human resources include conditions such 
as the outflow of personnel and capacity for contract management. Project-
specific conditions are those conditions that are not necessarily connected to 
the structure of DBFMO but have to do with project characteristics such as 
project type or project scope. Table 20 categorizes the influential conditions 
per value in three columns: DBFMO, Human Resources and Project. As 
described in sections 8.2.1 to 8.2.5, the conditions summarized in Table 20 can 
have a positive, negative, direct or indirect influence. For example, the output 
specifications might provide transparency but their actual contribution in that 
respect depends on the quality of these specifications which in turn depends 
on the capacity of the public procurer. Likewise, the outflow of personnel 
which hinders accountability is related to the long-term character of DBFMO 
projects. Figure 1 visualizes the relationship between the groups of conditions 
derived from the four case studies. The overlapping circles indicate that the 
conditions influence each other 
rather than being considered as 
isolated groups. All the 
conditions taken together, 
visualized by the horizontal 
brace, influence the course of 
the value or even more 
specifically, of certain facets of 
the value throughout the life 
cycle of the project which is 
illustrated by the forward 
pointing arrow.  
 
 
Project 
 
DBFMO 
Human 
Resources 
Preparation 
 
Realization Operation 
Figure 1: The relationship between conditions 
and phases 
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Table 20: Categorization of influential conditions per value 
 DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
Ac
co
un
ta
bi
lit
y 
-Contract 
-Little dependency of 
procurer on external advisors 
-Project preparation  
 
-Financial complexity  
-Long-term character of 
project  
-Mal implementation of 
monitoring mechanism  
 
-Cooperation 
procurer and external 
advisors preparation 
phase 
-External advisors  
-Training contract 
for management 
team members 
 
-Dependency of procurer 
on external advisors 
-Few people involved 
during project preparation 
-Lack of experience of 
contract management  
-Lack of guidance in 
transition phases 
-Lack of information 
diffusion  
-Lack of knowledge of 
content contract  
-Lack of knowledge of 
contract management  
-Lack of knowledge of 
procurement  
-Lack of performance 
monitoring  
-Lack of understanding of 
financial, juridical and 
technical project 
information 
-Outflow personnel 
-Personnel changes per 
phase 
 
-Pilot project  
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DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
T
ra
ns
pa
re
nc
y 
-Contract 
-Externalization  
-Integrality of contract  
-Integrality of output 
specifications and financial 
mechanism  
-Integrated performance 
monitoring  
-Intensive and integrated 
project preparation  
-Long-term and integrated 
project character  
-Long-term financial planning 
-Long-term contract 
-Monitoring reports 
-Output specifications  
-Performance monitoring 
-Quantitative output norms 
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of norms  
-Incomplete contract  
-Information overload 
-Long-term financial planning  
-Output specifications  
-Subjectivity performance 
monitoring reports 
 -Lack of experience of 
output specification 
development  
-Lack of knowledge of 
financial project aspects  
-Late development of 
monitoring system 
-Little attention to 
monitoring during 
preparation phase 
-Mal implementation of 
monitoring mechanism 
-Suboptimal use of 
monitoring mechanism 
-Reputation   
R
es
po
ns
iv
en
es
s 
-Contractual clauses that 
allow for intervening 
-Excluding essential tasks 
from scope contract 
-Influence with respect to 
formulation output 
specifications and contract 
-Room for contractual 
changes 
-Goal displacement  
-Lengthy implementation of 
contractual changes 
-Long-term contract 
-Long-term financial planning 
 
-Cooperation 
procurer and external 
advisors preparation 
phase 
-Little dependency of 
procurer on external 
advisors 
-Dependency of procurer 
on external advisors 
-Lack of experience of 
output specification 
development  
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DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 
-Contract 
-Interface agreement 
consortium 
-Output specifications 
-Risk sessions 
-Ambiguity of contract  
-Ambiguity of output 
specifications  
-Ambiguity risk distribution  
-Demarcation within 
consortium 
 
-Constructive 
communication 
between consortium 
and procurer 
-Cooperative attitude 
of procurer 
-Willingness of 
project members 
 
-Little cooperation within 
consortium 
-Little experience of 
integrated performance 
management in consortium  
-Unwillingness of project 
members 
  
Q
ua
lit
y 
-Clear scope 
-Contract 
-Financial incentives 
-Higher norms  
-Integrality contract  
-Long-term commitment  
-Output specifications 
-Quantitative output norms 
-Ambiguity of output 
specifications 
-Inaccuracy in calculating 
fines  
 
-Early preparation of 
operation phase 
-Emphasis on quality 
in output 
specifications 
-Integrality contract  
 
-Inaccuracy in calculating 
fines  
-Inconsistent application 
of fines 
-Little attention to 
operation phase during 
preparation phase 
-Unwillingness in 
consortium 
-Reputation -Budget 
-Technical 
difficulties 
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9 Conclusions and Discussion 
 
9.1 Introduction12 
This study began with the central research question of what happens to public 
values in public-private partnerships and what conditions are influential? In order to 
shed light on this question, the underlying study considered and compared 
four DBFMO projects as presented in Chapters 4 to 7, including two 
infrastructure projects (a highway and a water purification project) and two 
projects involving buildings to provide public services (a detention center 
and the renovation of the Ministry of Finance building). In each case, the 
values of accountability, transparency, responsiveness, responsibility, and 
quality have been under scrutiny and considered over the preparation, 
construction and operation phases of the projects. In Chapter 8, the case 
study findings are described and compared by value in detail. This final 
chapter presents and discusses the general conclusions (section 9.2), the 
implications for theory (section 9.3) and practice (section 9.4) and provides 
suggestions for further research (section 9.5).  
 
9.2 General conclusion  
The research findings indicate that whether or not public values are at stake 
in DBFMO cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Rather, we have 
seen that public values can be at stake, safeguarded or strengthened, 
depending on the project, project phase and the specific (facet of the) 
public value under scrutiny. For example, while accountability during the 
preparation phase is safeguarded by contracts and output specifications 
which lay down the project parameters, accountability when it requires 
understanding this information is not guaranteed. Furthermore, although 
accountability early on in the project might be protected by the written 
instruments, the absence of monitoring could hinder it during the 
construction and operation phases.  
 Although DBFMO, including the use of performance contracts, output 
specifications, and performance monitoring, provides opportunities for 
                                                            
12 Parts of this chapter have been published (Reynaers 2013). 
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safeguarding public values, it simultaneously provides challenges. For 
example, the effectiveness of performance monitoring in safeguarding 
transparency, depends on public servants’ management of the procurement 
and of the contract as well as the actual design and implementation of the 
monitoring mechanisms. Similarly, although the formulation of output 
specifications provides opportunities for transparency, its actual 
contribution depends on the quality of such output specifications as 
developed by the procurer.  
 This prompts the question of whether it is the DBFMO structure or the 
way in which this structure is mastered by public servants that determines 
what happens to public values in DBFMO. The findings of this study 
suggest that both are true. The tools provided by DBFMO cause public 
servants to act in accordance with the DBFMO logic, and in itself this 
reinforces the effectiveness of the tools and the structure. At the same time, 
the case studies show that when the design or implementation of those 
tools is not optimal, their effectiveness in protecting public values is 
altogether threatened. Depending on the professionalism and resources of 
the procurer, problems of this nature can be overcome during the project. 
 The above seems to suggest that the key to success in terms of 
safeguarding public values lies in the hands, and only in the hands, of public 
servants. As the findings suggest, this is not true. The DBFMO structure 
contains complicating elements such as the long-term character of the 
contract and the output specifications and these will probably always 
provide challenges that are hard to resolve, even if public servants are very 
willing to resolve them. By suggesting that procurement and contract 
management by public servants form the key to success we would give too 
much credit to the DBFMO structure itself. Besides, overemphasizing the 
importance of the DBFMO structure and procurement and contract 
management by the procurer, does not take into account the importance of, 
for example, the organization, communication, and management on the side 
of the consortium. In that respect, the case studies demonstrate the 
limitations of both the DBFMO structure and the management capacity of 
the procurer as means through which the public values’ trajectory can be 
conditioned. As for the contract and the output specifications, for example, 
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the case studies indicate that their contribution to the safeguarding of public 
values is significant but by no means a guarantee.  
 Indeed, as was demonstrated in Chapter 8, the case studies have 
identified many other conditions that influence what happens to public 
values in DBFMO. Table 20 summarized and categorized these conditions 
in three groups: DBFMO related conditions, human resource related 
conditions and project related conditions. As pointed out earlier, these 
conditions all impact each other. The following section discusses the 
theoretical implications with respect to respectively public values and 
influential conditions.  
 
9.3 Implications for theory 
 
9.3.1 Public values  
The findings of this study contribute to the current public values literature 
by providing empirical insight on the safeguarding of public values in 
DBFMO. As pointed out in Chapter 2, ever since the rise of NPM, there 
have been concerns about the safeguarding of public values in 
organizational manifestations of the NPM. While some scholars suggest a 
loss of public values (Collins and Butler 2003; Frederickson 1999; Jacobs 
1992; Milward and Provan 2000; Wittmer 2000), others suggest the exact 
opposite (Hirsch and Osborne 2000; Osborne and Plastrik 1998). The 
findings of this study show that in relation to DBFMO both camps only 
hold part of the truth: The research findings indicate that public values can 
be at stake, safeguarded or even strengthened, depending on the project, 
project phase and the specific (facet of the) public value under scrutiny (see 
Chapter 8). As Flinders (2010) suggested, DBFMO projects simply cannot 
be judged in dichotomous terms as accountable or non-accountable, 
transparent or non-transparent. The contradictory claims made about the 
safeguarding of public values actually reflect the reality of public values in 
DBFMO.  
 By way of illustration, accountability is not by definition threatened, 
safeguarded or strengthened in the context of DBFMO. As was suggested 
by Flinders (2010), DBFMO has a strict accountability mechanism, but the 
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actual contribution of this mechanism for the safeguarding of 
accountability, depends on the way in which the mechanism is developed 
and used in practice. Likewise, Domberger and Jensen’s (1997) suggestion 
that accountability might actually be better safeguarded in NPM-inspired 
governance structures because of the introduction of systematic 
performance monitoring, the construction and use of service level 
specifications, and the application of mechanisms that help to prevent or 
effectively penalize noncompliance only holds true if those mechanisms are 
indeed used in a correct manner. An organization’s lack of experience with 
DBFMO procurement might hinder the successful development and 
implementation of such mechanisms.  
 With respect to transparency, the findings demonstrate that transparency 
can, on one hand, be safeguarded or even improved within DBFMO while 
on the other hand it can be at stake. Again, the contradictory claims about 
transparency in public values literature all contain an element of truth in 
relation to DBFMO. Although it is certainly not the case that the level of 
transparency is completely decreased (Bloomfield 2006; Papadopoulos 
2007), the financial, juridical and technical complexities do indeed challenge 
transparency (Grimsey and Lewis 2002; Hood, Fraser and McGarvey 2006). 
Besides, project information appears not always to be available or accurate 
(Altshuler and Luberhoff 2003). The findings of this study do not, however, 
support the suggestion that DBFMO only provides meaningless data 
(Hood, Fraser and McGarvey 2006) and problems with respect to 
transparency can be overcome during the project.  
 The same ambiguous pattern arises in relation to responsiveness. The 
suggestion that the public sector is no longer in control when it comes to 
influencing and constructing public policy (Bevir 2010; Flinders 2010; 
Skelcher 2010) is not fully supported nor fully rejected by the findings of 
this study. While the influence of public servants remains through the 
contract itself, the output specifications and through contract management, 
the contract does not allow for direct intervention in the work of the 
consortium. In addition, with reference to the suggestion that NPM 
practices lessen politicians’ ability to be responsive (Bovaird 2004), the 
results of the case studies indicate that their influence is indeed impeded 
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when it comes to contractual changes and financial cutbacks, as was also 
suggested by Hodge (2010) and Peters (1997).  
 In terms of responsibility, the findings of this study neither support nor 
reject the suggestion that private parties might fail completely in providing 
public services (Debicki 2003). With some exceptions, consortia in general 
provide what is expected although the ambiguity in contracts and output 
specifications does challenge the safeguarding of responsibility and leads to 
blame games and to the dodging of responsibility (Hood and McGarvey 
2002; Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2010). The degree to which contracts 
do, in fact, guarantee compliance, depends greatly on the completeness or 
quality of the contract. The findings of this study, suggest that, besides the 
importance of the quality of the contract and output specifications, 
compliance depends on the attitude or willingness of the consortium to 
comply. 
 The findings of this study do not support the quality-shading hypothesis 
suggested by Box (1999). Although when it comes to quality the procurers 
do encounter problems, quality seems to be safeguarded or even improved 
in comparison with traditional projects (Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky 
2005). The findings of this study also support the claim, put forward by 
Domberger, Hall and Li (1995) that quality seems to be facilitated or even 
improved because of output formulation and the introduction of 
performance monitoring. However, the safeguarding of quality depends on 
the ability of the procurer to translate their expectations and to monitor and 
make adjustments in order to match what is provided with what is expected. 
Furthermore, the research findings support the suggestion that a necessary 
premise for safeguarding quality is that expectations are well articulated by 
the procurer and that performance indeed can be measured (Brown, 
Potoski and Van Slyke 2006, 326; Deakin and Walsh 1996).  
 
9.3.2 Conditions   
Section 2.4 in Chapter 2, summarized the conditions that were expected to 
have an influence, either negative or positive, on public values in 
organizational manifestations of the NPM. Some of the conditions listed in 
section 2.4 were indeed visible in this study too, although not always 
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pointing in the same direction. It is also true, and was demonstrated in 
section 2.4, that the same condition can have both a positive as well as a 
negative influence, depending on the specific facet of the public value under 
scrutiny. 
 Regarding the shortage of accountability mechanisms as suggested by, 
amongst others, Deakin and Walsh (1996) and Frederickson and Smith 
(2003), this study shows that during most preparation phases procurers and 
consortia do pay sufficient attention to the development of mechanisms for 
accountability. But the actual implementation and use of these mechanisms 
is not always effective at the start of the realization and operational phases, 
although it does improve over time. A shortage of mechanisms is therefore 
not apparent in this study; The problem is infrequent use of these 
mechanisms.  
 With respect to the lack of experience and knowledge of performance 
monitoring, the findings of this study indicate that there is such a lack, and 
that it hinders the safeguarding of certain values as was suggested by Peat 
and Costley (2001). However, the findings also demonstrate that during the 
project, the quality of performance monitoring by procurers as well as 
consortia can improve over time and that initial failures can be overcome. 
The study corroborates the suggestion by Domberger and Jensen (1997), 
that the actual quality of monitoring varies from project to project. 
Moreover, as they also suggest, despite irregularities, the presence of a 
monitoring system, and the obligation to measure performance, does seem 
to help the safeguarding of several values.  
 The findings of this study do indeed support the suggestion that due to 
the juridical, technical and financial complexity of the DBFMO model 
public values might be at stake (de Bettignies and Ross 2009; Savas 2000; 
Van Slyke and Hammonds 2003). For example, the case studies have shown 
that because of the complexity of contracting, the technical requirements 
and the financial mechanisms employed, procurers depend (in some cases) 
heavily on external advisors and this harms certain aspects of accountability. 
The complexity of the financial parameters also harms transparency, as was 
suggested by Hood, Fraser and McGarvey (2006) and Grimsey and Lewis 
(2002).  
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  The suggested difficulties in respect of the formulation of service 
expectations (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2006; Deakin and Walsh 1996), 
and the influence of those expectations on, for example, quality was indeed 
evident in this study given that, in most cases, discussions on the output 
norms arose. The output specifications, however, do not only contain 
difficult-to-establish norms but also contain some clear norms that are 
relatively easy to lay down and to establish. In that respect, the introduction 
of output specifications represents both a change and a challenge for public 
values.  
 A similar pattern is discernible in relation to the long-term character of 
DBFMO projects. As was suggested by Deakin and Walsh (1996), Hodge 
(2010) and Peters (1997), the long-term nature of the project hinders 
responsibility. At the same time, however, the long-term contract has also 
demonstrated that it facilitates certain aspects of transparency.  
 Finally, with respect to performance related pay, the findings indeed 
demonstrated that such a mechanism might facilitate, quality, for example, 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992). However, the findings also showed that the 
contribution of performance related pay is not by definition positive given 
that its effectiveness depends, amongst other things, on the way procurers 
use fines.  
 The conditions mentioned above, and discussed earlier in Chapter 2, 
were related to NPM, privatization and contracting, rather than to DBFMO 
specifically. For that reason, this study chose an inductive exploratory 
approach to find out what conditions influence the public values’ trajectory 
in DBFMO. As a result, a more detailed and specific overview of influential 
conditions for each value was possible and was discussed and summarized 
in Table 20 (Chapter 8). This table categorizes and summarizes the 
conditions relating to the DBFMO structure itself, to human resources and 
to project characteristics. Chapter 8 described in detail the way in which 
these conditions influence the public values’ trajectory. In general, the 
research findings demonstrate that several DBFMO-related conditions 
provide opportunities as well as challenges for the safeguarding of public 
values. Some of the DBFMO-related conditions have a positive and/or 
negative influence on more than one public value while other conditions 
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only influence one specific value. The actual influence of these conditions 
on the public values’ trajectory depends on conditions related to human 
resources and on project related conditions.  
 As regards the conditions relating to human resources, the findings 
demonstrated the need for improving the capacity of procurers as project 
and contract managers. The crucial role of contract and procurement 
management was also observed in a recent study on DBFMO projects 
carried out by the Dutch National Court of Audit.13 However, better 
management is a rather vague term and raises the question of what it means 
in DBFMO? More detailed examination of the second group of influential 
conditions offers various points for consideration.  
 The most prominent pointer is to the dependency of procurers on 
external advisors during the preparation phase. The findings demonstrate 
the need to develop human capital in terms of procurement management. 
DBFMO procurement requires new skills and knowledge that apparently, 
and perhaps understandably, is not yet sufficiently developed in all 
procuring organizations.  
 A second point for consideration comes from the actual relationship 
between the design and the implementation of such tools as the output 
specifications, the contract, monitoring and financial mechanisms. Whereas 
a good design is fundamental for the safeguarding of public values, its actual 
effectiveness is not guaranteed if the design is not followed up with proper 
use of the above tools throughout the different project phases. The 
safeguarding of public values is not solely determined at the start of the 
project when the coordinating mechanisms are developed. Rather, 
conditions related to the subsequent project phases have their influence on 
these mechanisms and this can be either positive or negative. Overall, the 
contract, output specifications, monitoring and financial mechanisms are by 
no means a guarantee that public values will be protected, given that both 
the design and the implementation of these components are often flawed. 
 A further point for consideration is the transition from one phase to 
another, a potential weak spot in the DBFMO process. This transition 
                                                            
13 Algemene Rekenkamer. Contractmanagement bij DBFMO-projecten. Tweede Kamer, 
vergaderjaar 2012-2013, 33639, nr. 1.  
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requires proper guidance in the sense that those responsible for the 
management of the contract during the build and operational phases must 
have the skills and knowledge necessary to see the project through to a 
successful conclusion. When such guidance is absent, the effectiveness of 
even carefully designed mechanisms can be threatened. In that respect, 
information management is crucial. Given the long-term character of this 
style of contracting and the division of the project into several phases, 
continuity of personnel and resources cannot be taken for granted. Proper 
information management can mitigate such a lack of continuity. 
 A fourth and final point is the importance of building a good 
relationship between the procurer and consortium as well as between 
consortium members. Although the success of their relationship might 
already largely depend on the quality of the contract in which the 
parameters for cooperation are determined, the case studies demonstrate 
that a pro-active and cooperative working attitude from both sides 
positively influences the public values’ trajectory. The cases also 
demonstrate the importance of the internal organization of the consortium 
with respect to the public values’ trajectory. When there is no real 
institutionalized interdependency between consortium partners, the 
safeguarding of specific public values can be at risk.  
 The third column of Table 20 sets out project-related conditions. 
Concerning the type of product, the case comparison provides indications 
that quality seems better protected in infrastructure projects than in projects 
involving buildings which house public services or utilities, especially as the 
operational process in the latter is often more complex and more exposed 
to user perception. However, it would be unfair to conclude that the project 
type itself determines what happens to public values. Indeed, although 
infrastructure projects might be less challenging in terms of protecting 
quality, this advantage can peter out completely if, for example, contract 
management is poor. This again underlines the interconnection between the 
contents of all three categories of conditions.  
 Taking reputation building as an influential condition, it was suggested 
that since all four projects were part of a pilot program which provided 
procurers and consortia with the opportunity to acquire a strong reputation 
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for DBFMO procurement, then this could have been a positive stimulus for 
maintaining public values. However, as was also suggested in the case 
studies, when DBFMO procurement becomes common, this effect might 
evanesce.  
 Finally, as with any other type of contract, a relationship between budget 
and, for example, quality is a plausible one. Ideally, procurers should be able 
to anticipate what quality will be delivered in return for their investment. 
With DBFMO this implies that procurers should be able to estimate 
whether what the consortium is offering is a realistic return for investment. 
If such estimation were possible, disappointment with the quality delivered 
might be avoided. However, given the lack of information on costs and 
margins, it remains questionable whether such advance knowledge of the 
quality of the finished product can ever be available. 
 
9.4 Implications for practice 
This study provides valuable insight on the actual practice of DBFMO 
projects in terms of public values. Empirical insight into the question of 
what happens to public values in DBFMO projects and what conditions are 
of influence provides practitioners with opportunities for optimization.  
 The findings suggest that procurers should be aware of the limitations of 
the DBFMO structure as well as of repercussions from human resources 
issues. In an ideal world, the coordinating mechanisms are designed, 
implemented and used in such a way that they do help to uphold public 
values. However, it is questionable whether it is realistic to expect such an 
optimal relationship between mechanisms and behavior, given the lack of 
resources when it comes to human capital, time, and money. Overall, it is 
important for procurers to be aware that the contract, output specifications, 
monitoring and financial mechanisms are by no means a guarantee that 
public values will be protected, since the design and implementation of 
these components is often flawed. Practitioners should be aware that what 
happens to public values in DBFMO is the outcome of a complex 
interaction of different conditions and that the process of DBFMO 
challenges procurers to search constantly for an optimal equilibrium 
amongst those conditions.  
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 In this constant search for equilibrium, procurers should not focus solely 
on the preparation of the coordination mechanisms but should oversee the 
entire project, including the construction and operation. The findings 
demonstrate that often the two later phases are more or less taken for 
granted. And it is not sufficient to give equal attention to all three phases at 
the outset: Rather, attention is also needed during the construction and 
operational phases. In the same vein, rather than only evaluating the 
procurement and construction phases, procurers should show equal interest 
in the evaluation of the operational phase, since the coordination 
mechanisms that help the procurer to safeguard public values are put into 
practice and challenged for many years in that specific phase. Safeguarding 
public values requires constant attention from the procurer throughout all 
project phases and DBFMO is by no means a model that allows for the 
procurer simply to sit back and wait for results. For that reason, it is 
recommended that every effort is made to retain core personnel who are 
involved in all three project phases and who can diffuse knowledge of the 
project throughout the organization.  
 If DBFMO is here to stay, and politicians and public servants are 
concerned with safeguarding public values, it is advisable to invest seriously 
in human capital to improve contracting skills and procurement 
management. The cases show that dependency on external advisors and the 
lack of experience and knowledge of contract management creates 
problems with delivery which are not helped by the inconsistent application 
of fines nor by shortcomings in financial monitoring, themselves products 
of inexperience. All of that hinders the safeguarding of public values. As 
was also observed by the Dutch National Court of Audit, the suboptimal 
implementation of these mechanisms leaves the procurer in doubt as to 
whether DBFMO does in fact provide financial advantage.14 
 To those in public policy and to practitioners concerned with whether 
DBFMO allows for the safeguarding of public values, it is clear from this 
study that it does. But while the structure can protect public values, there is 
                                                            
14 Algemene Rekenkamer. Contractmanagement bij DBFMO-projecten. Tweede Kamer, 
vergaderjaar 2012-2013, 33639, nr. 1.  
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no guarantee that it will. And in establishing what determines the extent to 
which public values will be safeguarded, Table 20 provides valuable insight. 
If procurers take into account the relationship between those groups of 
influential conditions while they are preparing and managing DBFMO 
projects, the chances are that public values will be protected. A one-
dimensional perspective on the project that only considers the DBFMO 
structure itself, does scant justice to the safeguarding of public values.  
 A final, but important, remark that should be made is that it is an illusion 
to think that the values under scrutiny in this study will ever be safeguarded 
to any full extent. Public values compete with each other and public 
managers are often obliged to make value trade-offs (De Graaf et al. 2011; 
Steenhuisen 2009). However, this challenge is not restricted to DBFMO 
projects alone but manifests itself throughout the public sector and within 
different organizational structures. Thus, procurement according to 
DBFMO principles can be considered as a medicine with insurmountable 
side-effects.  
 
9.5 Future research 
In this study, public values have been considered throughout the different 
project phases. Considering values over time allows for a more nuanced 
picture of how each value fares within the life span of a project, and the 
answer to the central question of what happens to public values in DBFMO 
will be different at different times in the life cycle of the project. This 
suggests the need for further research since the cases included in this study 
have only been operational for a few years. In order to arrive at a fuller 
understanding of the impact of DBFMO on public values, these projects 
should be evaluated over the full contract period.  
 Something else that is relevant for future research is the inevitable 
selection of only a few public values as a basis for this study. Although 
accountability, transparency, responsiveness, responsibility and quality cover 
a relevant part of spectrum as described in the public values literature, they 
are not the only values. The same body of literature, as well as literature on 
good governance and the integrity of governance, consider other values to 
be important too. Insight on how different values are threatened, 
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safeguarded or strengthened in DBFMO would put the findings of this 
specific study into perspective and might indicate whether the relationship 
between conditions and values found here is generalizable for other public 
values.  
 In addition, since this study focuses only on Dutch DBFMO projects, 
additional empirical research is needed to establish whether its findings hold 
for DBFMO projects in other countries. A comparison of international 
cases that include different sectors and different products would provide a 
better understanding and enable broader interpretation of these findings 
and will unravel the similarities, differences, and particularities within and 
between cases. This current study, one of the first to address public values 
in DBFMO, provides a valuable touchstone for such comparison. 
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Samenvatting 
Titel: De impact van publiek-private samenwerking op publieke waarden.  
Introductie 
Het kabinet Rutte II kondigde op 29 oktober 2012 aan publiek-private 
samenwerking (PPS) voor de realisatie van publieke dienstverlening en 
infrastructuur te blijven stimuleren.15 PPS projecten zijn ook wel bekend 
onder de naam Design-Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate (DBFMO). DBFMO is 
een vorm van aanbesteding waarbij een publieke opdrachtgever de 
verantwoordelijkheid voor het ontwerp, de constructie, financiering, het 
onderhoud en de exploitatie van publieke infrastructuur en dienstverlening 
overdraagt aan een privaat consortium via een langdurig prestatiecontract. 
 Hoewel verschillende Angelsaksische landen reeds ervaring met 
DBFMO (of soortgelijke vormen van aanbesteding) opdeden in de jaren 
‘80, deed DBFMO pas zijn intrede in Nederland halverwege de jaren ’90. 
Onder invloed van het opkomende New Public Management (NPM) dat 
een zakelijker, kleiner en meer bedrijfsmatig openbaar bestuur voorschrijft, 
zijn ook Nederlandse overheden op zoek gegaan naar alternatieve 
organisatievorming zoals privatisering, outsourcing en DBFMO middels 
welke publieke diensten en producten efficiënter gerealiseerd kunnen 
worden. Gezien het feit dat de overheid zich in DBFMO terugtrekt als 
uitvoerder en daarmee de markt kansen biedt om op een efficiëntere en 
effectievere manier producten en diensten aan te bieden, lijkt DBFMO op 
het oog inderdaad een organisatievorm welke de overheid in staat stelt winst 
te behalen in termen van kostenefficiëncy.   
 Om de prestaties van het consortium te coördineren en controleren, 
maakt de opdrachtgever gebruik van outputspecificaties waarin wordt 
aangegeven aan welke eisen de geleverde producten en diensten moeten 
voldoen. Deze specificaties geven in theorie enkel aan wat de opdrachtgever 
verwacht en laten buiten beschouwing hoe het consortium hier invulling aan 
geeft. Gedurende de bouw en exploitatie worden de prestaties van het 
                                                            
15 Regeerakkoord VVD-PvdA. Bruggen slaan. 29-10-2012. 
 
198 
 
consortium gemonitord door zowel het consortium als de opdrachtgever. 
Wanneer de monitoringrapportages een discrepantie tussen het gevraagde 
en het geleverde aantonen, kan de opdrachtgever het consortium een boete 
opleggen wat betekent dat de beschikbaarheidsvergoeding die het 
consortium ontvangt voor zijn prestaties, lager uit zal vallen. Gezien het feit 
dat het consortium het project zelf financiert, resulteert het opleggen van 
boetes tot een verbetering van de prestaties. In theorie vormen het contract, 
de outputspecificaties, de monitoringactiviteiten en de prestatieafhankelijke 
vergoeding een waterdicht systeem dat de opdrachtgever in staat stelt om de 
werkzaamheden van het consortium te coördineren en te controleren.
   
Publieke waarden in het geding?  
Hoewel veel studies naar DBFMO zich richten op de vraag of DBFMO 
inderdaad tot efficiëncywinst leidt, roept deze nieuwe vorm van 
aanbesteding ook vragen op ten aanzien van de waarborging van andere 
publieke waarden. Niet zelden wordt verondersteld dat de nadruk op 
efficiency in de publieke sector de waarborging van bijvoorbeeld 
verantwoording, transparantie, responsiviteit, verantwoordelijkheid en 
kwaliteit in het geding brengt. Deze veronderstelling wordt echter in twijfel 
getrokken door verscheidene auteurs die betogen dat een meer zakelijke 
aanpak weldegelijk of zelfs meer recht doet aan de waarborging van 
publieke waarden.  
 Wanneer we de wetenschappelijke discussie ten aanzien van de 
waarborging van publieke waarden in relatie tot NPM overzien, valt ten 
eerste op dat een eenduidig en degelijk empirisch onderlegd antwoord op de 
vraag of publieke waarden al dan niet in het geding zijn ontbreekt. 
Daarnaast is het wetenschappelijk debat weinig specifiek in de zin dat er 
weinig oog is voor de verschillen tussen DBFMO, privatisering en 
outsourcing. Gezien de significante verschillen tussen deze drie 
organisatievormen zou het wetenschappelijke debat blijk moeten geven van 
deze nuance: wat opgaat voor privatisering hoeft immers niet te gelden voor 
DBFMO of omgekeerd. Bovendien, het geringe aantal empirische studies 
richt zich vooral op privatisering en outsourcing waarbij DBFMO 
verrassend genoeg onderbelicht blijft.  
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Empirisch onderzoek  
Het gebrek aan empirisch inzicht ten aanzien van de vraag of publieke 
waarden al dan niet worden gewaarborgd in DBFMO, vormt het startpunt 
van deze studie. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: Wat gebeurt er met publieke 
waarden in publiek-private samenwerking en welke condities zijn hierop van invloed? De 
zinsnede ‘wat gebeurt er met publieke waarden’ verwijst naar het in de 
literatuur veronderstelde effect van een zakelijker openbaar bestuur op de 
waarborging van publieke waarden waarbij deze (1) teloor kunnen gaan, (2) 
in acht worden genomen of (3) zelfs versterkt worden. De zinsnede ‘welke 
condities zijn van invloed’ verwijst naar de omstandigheden die de 
levensloop van publieke waarden binnen DBFMO beïnvloeden.  
 De publieke waarden die in dit onderzoek centraal staan, zijn 
respectievelijk verantwoording, transparantie, responsiviteit, dienstbaarheid 
en kwaliteit. Tabel 1 geeft weer hoe deze waarden geoperationaliseerd zijn 
in deze studie.  
 
Tabel 1. Operationalisatie van de geselecteerde waarden 
Waarde Definitie 
Verantwoording De mate waarin de opdrachtgever in staat is om verantwoording af te 
leggen over (1) de inhoud van het project in financiële, juridische en 
technische zin en (2) over de uiteindelijke prestaties van het consortium 
gedurende de realisatie- en exploitatiefase.  
Transparantie De aanwezigheid en juistheid van juridische, financiële, technische en 
operationele projectinformatie.  
Responsiviteit De mogelijkheid voor gekozen bestuurders en ambtenaren om de 
contractuele afspraken en outputspecificaties te kunnen bepalen, 
beïnvloeden en aanpassen voor en na het sluiten van het contract.  
Verantwoordelijkheid De mate waarin het consortium afspraken volgens het contract en de 
outputspecificaties nakomt.  
Kwaliteit De mate van tevredenheid van de opdrachtgever in relatie tot de 
geleverde infrastructuur en de dienstverlening. 
 
De levensloop van deze vijf waarden is bestudeerd middels een viervoudige 
casestudie. DBFMO projecten zijn in te delen in grofweg drie fasen: een 
voorbereidende fase waarin het contract en de outputspecificaties worden 
geformuleerd, de realisatiefase waarin de infrastructuur wordt gerealiseerd, 
en een exploitatiefase waarbij de infrastructuur daadwerkelijk in gebruik 
wordt genomen en diensten worden verleend. Om een volledig beeld te 
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vormen van de levensloop van de geselecteerde waarden is het van belang 
deze gedurende de verschillende projectfasen te beschouwen. De vier 
geselecteerde DBFMO projecten voldeden dan ook allen aan het vereiste 
reeds in de exploitatiefase te zijn. Tabel 2 geeft de kenmerken van de 
geselecteerde cases weer.  
 
Tabel 2. Kenmerken casus  
 Snelweg Detentiecentrum Waterzuivering Ministerie  
Pr
od
uc
t Constructie, 
onderhoud 
snelweg 
Constructie, 
onderhoud, 
exploitatie 
detentiecentrum 
Constructie, renovatie, 
exploitatie 
waterzuiveringsinstallatie  
 
Renovatie, 
exploitatie 
Ministerie van 
Financiën  
Se
ct
or
 Infrastructuur  Utiliteitsbouw Infrastructuur Utiliteitsbouw 
O
pd
ra
ch
tg
ev
er
 Rijkswaterstaat 
(RWS) 
 
 
 
 
Rijksgebouwen- 
dienst 
(RGD) 
Hoogheemraadschap 
Delfland 
Rijksgebouwen-
dienst  
(RGD) 
Kl
an
t Rijkswaterstaat 
divisie 
Friesland 
Ministerie van 
Veiligheid en 
Justitie 
Hoogheemraadschap 
Delfland 
Ministerie van 
Financiën  
 
 
Een documentstudie waarbij projectgerelateerde documenten, zoals 
basiscontracten, externe en interne evaluaties vormden het startpunt voor 
de data verzameling. Daarnaast zijn in totaal 69 semi-gestructureerde 
interviews met 66 betrokkenen afgenomen. Tijdens de interviews is gebruik 
gemaakt van een topiclijst (Appendix I). Vanwege privacyredenen is er voor 
gekozen de namen en de functies van de respondenten niet weer te geven in 
de resultatensectie. Tabel 3 geeft aan hoeveel ambtenaren, consortiumleden 
of externen geïnterviewd zijn per project.  
 
Tabel 3: Overzicht respondenten per casus  
Snelweg Detentiecentrum Waterzuivering Ministerie 
Overheid: 12 
Consortium: 5 
Extern: 1 
Totaal: 18 
Overheid: 9 
Consortium: 2 
Extern: 0 
Totaal: 11 
Overheid: 4 
Consortium: 5 
Extern: 3 
Totaal: 12 
Overheid: 10 
Consortium: 8 
Extern: 7 
Totaal: 25 
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De dataverzameling leverde in totaal 870 pagina’s aan documenten op en 
230 pagina’s (238.000 woorden) aan interviewmateriaal. De data is per casus 
geanalyseerd door middel van codering. Na de analyse per casus zijn de vier 
casus met elkaar vergeleken. 
 
Bevindingen en conclusie 
Ten aanzien van de vraag of publieke waarden worden gewaarborgd, 
versterkt of bedreigd, toont de vergelijkende casestudie aan dat deze vraag 
niet beantwoord kan worden met een simpel ja of nee. Het antwoord op 
deze vraag verschilt per waarde, waarde aspect, projectfase en project. In 
relatie tot de tegengestelde assumpties in literatuur, betekent deze uitkomst 
dat beide kampen, dat wil zeggen, zij die een negatieve dan wel een positieve 
invloed van DBFMO op de waarborging van publieke waarden verwachten, 
slechts gedeeltelijk gelijk hebben: de ambiguïteit van de publieke waarden 
literatuur reflecteert daarmee de empirische bevindingen.  
 Wat betreft de vraag welke condities van invloed zijn op de levensloop 
van de verschillende publieke waarden, kan op basis van de casestudies 
geconcludeerd worden dat (1) DBFMO gerelateerde, (2) Human Resources 
gerelateerde alsmede (3) projectgerelateerde condities een positieve dan wel 
negatieve invloed uitoefenen op de waarborging van publieke waarden, en 
dat hun daadwerkelijke invloed afhankelijk is van de onderlinge dynamiek 
tussen deze condities (zie Tabel 4).  
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Tabel 4: Categorisering van condities die van invloed zijn per waarde  
 DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF 
Ve
ra
nt
w
oo
rd
in
g 
-Contract 
-Opdrachtgever in 
beperkte mate 
afhankelijk van externe 
adviseurs  
-Projectvoorbereiding 
 
-Financiële complexiteit  
-Lange termijn karakter project  
-Verkeerde implementatie 
monitoringmechanismen  
 
-Externe adviseurs  
-Samenwerking 
opdrachtgever en 
consortium gedurende 
voorbereidingsfase  
-Scholing contract 
managementteamleden  
 
-Beperkt aantal 
betrokkenen 
voorbereidingsfase  
-Opdrachtgever afhankelijk 
van externe adviseurs 
-Personele veranderingen 
per fase  
-Tekort aan begeleiding 
overgangsfases  
-Tekort aan begrip 
financiële, juridische en 
technische project- 
informatie 
-Tekort aan ervaring 
contractmanagement  
-Tekort aan informatie- 
uitwisseling  
-Tekort aan kennis 
contractmanagement  
-Tekort aan kennis project- 
voorbereiding 
-Tekort aan prestatie- 
monitoring  
-Uitstroom personeel  
 
 
-Pilot project  
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DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF 
T
ra
ns
pa
ra
nt
ie
 
-Contract 
-Externalisatie  
-Integraal contract  
-Integrale prestatie- 
monitoring  
-Lange termijn contract  
-Lange termijn planning 
financiën  
-Monitoring  
-Outputspecificaties  
-Project voorbereiding  
-Samenhang output 
specificaties en financieel 
mechanisme  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Ambiguïteit van contract  
-Ambiguïteit van output 
specificaties  
-Incompleet contract  
-Lange termijn planning 
financiën  
-Outputspecificaties  
-Subjectiviteit monitoring 
rapporten  
-Te veel aan informatie 
 -Late start ontwerp 
monitoringmechanisme 
-Suboptmiaal 
gebruikmaking monitoring- 
mechanisme 
-Tekort aan aandacht voor 
monitoring in 
voorbereidingsfase  
-Tekort aan ervaring 
formulering output 
specificaties  
-Tekort aan kennis 
financiële projectaspecten  
-Verkeerde implementatie 
monitoringmechanisme  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Kwantitatieve 
output normen 
-Reputatie  
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DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF 
R
es
po
ns
iv
ite
it 
-Contractuele clausules die 
ingrijpen/overname toestaan 
-Invloed met betrekking tot 
formulering output 
specificaties en contract  
-Ruimte voor contractuele 
verandering 
-Uitsluiten van essentiële 
taken in contract 
-Doelverschuiving  
-Lange termijn contract  
-Lange termijn planning 
financiën  
-Tijdrovende 
implementatie 
contractuele wijzigingen  
 
-Opdrachtgever in 
beperkte mate 
afhankelijk van externe 
adviseurs  
-Samenwerking 
opdrachtgever en 
externe adviseurs 
voorbereidingsfase  
 
-Opdrachtgever afhankelijk 
van externe adviseurs 
-Tekort aan ervaring 
formulering output- 
specificaties  
 
  
Ve
ra
nt
w
oo
rd
el
ijk
he
id
 
-Contract 
-Interface overeenkomst 
-Outputspecificaties  
-Risicosessies 
-Ambiguïteit van contract  
-Ambiguïteit van output 
specificaties  
-Ambiguïteit van risico 
verdeling 
-Demarcatie consortium  
 
-Constructieve 
communicatie tussen 
opdrachtgever en 
consortium 
-Coöperatieve houding 
opdrachtgever 
-Welwillendheid 
opdrachtgever en 
consortium  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Gebrek aan ervaring 
integraal project 
management consortium  
-Gebrek aan samenwerking 
consortium  
-Onbereidwillig 
consortium 
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DBFMO HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECT 
POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF POSITIEF NEGATIEF 
Kw
al
ite
it 
-Contract 
-Financiële prikkels 
-Heldere scope 
-Hogere normen 
-Integraal contract  
-Lange termijn verbintenis  
-Outputspecificaties 
-Ambiguïteit output 
specificaties  
-Niet accurate berekening 
boetes  
-Integraal contract 
-Nadruk op kwaliteit in 
output specificaties  
-Vroege voorbereiding 
exploitatie fase  
 
-Gebrek aan aandacht voor 
exploitatie in 
voorbereidingsfase  
-Inaccurate berekening 
boetes  
-Inconsistente toepassing 
boetes  
-Onbereidwilligheid 
consortium  
-Kwantitatieve 
output normen 
-Reputatie 
-Budget 
-Technische 
problemen 
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Appendix I Documents  
 
PPPs in General 
Voortgangsrapportage PPS 2004. Van incidenteel naar structureel. Available 
through: www.ppsbijhetrijk.nl (date of access 21-5-2013). 
 
Voortgangsrapportage PPS 2007 en vooruitblik 2008. Samen werken aan 
meerwaarde. Available through: www.rijksoverheid.nl (date of access 21-5-
2013). 
 
RGD. Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer. 
Verslag congres. PPS: ervaringen met rijkshuisvesting (2008) (not public). 
 
Rijkswaterstaat. Rijksbrede modelovereenkomst DBFM infrastructuur (2012). 
Available through: www.ppsbijhetrijk.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Rijksgebouwendienst. Rijksbrede modelovereenkomst DBFMO huisvesting 
(2012). Available through: www.ppsbijhetrijk.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
The Highway 
Buck Consultants International. Evaluatie DBFM Rijksweg 31 (2004). 
Available through: www.pianoo.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Rijswaterstaat. DBFM-N31. Tussentijdse procesevaluatie realisatiefase. 
Available through: www.pianoo.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
The Detention Center 
VROM. RGD. Inputsepcificaties PPS DC Rdam Airport (2007) (not public). 
 
VROM. RGD. Leidraad aanbesteding. PPS Detentiecentrum Rotterdam 
Airport (2006) (not public). 
 
VROM. RGD. Leidraad dialoog. PPS Detentiecentrum Rotterdam Airport 
(2007) (not public). 
 
Toelichting Monitoring en Betalingsmechanisme PPS Detentiecentrum 
Rotterdam Airport (not public). 
 
Ministerie van Financiën. De toepassing van Publiek Private Samenwerking op 
een Nederlandse gevangenis. Een verkennende argumentatie (2003). Available 
through: www.ppsnetwerk.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
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PowerPoint presentations provided by respondents (not public). 
 
Inspectie voor de Sanctietoepassing. Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie. 
Detentiecentrum Rotterdam. Inspectierapport doorlichting (2012). Available 
through: www.ist.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Copies of the Output specifications provided by respondents (2012) (not 
public). 
 
The Wastewater Project 
CBP. Calamiteiten bestrijdingsplan. Uitval afvalwaterzuivering. Available 
through: www.hhdelfland.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Boer&Croon. Delfland-Delfluent Discussiedocument analyse DBFO-contract. 
Available through: www.hhdelfland.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland. Samenvatting analyserapportages DBFMO 
Contract Delfland-Delfluent (2001). Available through: www.hhdelfland.nl 
(date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland. Werken aan en op de Harnaschpolder 
(2007) (not public). 
 
RIVM. Gezondheidsklachten bij RWZI Harnaschpolder (2007). Available 
through: www.rivm.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
Unie van Waterschappen. Bedrijfsvergelijking Zuiverningsbeheer (2009). 
Available through: www.hhdelfland.nl (date of access 11-07-2012). 
 
Hoogheemraadschap van Delfland. Onze behoefte: weg naar schoon water 
(2006)(not public). 
 
Project evaluations and reportages consortium (not public). 
 
PowerPoint presentations provided by respondents (not public). 
 
The Ministry of Finance 
RGD. Ministerie van Financiën. Evaluatie van het gebruik van een digitaal 
model voor de Outputspecificatie en het Verificatiemodel. Project PPS 
Renovatie Financiën (2007). Available through: www.psibouw.nl (date of 
access 29-6-2012). 
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Ministerie van Financiën. Projectdirectie Eigentijds Werken. Evaluatierapport 
Europese aanbesteding PPS renovatie Financiën (2006). Available through: 
www.rijksoverheid.nl (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
VROM. RGD. SMAAK. Blad voor de Rijkshuisvesting (2009). Available 
through: www.issuu.com (date of access 29-6-2012). 
 
PowerPoint presentations provided by respondents (not public).  
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Appendix II Topic list 
 
Introduction study  
Role of respondent in project  
Accountability  
 Preparation phase 
 Construction phase 
 Operation phase  
Transparency  
 Preparation phase 
 Construction phase 
 Operation phase  
Responsiveness 
 Preparation phase 
 Construction phase 
 Operation phase  
Responsibility  
 Preparation phase 
 Construction phase 
 Operation phase  
Quality  
 Preparation phase 
 Construction phase 
 Operation phase  
Final comments 
Suggestions for documents 
Suggestions for new interviewees  
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